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The Moralisation of Eating  
Thea Sofie Schei 
Morality, food and eating have been associated for centuries. However, little is known about 
the extent and impact of this association on how people relate to food and eating today. This 
thesis explores three questions in seven studies. The first question is: ‘Do people compensate morally 
for unhealthy eating behaviours?’. Moral compensation is the tendency for people to carry out an act 
perceived as ‘good’ following an act perceived as ‘bad’. Chapter 3 and 4 address this question 
by measuring whether chocolate consumption is associated with moral judgements (Study 1), 
and investigating whether recalling an overeating episode makes people more likely to act 
prosocially (Study 2). The results reveal first, an association between eating behaviour and 
moral judgement such that the more chocolate people eat, the less harsh their moral 
judgements, and second, that those recalling an overeating (vs neutral) event were later more 
prosocial.  
The second question is: ‘How prevalent is the tendency to associate morality with eating and food?’. 
Chapter 5 addresses this question by measuring the extent to which moral concepts are used to 
advertise food in women’s magazines (Study 3). The results show that a third of food adverts 
use moralising concepts, a pattern that has remained stable over the last fifteen years.  
The third question is: ‘What is the impact on self-reported desire and observed behaviour of associating moral 
terms with food?’. Chapter 6 presents experiments assessing whether moral labels on unhealthy 
and healthier food impact participants’ desire to consume the food (Study 4), actual 
consumption of the food (Study 5) and selection of the food (Study 6). An internal meta-analysis 
of the three studies demonstrates that moral labelling has no effect on self-reported desire for 
food. However, in terms of the observed behavioural measures (selection and consumption), 
the results follow a pattern of congruency: moral labels increase behaviour (selection and 
consumption) towards healthy food and immoral labels increase behaviour towards unhealthy 
food.  
Taken together, the findings indicate that the moralisation of eating has several consequences. 
First, people’s unhealthy eating behaviour is associated with moral judgement and later moral 
compensation. Second, eating and food are associated with morality in about a third of food 
advertisements in women’s magazines. Third, this association impacts self-reported desire and 
behaviour towards the morally labelled food: when a food has a moral label congruent with its 
healthiness, people are more likely to select and consume it.   
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1.1 Rationale 
There is a long and significant link between morality and eating. In the Christian tradition, 
eating too much gained the status of a deadly sin, and most religions have clear rules often 
relating food to sanctity. Today, many individuals report struggling with their relationship with 
food and experience negative, often moral emotions such as guilt or shame after a meal. 
Furthermore, many diets use moral language, and food companies often sell their products 
using moral imagery. Despite this, very little research has been carried out on how this link 
might affect people’s relationship with food. Because of the lack of research, this thesis asks 
three questions as a starting point for investigation: First, if unhealthy eating is considered 
immoral, does it have similar consequences to other immoral actions? There is a tendency for 
people to morally compensate for their transgressions. That is, people have a tendency to carry 
out an act perceived as ‘good’ following an act perceived as ‘bad’. Thus, when people eat 
unhealthily, does moral compensation follow?  Second, to what extent is morality associated 
with eating and food? Third, when morality is explicitly associated with food, through food 
labels bearing moral words, how does this affect the way people think about and engage with 
the food?  
 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
The overarching aim of the thesis is to examine the consequences of the moralisation of eating. 
This aim is addressed by three research questions: 
 
1. Do people compensate morally for unhealthy eating behaviours? (Chapters 3 and 4); 
2. How prevalent is the tendency to associate morality with eating and food? (Chapter 5); 
3. What is the impact on self-reported desire and observed behaviour of associating moral 
terms with food? (Chapter 6).  
 
1.3 Background to the thesis 
Chapter 2 establishes the background to the thesis aims and objectives. It starts by introducing 
what is meant by morality alongside how people might make moral judgements and decision. 
It continues with an overview of the process of moralisation, whilst presenting the historical 
evidence of a link between morality, food and the body. Then, research on morality and eating 
is examined before discussing what potential consequences might arise from this link. Finally, 
the research aims and objectives are set forth.  
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1.4 Do people compensate morally for unhealthy eating behaviours? 
Chapters 3 and 4 present Study 1 and 2 respectively which both test the relationship between 
unhealthy eating behaviours and changes in moral judgement and behaviour. Study 1 is a 
laboratory-based correlational study testing the relationship between chocolate consumption 
and moral judgement of others’ wrongdoings. Study 2 is a laboratory-based experiment testing 
whether recalling past overconsumption leads to increased helping behaviour. 
 
1.5 How prevalent is the tendency to associate morality with eating and food? 
Chapter 5 presents Study 3 which explores the use of moral concepts in food advertising in 
women’s magazines in the UK over a 15-year period. Advertisements from the June editions 
from 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 were sampled to assess whether there has been a change in 
the frequency of moral concepts used in food advertising over this period.  
 
1.6 What is the impact on self-reported desire and observed behaviour of 
associating moral terms with food? 
Chapter 6 presents Studies 4, 5, 6 and 7, which examine the effects of moral labels (‘Angelic’ 
vs. ‘Devilish’) on the desire, selection and consumption of food products depending on 
healthiness (cereal bar vs. chocolate bar). Study 4 is an online experiment assessing whether 
moral labels affect self-reported desire for cereal bars and chocolate bars. Study 5 is a 
laboratory-based experiment and follows from the results of Study 4 by investigating whether 
the moral labels differently impact self-reported desire and observed consumption of cereal and 
chocolate bars. Study 6 is a field-based experiment testing if moral labels impact participants’ 
observed selection of cereal bars and chocolate bars. Study 7 is an internal meta-analysis of the 
effect of moral labels on self-reported desire to consume (Study 4 and 5) and observed behaviour 
(selection and consumption; Study 5 and 6). 
 
1.7 Discussion and conclusions 
Finally, in Chapter 7 the results of the present studies are integrated into a discussion of the 
historical and contemporary research context of the moralisation of eating, together with a 
summary of the implications of the present results for further research.  
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Summary 
This chapter presents the background to the topic of this thesis, by reviewing both the historical 
and cultural context of morality and food, as well as summarising relevant research literatures. 
The chapter starts by examining the definition of morality and how people might make moral 
judgements and decisions. This is then followed by a discussion of how a neutral concept such 
as food might become moralised before investigating how the process of moralisation pertains 
to views and ideas about the body, food and eating. An overview of the research evidence on 
morality and eating is then reviewed before discussing some possible consequences of this 
moralisation. Finally, the aims of the thesis are presented alongside an overview of each study 
that follows.  
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It is said that sin entered the world through the appetite of a woman. If we are to believe 
Christian mythology, Eve could have eaten anything she wanted, but she wanted the forbidden 
apple. She gave in to temptation and the world fell in to disarray. This thesis is about the 
moralisation of eating. Specifically, the moralisation of eating healthily or unhealthily. Despite 
a long and significant history associating morality and food, surprisingly little is known about 
how this link influences how people think about and behave with food. In this chapter, I start 
by introducing the current thinking around morality in psychology today. Then I will discuss 
what moralisation is and how and why it might occur. Finally, I will examine the evidence for 
the moralisation of eating and the potential consequences of this moralisation. This is achieved 
through an initial review of their interrelationships prior to discussing the modern conceptions 
of both morality and eating behaviours and their relevance in the current day. 
 
2.1 Morality 
Studies of morality are historically divided into two camps (Gert, 2016). There is normative 
morality on one side, which concerns the study of what, if anything, should be moral and would 
be accepted by all rational agents. Answers to this question have traditionally been sought by 
philosophers and theologians (Sayre-McCord, 2010). Psychologists, on the other hand, have 
been largely occupied with descriptive morality. That is, what do people either individually or 
in certain groups consider to be moral? Early psychologists were concerned with how adults 
reason about morality (Kohlberg, 1971) and how this changes throughout childhood 
development (Piaget, 1932). Kohlberg in particular argued for a singular morality, namely that 
of justice. However, subsequent research by his graduate students, expanded the moral realm 
to include care and harm concerns (Gilligan, 1982; Turiel, 1983). By interviewing women, and 
not only men as Kohlberg had, Gilligan established that for many morality also incorporated 
ideas of care, intimacy and interpersonal responsibility. Further increasing the search in scope, 
Shweder and colleagues looked at moral conceptions across cultures (1984; 1993; 1997). They 
argued that notions of community and divinity/sanctity, not just autonomy (care, harm and 
justice), were important moral concepts in many non-Western societies. The ethics of 
community included concepts such as duty, interdependence and hierarchy. Divinity/sanctity 
on the other hand, included ideas of pollution, sin, sacred order, natural order and tradition. 
Integrating this work, as well as research carried out by others (e.g. Brown, 1991; de Waal, 
1996; Fiske, 1991; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), Haidt and Joseph (2004) presented their moral 
foundations theory and what they considered to be the five (subsequently six) most common 
moral concerns: care/harm, fairness/cheating, ingroup/loyalty, authority/subversion and 
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purity/sanctity. Haidt (2012) later argued for a sixth moral foundation related to 
liberty/oppression. Overall, what this prior research showed is that what people understand as 
moral is multifaceted and varies from group to group. The next section will present one 
theorised aspect of why these six concerns might be moralised.  
 
Haidt and Joseph (2004; 2007) theorise that these foundations are the result of innate brain 
modules that amplify the likelihood of certain concerns becoming moralised. As is the crux of 
most evolutionary speculation, they argue that the groups who moralised these entities were 
more likely to successfully reproduce. This evolved preparedness would be the same as a fear 
of heights (DeLoache & LeBue, 2009), which would be a useful thing for someone to easily 
develop as it would minimise falling off a cliff or down from a tree. As such, aspects of the moral 
foundations, such as cooperation, respect for authority or punishing cheaters, in many ways 
facilitate societal living and thereby increase the chances of reproductive success. To explain 
why different cultures and societies may have different patterns of moralised entities, Haidt 
(2012) uses the metaphor of a stereo equaliser– everyone has the same buttons but the music 
they make depends on how culture presses the buttons. However, the study of morality is not 
just about the entities that people consider moral, but extends out to how individuals are 
thinking about morality and how they are making moral decisions. The next sections introduce 
two seemingly contrasting approaches to moral judgement and decision: reasoning and 
emotion.   
 
A new view of moral cognition was re-introduced from the ideas of Hume (1777) in parallel to 
the expansion of a previously narrowly defined concept of morality. In comparison to previous 
decades (e.g. Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Kohlberg, 1971; Peterson & Beach, 1967), where 
reasoning and rationality had taken centre stage, the intuitionist/affective view argued that 
people arrive at their moral judgements through an affective appraisal (Haidt, 2001). This view 
was part of a larger affective or ‘irrational’ shift within psychology. First, Schacther and Singer 
(1962) demonstrated that affective arousal can be misattributed to the situation, depending on 
whether the person has an immediate explanation for the arousal. Then, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) challenged the idea of people’s rationality by pointing out a series of biases 
they display and heuristics that are present in their thinking. Not only were people no longer 
logical or making well-reasoned decisions and judgments, their emotions (the believed antithesis 
of reason) were in many ways responsible for the decisions people arrived at. Both Zajonc (1980) 
and Schwarz and Clore (1983;1988) argued that affect played a key part in the judgement and 
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decision process, where a person’s affective state can be used to guide their perceptions and 
judgements.  
 
In accordance with Hume, Haidt (2001) similarly contended that moral judgements were 
emotive sentiments in his social intuitionist model of moral judgement. Because emotion had 
been shown to impact on general cognition, it was very plausible to also impact on moral 
cognition. The social intuitionist model proposes that each moral foundation comes with a set 
of emotions and intuitions. For example, fairness transgressions would elicit anger, while 
violations of purity would result in disgust. Not only would these transgressions have set 
emotional outcomes, experiencing these emotions would also result in a moral judgement of 
the relevant foundation. Therein, the model proposes moral judgements and decisions are the 
product of emotive states, and any reasoning that occurs is seen as post-hoc justifications (Haidt, 
2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008). This extreme position however has received criticism. For 
example, Pizarro and Bloom (2003) argued that in many everyday scenarios people grapple 
with what is the right thing to do, and point to work carried out by Coles (1986) and Gilligan 
(1982) showing that in many situations (e.g. having an abortion) decisions are made with 
significant deliberations. As is reviewed in the next section, this has led to some researchers 
proposing a model in which both intuitive/emotional and rational systems are both part of the 
moral reasoning and decision-making process.   
 
Instead of being in opposition, there is an argument for the moral rationalist and the moral 
intuitionist examining two different features of moral judgement and decision making. It is 
likely that people might use moral intuitions in one situation and moral reasoning in another. 
Monin and colleagues (2007a, 2007b) have made the point that different methods are resulting 
in different findings. In cases where participants are asked to judge someone’s wrongdoing, the 
triggered emotion might be used as a guide as to how harshly to judge them. In moral 
dilemmas, on the other hand, where participants are asked to select the outcome of a situation 
that does not have a clear answer, people might be more prone to use reasoning. A dual process 
theory of moral judgement has also been suggested (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, 
Engell, Darley & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001), which 
proposes that much of moral judgement is based on automatic – quick, effortful and implicit – 
processes only some of which are controlled – slow, effortful and explicit. It is also claimed that 
emotional processing is automatic, while reasoning is controlled. It puts forward that when 
people are faced with a moral dilemma and they use their emotional, intuitive system, they 
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arrive at a deontological conclusion. When they use controlled reasoning, on the other hand, 
they arrive at a utilitarian conclusion.  However, this model has also been criticised (Kahane, 
2012; Moll & de Oliveira-Souza, 2007), such as arguing that the utilised, often unrealistic moral 
dilemmas are responsible for the pattern of findings (Bloom, 2011). 
 
In sum, morality and emotion are interlinked, although the details of the involvement of 
emotions and reasoning is yet to be established. Furthermore, while the specific processes of 
moral judgement and decision making are unclear, it is reasonable to conclude that morality is 
multifaceted. If what is considered moral differs from one group to another and changes over 
time, this necessitates that something can become moral and cease to be moral.   In the following 
section I will examine how this process unfolds.  
 
2.2 Moralisation 
What is considered moral is not constant across societies and across time. For example, in the 
UK homosexuality was for a long time considered immoral – as reflected in its criminal status 
- but has recently lost much of its moral implications. In the same way that something can cease 
to be moral or immoral, neutral objects or activities can gain moral significance. According to 
Rozin (1999), moralisation occurs when preferences are transformed into values. In comparison 
to preferences, values are internalised and more able to withstand changes over time. Their 
durability is usually sustained by accompanying laws and societal structures and norms. Moral 
values also tend to be more integral to a person’s sense of self. This is evidenced by the finding 
that when someone acts in opposition to their values, self-conscious moral emotions such as 
guilt and shame are likely to occur (Tangney et al., 2007). In sum, moralisation is the 
transformation of a neutral entity to one that has moral value. The next section will briefly 
present how the process of moralisation might occur.  
 
As noted in a recent article by Skitka, Wisneski and Brandt (2018), little direct research on the 
process of moralisation has been conducted since Rozin’s work twenty years ago. He theorised 
that moralisation can occur by two routes: piggybacking or expansion (Rozin, 1997). Through 
piggybacking, the new moralised entity is attached to something that is already moralised. In 
this case, the new moralised entity inherits the rules and conventions associated with the old 
moral code. Alternatively, through expansion a completely new moral code is created and the 
moral framework is expanded. More recent research has emphasised the potential role of 
reasoning and emotion in moralisation. For example, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) have argued 
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that emotional arousal, such as incidental feelings of disgust that occur outside of awareness, 
can moralise an entity previously understood as neutral. Horberg, Oveis and Keltner (2011) on 
the other hand have posited that it is necessary to perceive an entity as harmful for that issue 
to be moralised. From their more recent work, Wisneski and Skitka (2017) found support for 
the role of disgust in the moralisation process, but only when the emotion was integral to the 
presented concern.  No support was found for recognition of harm being a necessary condition 
for moralisation to occur. Although there has been a lack of research into the specific processes 
involved in moralisation, Rozin (1997) draws attention to several aspects of a situation proposed 
to influence why something is likely to become moralised or not. As an extension of the body, 
Rozin (1999) proposes that health often becomes moralised due to the long-established link 
between morality and health that has been evidenced in history (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1997; 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra & Park, 1997; Thomas, 1997). This link will be further discussed 
in the next section (2.3.1). Furthermore, Mintz (1997) argues that morality often attaches itself 
to concepts or behaviours that are evoked frequently, but at the same time involves some degree 
of personal choice. In the following sections I review some of these conditions and how they 
relate to eating. I will also examine the potential evolutionary basis for the connection between 
morality and food, and how emotions might be involved in this moralisation process.  
 
2.3 Evidence for the moralisation of eating 
2.3.1 History of a link in Western societies 
Integral to understanding the moralisation of eating is to understand the linked history with the 
body. The human body has a complicated past. During its tumultuous history it has been both 
celebrated and despised (Vandereycken & van Deth, 1997). Here I briefly examine how the 
body has been associated with food, health and morality during Antiquity, the medieval times 
and the modern era. This is by no means a comprehensive analysis, but rather goes some way 
to highlight the longstanding relationship between ingestion and morality. In ancient Greece, 
Plato believed the body to prevent access to ‘universal truths’ (Plato’s Phaedo in Gallop, 1993; 
Robinson, 2011). In this early conception of the body-mind duality, the mind was understood 
to be responsible for such activities as reasoning and learning, while the body would distract 
from these noble pursuits by its’ appetites, desires and fears. The function of the soul would 
include regulating and controlling the body. Key to these views, however, was that of 
moderation or of balance between excess and restriction. Food was an important part of what 
was called ‘dietetics’. Separate to ideas of ‘diet’ today, ‘dietetics’ meant ‘the model of living’ for 
the Greeks. Being moderate in one’s appetites was, however, also seen as a means to develop 
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reason and reach the truth (Coveney, 2006; McHoul & Grace, 1993) 
During medieval times, the previously maintained boundary between the body and food broke 
down (Kalof, 2010). On a larger scale, people now believed that the body was a product of 
what it consumed and its surroundings. Furthermore, in comparison to the stark division 
between body and soul presented in Antiquity, the body became seen as inseparable from the 
soul (Riches & Bildhauer, 2010). These views went hand in hand with the prevalent notion of 
self-punishment during medieval times. Never before had the mortification of the flesh been 
more common place. By punishing the flesh, the soul could be purified. One of the ways in 
which purification or salvation could occur was through fasting, taken to be a public display of 
penance. The medieval citizen was expected to fast on Wednesday, Friday and Saturday – 
although few fully adhered to these strict commands (Coveney, 2006). In comparison to the 
perceived ‘ugliness’ of overconsumption in Antiquity, bingeing on large volumes was now 
deemed serious enough to gain the status of a ‘deadly sin’ by early Christian thinkers. 
The embodiment of this concept can be found in what has been later described as the ‘Holy 
Anorexics’. Although caution should be made when applying modern diagnoses to historical 
behaviours, the ‘Holy Anorexics’ were a group of women saints who made fasting their forte. 
There were also fasting male saints (e.g. Francis of Assisi, Henry Suso) but the practice was 
primarily female. This is likely due to women being portrayed as symbols of the flesh through 
the process of conception (Bynum, 1987). Theresa Neumann for example was thought to not 
have eaten for over thirty years – if regular communion was not counted (Vogl, 1978). The 
most famous example, however, was that of Catherine of Siena whose fasting and hunger 
became a lived metaphor (Bell, 1987; Bynum, 1987). The function of the fasting was not only 
to redeem sinful flesh, but also to experience pain in unison with Christ and to achieve union 
with him (Bynum, 1987) 
In recent times the influence and prevalence of religion has decreased in many Western 
societies. The move away from religion has at the same time seen a move towards a 
preoccupation with health and wellness (Brandt & Rozin, 1997; Cederström & Spicer, 2015). 
In such cases, there is a search for a new moral code to replace what has been lost. In the West, 
health has in many ways taken over as a new secular morality - ‘healthism’ (Crawford, 2006; 
Katz, 1997). Furthermore, the rising obesity epidemic has put the weight and food intake of 
individuals firmly on the political agenda, with increasing efforts of prevention and treatment 
being tested and implemented. However, it is not just those who are obese or at risk of obesity 
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who have become the centre of attention. In their book ‘The Wellness Syndrome’, Cederström 
and Spicer (2015) describe what they perceive to be a new social order in which individuals and 
organisations perpetuate the idea of self-care. Not only is taking care of one’s own health seen 
as an important practice, it has become a moral imperative. In a recent BBC article (Jones, 
2018), Susie Orbach, a psychotherapist who has written extensively on people’s relationships 
with their bodies and food (1978, 1986, 2002, 2009) argues that the goal of a diet has shifted 
from simply making the dieter thin to having moral pursuits such as being purifying. 
Furthermore, dieting has increased in recent decades, with a recent systematic review finding 
that 42% of the global population has attempted to lose weight in the past year (Santos, 
Sniehotta, Margques, Carraca & Teixeira, 2017). Examining the terms people search for 
worldwide on Google reveals that since its inception in 2004, the search for ‘healthy’ has 
increased by roughly 50%, in comparison to searches for ‘religion’ that has shown a decreased 
search frequency (see Figure 2.1).  However, although views of a healthy diet and a healthy or 
ideal body frame have occurred throughout human history, the 20th century saw a different 
kind of change.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Relative change in worldwide Google searches for the term ‘healthy’ and ‘religion’ from 2004-2017.  
 
Levenstein (2003) has traced the trajectory of health and slimness during the twentieth century. 
He describes a common pattern of how food shortages usually result in plumper ideals, while a 
slender frame is preferred in times of abundance. When there is not enough food to go around, 
a larger shape would indicate personal wealth. In comparison, when there is too much food a 
slimmer figure signals self-control in the face of indulgence. This pattern can also be seen in 
Nahoum’s (1979) analysis of female body shapes in early modern European paintings. It follows 
then that in the excesses of the 1920s, the previous positive views on girth made way for ideas 
of sloth and a lack of self-control. However, in the 1930s, nutrition science changed how the 
public viewed body sizes and who was responsible for them (Levenstein, 2003). The slim figure 
of the 1920s was no longer understood as simply a fashion statement – it was a symbol of health. 
28 
 
When the Depression hit America, the larger body sizes predicted by previous food shortages 
failed to make an appearance. Instead, diets and slimming obsessions took over (Levenstein, 
2003). 
 
Not only had scientific research at the time communicated that being slim was healthy and 
being large was unhealthy, the individual was also in charge of their weight. Previously, the 
view of weight had been that it was largely down to forces beyond the individual’s control. With 
the proposal of the ‘calories in/calories out’ model of weight gain, a person’s weight was 
controlled by their own willpower (Alberti, 2016). Much of this thinking has survived - people 
who are obese are often portrayed as having low self-control (de Ridder et al., 2012; Gerbrand 
et al., 2004). It is an interesting parallel to note that self-control has for a long time been seen 
as central to morality. Baumeister and Exline (1999) called it the ‘moral muscle’ because many 
virtuous acts require a degree of quelling other desires. Thus, it is possible that self-control being 
central in the view of weight and obesity in the 20th century has contributed to the association 
between morality and food.  
 
2.3.3 Uncertainty 
Although the understanding of the human body is better than ever before, the twentieth and 
twenty-first century have also been filled with a multitude of different and opposing nutritional 
advice and knowledge. Everyone from governments, research scientists, retailers, companies 
and individuals can make dietary recommendations, in the absence of any genuine agreement 
(Hornik & Kelly, 2007).  Research scientists have also reported they often find it difficult to 
communicate the complexities of their findings to the public in an effective manner (Folker & 
Sandoe, 2007), which in turn can blur the picture further. Although there has likely always 
been conflicting information available, in the current information age people are bombarded 
with health and nutritional findings, opinions and advice wherever they go. Research from the 
US has shown that 55-67% of adults go online for health information (Deloitte, 2010), and 20-
34% use social media for the same purpose (Deloitte, 2010 and National Research 
Corporation, 2011 respectively, as cited in Tobey & Manore, 2014). In addition to this, the 
public’s trust in experts fell to be equal with the trust of ‘people like me’ in 2017 (Edelman, 
2017), making them potentially more vulnerable to untested opinions. The trust in experts has 
since then increased slightly (Edelman, 2018). Some research from Canada (Marquis, Dubeau 
& Thibault, 2007) and Australia (Cash, Desbrow, Leveritt & Ball, 2015) has suggested that the 
most utilised sources of nutrition information, such as the internet, friends, family and 
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magazines, are often not the most trustworthy or credible. When anyone can post and publish 
anything online, this can result in consumer confusion, caused by an overload of 
misinformation (Spiteri-Cornish & Moares, 2015). 
 
Such chaotic times, Rozin (1997) and Brandt (1997) argue, are likely to be especially vulnerable 
to moralisation. Moralising and controlling the body, which is intimately related to the idea of 
healthy eating, is often the fall-back in such contexts. 
 
3.2.4 Social benefits 
As seen above, in Western societies the twentieth century saw a shift towards a preference for 
a slim body. This links to what will here be described as the functional value of a thin body. In 
cases where moralisation occurs, there is a tendency that adhering to the norms and rules have 
social benefits. For women, the thin body is idealised both in Western societies (Anschutz, 
Spruijt-Metz, van Strien & Engels, 2011; Brown & Slaughter, 2011) and increasingly elsewhere 
(Talukdar, 2012). Engeln-Maddox (2006) describes how women associate a range of rewards 
with a slim body. The surveyed women believed that if they were to achieve a slim body they 
would also become more socially competent, well-adjusted and successful. However, these 
beliefs are not simply wishful thinking. Body size is one of the main contributors to 
attractiveness for women (Singh & Young, 1995; Swami & Tovée, 2005) and research has 
shown that for women physical attractiveness is strongly related to career success (e.g. Baum & 
Ford, 2004; Biddle & Hamermesh, 1998; Cawley, 2004; Kim & von dem Knesebeck, 2018). 
For example, Judge and Cable (2011) found that thinner women were paid more for the same 
work than larger women. For men on the other hand, even though there are still benefits, they 
are less well pronounced (Baum & Ford, 2004; Frieze, Olson & Russell, 1991).  
 
2.3.5 Associated with stigmatised groups 
When self-care becomes a moral demand, those who do not engage accordingly, either out of 
choice or out of circumstance, can become stigmatised (Metzl & Kirkland, 2010). This is the 
other side of the social benefits accompanying a slim body. Those who are obese face 
stereotypes, bias and discrimination in most areas of life, from health care and education, to 
work, media and personal relationships (see Puhl & King, 2013, for a review). A range of 
negative characteristics are attributed to, in particular, the heavier woman. A review by Puhl 
& Brownell (2001) demonstrated how they are perceived by employers as lacking self-control 
and professionalism, but also being lazy and emotionally unstable. Not only are those who have 
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a larger body frame susceptible to prejudice and negative stereotypes, they are also heavily 
discriminated against. A large body of research has shown that a range of negative life factors 
are associated with a higher BMI. For example, Sartore and Cunninham (2007) found that 
employers can show more interest in choosing a thinner, less qualified than a larger, more 
qualified individual. Similarly, larger individuals have also been found to be less well educated 
(Gortmaker et al., 1993).  
 
It is not only in the workplace that larger people face a range of bias and discrimination. Even 
in the health care system, where employees might be expected to have a better grasp of the 
complex reasons for obesity, heavier individuals face many of the same stereotypes. Tomiyama 
and colleagues (2015) reported that healthcare professionals think that obese people are lazier, 
more stupid and more worthless than thin people. These negative beliefs are likely to influence 
the quality of care given, with research showing that physicians are less motivated to provide 
help and think it is more of a waste of time than helping slimmer individuals (Hebl & Xu, 2001; 
Huizinga et al., 2009). 
 
However, it should be noted that these groups could have become stigmatised due to 
overconsumption of food having immoral associations. As such, it could be either a cause or a 
consequence or is reinforced through a feedback loop. Taken together, the benefits associated 
with a slim body frame and the disadvantages associated with a larger size provide a multitude 
of reasons for why people would be motivated to adhere to a norm of healthy eating – even if 
they might not always succeed at doing so.   
 
2.3.6 Evolutionary aspects 
Even though a long history between body, food and morality is evident, it is possible that this 
moralisation did not only occur with the advent of religion. The moralisation of the body and 
food in religious thinking and practice is likely to have occurred alongside evolutionary 
pressures. To avoid contamination and disease, it is generally advisable to avoid food that might 
be rotting or poisonous. The emotion of disgust is understood as having developed in order to 
achieve pathogen avoidance of all types, from infectious diseases to spoilt food (see Curtis, de 
Barra & Aunger, 2011 for a review).  Many definitions of disgust exist (e.g. Angyal, 1941; 
Darwin, 1872/1965; Plutchik, 1980; Rozin & Fallon, 1987), but they generally center on the 
functional properties of avoiding or expelling an unacceptable or contaminated object which is 
usually digestible. Disgust is a universal emotion that shows similarities across species and over 
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time in aspects such as facial expressions (Curtis, 2007; Curtis & Biran, 2001). It is argued that 
through evolutionary pressures the disgust evaluation system was expanded to include moral 
concerns (see Chapman & Anderson, 2013 and Landy & Goodwin, 2015 for two recent 
reviews), such as violations of divinity (Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999) or fairness 
(Chapman, Kim, Susskind & Anderson, 2009). A disgust response that would cause withdrawal 
from the people who committed these kinds of violations would have been adaptive as they 
would threaten group cohesion (Rozin, Haidt & Fincher, 2009; Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 
1993) 
 
The relationship between disgust and morality is usually posited in three ways: Moral 
transgressions can trigger feelings of disgust (elicitation hypothesis), disgust can make a moral 
transgression be perceived as more wrong (amplification hypothesis) and experiencing disgust 
can moralise an entity (moralisation hypothesis). For example, Hutcherson and Gross (2011) 
found that participants felt disgusted by a broad set of moral transgressions, while Horberg, 
Oveis, Keltner and Cohen (2009) only found that participants reported significantly more 
disgust than anger in response to vignettes detailing purity violations but not to justice 
violations. In terms of amplification, Schnall, Haidt, Clore and Jordan (2008) demonstrated 
how a disgusting smell made participants judge others’ wrongdoings more harshly. Similar 
findings have been reported using a disgusting video (Ugazio, Lamm & Singer, 2012) or bitter 
tastes (Eskine, Kacinik & Prinz, 2011). For the moralising effect of disgust, however, there is 
little published evidence. In a meta-analysis by Landy and Goodwin (2015) including non-
published research they found support for the moralising hypothesis, such that experiencing 
disgust made participants judge non-moral actions as more morally wrong. They also 
calculated that there was support for the amplification hypothesis among published literature, 
but not when unpublished experiments were included. 
 
As such, it is possible that one source of the moralisation of eating was a disgust response to 
certain food products that were perceived as harmful. The special case of food is that it becomes 
you. ‘You are what you eat’ is not just a saying but a statement of fact. Today much of the food 
that has a moral association is not rotten or directly poisonous. However, it can be argued that 
this food is still perceived as harmful through an association between ‘sinful’ foods such as those 
high in sugar, fat and salt, and medical outcomes such as obesity, heart disease and diabetes. 
Although as discussed by Wisneski and Skitka (2017) harm might not be a necessary condition 
for moralisation to occur.  
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2.4 Research on moralisation of eating and its consequences 
As I have presented in the previous section, several lines of evidence point to a moralisation of 
eating. In the following section I review the relevant research carried out in this area including 
the potential consequences of such moralisation.  
 
Some researchers have explored how people think about and relate to food and the people who 
consume it. Interviewing a group of Canadian teenagers on their views of fast food, McPhail, 
Chapman and Beagan (2011) found that morality was intimately linked with how they 
approached fast food. Most teens at some point had felt guilty about eating fast food and 
perceived those who consumed it as ‘out of control’ and ‘disgusting. They also associated ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ food with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people. Furthermore, many perceived the food in these 
restaurants to be ‘bad’, but that one could choose ‘better’ options by selecting the healthies item 
on the menu. On the other end of the lifespan, Delaney and McCarthy (2014), interviewed 
adults aged between 50-70 years on the ‘moral space of food’. Corresponding to religious 
notions of food consumption, the interviewees believed that too much involvement with food 
was ‘wrong’ and rather that the ‘right’ approach was to simply focus on its nourishing 
properties. They also perceived eating unhealthily as a transgression from the ideal norm 
presented by healthism.  
 
There is some evidence that companies are drawing on this association in their advertising of 
food products (see Box 2.1 for examples). In the UK there is a ‘Heavenly’ chocolate mousse 
(Nestlé), an ‘Innocent’ smoothie (Coca Cola), ‘seven deadly sins’ Magnum ice creams (Unilever) 
and a ‘Divine’ chocolate (Twin).  Furthermore, dieting company ‘Slimming World’ are using 
the term ‘syn’ (Slimming World, June 2017), previously called ‘sin’ (Slimming World, June 
2002), to denote food points, indicating how many ‘syns’ one can have in one day and what 
products are ‘syn’ free. This tendency to market food using moral terms and images has 
previously been highlighted by Kilbourne (1994) who wrote that healthy food products are 
often sold as virtuous while unhealthy products are presented as sin. Similarly, Griffin and Berry 
(2003) analysed a series of food advertisements in women’s magazines and found that religious 
imagery associated with morality is used to sell products.  In their analysis they highlighted the 
tendency for diet version of traditionally unhealthy products to be exhibited as salvation.  
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Box 2.1 Moral concepts in the marketing of food and non-alcoholic drink 
 
Moral concepts are used in both the labels of and the marketing for food and non-alcoholic drinks. Below are 
examples from both television advertisements and print advertisements showing a combination of both moral 
concepts in labels and in the concept of the advertisements. 
       
a) Marketing campaign for ‘Aero’ Heavenly chocolate      b) Marketing campaign for ‘Innocent’ smoothies by  
 mousse by Nestlé                                                                    Coca Cola 
 
       
c) Marketing campaign for ‘Magnum’ ice cream by            d) Marketing campaign from ‘Divine Chocolate’ by  
    Unilever      Twin 
 
 
2.4.1 Emotional consequences 
To further explore the moralisation of eating, the use of moral emotions in relation to food and 
eating could be thought of as a signal indicating whether or not something may have taken on 
moral value. When people perceive the breaking of a moral rule, a series of emotions are likely 
to be triggered. Although a variety of emotions can occur, the most common indications of 
Photos removed due to copyright reasons. 
Photos removed due to copyright reasons. 
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moral transgressions are guilt, shame, disgust and righteous anger. Guilt, shame and disgust 
are often self-conscious and come about when the individual carries out the wrongdoing 
themselves. It is theorised that guilt occurs when the individual has behaved in what they 
perceive to be an immoral way, while shame is triggered by the perception that their whole 
being is immoral (Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007). 
 
Using data collected from student women via a one-week food diary, Steenhuis (2009), found 
that most participants reported feeling moderately guilty throughout. This was specifically the 
case when they were snacking after lunch or after dinner, and particularly when eating sweets 
or ice cream. Schuster and colleagues (2017) also showed that their participants felt guiltier 
about eating typical ‘unhealthy’ snacks such as chips, candy and cookies in comparison to more 
typical ‘healthy’ snacks such as nuts. Chocolate is seen as a ‘guilty pleasure’, where being 
exposed to chocolate induces both desire and guilt (Rogers & Smit, 2000). Rozin and colleagues 
(1999) and later Kuijer and Boyce (2014) found that among those surveyed, 22% associated 
chocolate cake more with guilt than with celebration. Furthermore, in comparison to eating an 
apple or nothing, women who ate a chocolate bar reported more guilt (Macht & Dettmer, 
2006). Examining the gender difference, Wansink, Cheney and Chan (2003) found that feelings 
of guilt after chocolate consumption were more pronounced for women (51 %) than for men 
(24 %). Other studies have replicated these gender differences (Kuijer & Boyce, 2014; Rozin, 
Bauer & Catanese, 2003). Not only do people report feeling guilty after eating what they deem 
to be unhealthy food, they also anticipate feeling guilty before doing so.  When presenting 
participants with advertisements showing varying degrees of healthy foods, Hur and Jang 
(2015) found that the less healthy the product the more likely they were to say they would feel 
guilty eating the food item presented in the picture.  
 
Guilt and shame are commonly associated with overeating in those who value remaining thin 
or restraining their food intake (Burney & Irwin, 2000). Chocolate cake has also been found to 
be more associated with guilt than celebration among those who want to lose weight (Kuijer & 
Boyce, 2014). Taken to the extreme, feelings of guilt and shame are frequent in those who suffer 
from eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa and binge eating (e.g, 
Cartwright & Stritzke, 2008; Sassaroli, Bertelli, Decoppi, Crosina, Milos & Ruggiero, 2005). 
Burney and Irwin (1999) found that shame and guilt associated with eating behaviour was one 
of the strongest predictors of eating disorder symptomatology. A proneness to shame or guilt, 
on the other hand, was not a significant predictor. Furthermore, during episodes of binging 
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and purging many report the involvement of guilt and shame in maintaining the cycle (e.g. 
Tachi, Murakami, Murotsu & Washizuka, 2001).  
 
Again, this relates to the process of moralisation. Rozin (1997; 1999) postulates that in cases of 
moralisation, the object or activity tends to become internalised – meaning that it is 
incorporated into the person’s sense of self. The internalised concept in turn formulates a moral 
standard or a set of rules. The findings that eating too much or the wrong thing brings about 
feelings of guilt would indicate that the activity has become internalised and a moral standard 
surrounding what is ‘right’ eating behaviour has been created. Furthermore, as seen above, 
guilt and shame are triggered more frequently the more internalised the eating rules are, such 
as in those who are on a diet or those suffering from eating disorders.  
 
Not only can eating too much or eating the wrong things trigger moral emotions, it can create 
an impression in the individual of being immoral.  In the following section I will outline research 
on moral judgement of people based on what they eat and moral self-regulation in the context 
of food consumption. 
 
2.4.2 Judgemental and behavioural consequences 
Similar to a preference being transformed into a value through the process of moralisation, the 
law of contagion posits that properties can be transferred from one source to a receiver 
(Nemeroff & Rozin, 1992). What is transferred can be something behavioural, something 
physical such as germs or even something moral, such as the moral ‘essences’ of Hitler present 
in his old jumper (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994). In relation to food, research has shown that 
contagion seems to occur between the food product and the consumer. In addition to the 
physical properties that are transferred in such an encounter, a series of studies have 
demonstrated that people believe moral essences can be transferred as well. Stein and Nemeroff 
(1995) conducted a study in which they described a person as either preferring unhealthy foods 
or healthy foods, but both being of average height and weight and physically active. They found 
that individuals who preferred healthy food were seen as more tolerant, considerate and 
virtuous than those who preferred the unhealthy food.  Women who prefer low-fat products 
have also been judged as more conscientious (Mooney, DeTore & Malloy, 1994). Money and 
Amico (2000) have shown that a woman described as ordering a chicken sandwich and a salad 
was perceived as more moral than one ordering a hamburger and fries. Finally, although more 
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fun and easy going, pie eaters were also thought to be less responsible and less moral than 
oatmeal eaters (Oakes & Slotterback, 2004 - 2005).  
 
Taken together, whether someone chooses to eat a salad or a burger is not only a health choice, 
but can signal moral status. Again, healthy food is being associated with good moral 
characteristics, while unhealthy food is associated with bad moral characteristics. Considering 
that eating unhealthily can trigger feelings of guilt and shame, and the knowledge of others’ 
judgement, it is possible that these eating behaviours can result in a desire to undo impressions 
or self-evaluations.  
 
2.4.2.1 Moral Self-Regulation 
Box 2.2. Definitions of key terms relating to moral self-regulation 
Moral Compensation: the tendency for people to carry out an act perceived as ‘good’ following an act 
perceived as ‘bad’ (Zhong, Liljenquist & Cain, 2009).  Perceived ‘good’ acts are those that in some way are believed 
to make up for or balance out the ‘bad’ behavior, such as prosociality, purifying acts (cleaning), and self-
punishment. 
 
Moral Licensing: the tendency for people to carry out an act perceived as ‘bad’ following an act perceived as 
‘good’ (Merritt, Effron & Monin, 2010).  
 
Self-Licensing: the tendency to rely on reasons or justifications for gratification (de Witt Huberts et al., 2012). 
Moral licensing is an example of self-licensing where the justification is that one has been ‘good’.  
 
In their seminal study, Carlsmith and Gross (1969) showed that participants who believed they 
had done wrong in harming others by administrating painful electric shocks were more likely 
to comply with a later request for help. Moral compensation (see Box 2.2 for an overview of 
terms used in this section), the tendency for people to carry out an act perceived as ‘good’ 
following an act perceived as ‘bad’, has been shown in several experiments. For example, in a 
series of three studies, Jordan and colleagues (2011) showed that recalling a time they had acted 
immorally (vs. morally) led participants to want to demonstrate their moral status to others, 
report greater moral intentions and behave more morally by not cheating when given the 
chance. Similar findings have also been reported by Ding, Xie, Sun, Li, Wang and Zhen (2016) 
who found that guilt significantly moderated the effect between recalled wrongdoing and 
subsequent prosocial behaviour. Prosociality is here defined as acts carried out that benefits 
others but may sometimes occur at a cost to oneself. 
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Moral compensation is not only achieved by increased prosociality. Engaging in morally 
dubious behaviour has also been shown to increase a desire to physically cleanse oneself either 
physically or through ‘pain’. Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) found that participants who recalled 
past unethical behaviour were more likely to fill out a word completion task using cleansing 
related words and to choose an antiseptic wipe over a pencil. The so-called ‘Macbeth effect’ is 
thought to come about due to the association in English language between concepts of purity 
and morality. Furthermore, like the self-flagellation of the Middle Ages, people who have done 
wrong can sometimes punish themselves. Bastian and colleagues (2011) found that after 
recalling a time they socially rejected another person, a behaviour that was perceived as 
unethical and elicited guilt, participants held their hands in painfully cold water for longer than 
those participants who recalled an everyday interaction with another person. This strategy was 
also effective in reducing feelings of guilt. Similar findings have been reported by Inbar and 
colleagues (2012), who also ruled out the alternative explanation that negative feelings in 
general (e.g. sadness) lead to self-punishment. However, there is some suggestion that self-
punishment is first and foremost a strategy used to signal remorse to others. Nelissen (2012), 
who did not replicate the findings of Bastian and colleagues (2011) and Inbar and colleagues 
(2012), only found self-punishment in the presence of others. 
 
In comparison to moral compensation, moral licensing is the tendency for people to carry out 
an act perceived as ‘bad’ following an act perceived as ‘good’ (e.g. Merritt et al., 2010 for a 
review). For example, Monin and Miller (2001) demonstrated that after having disagreed with 
sexist statements, men were more likely to show sexist discrimination in suggesting a male 
candidate for a job. Similarly, after recalling an unethical act they had carried out, participants 
were less likely to say they wanted to take part in prosocial activities (Jordan, Mullen & 
Murnighan, 2009). Or, after selecting environmentally friendly products, participants were 
more likely to cheat on a task to win money and to steal money in a trust situation (Mazar & 
Zhong, 2010).  Although some effects have failed to replicate, with studies often reporting small 
sample sizes (Blanken, Van de Ven, Zeelenberg & Meijers 2014), a meta-analysis demonstrated 
a significant small-to medium moral licensing effect of perceived ‘bad’ acts to follow perceived 
‘good’ behaviour (Blanken, Van de Van & Zeelenberg 2015). 
 
Why do people act in such inconsistent ways? People have a need to perceive themselves as 
consistent (Festinger, 1957) and in a positive light (Allport, 1955, Steele, 1988). Being moral is 
central to many individual’s identities (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Monin & Jordan, 2009) and in 
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large parts influences people’s self-worth (Alicke, 1985; Dunning, 2007).  As such, when people 
have broken a personal or societal moral rule a gap opens between an ideal or true self and the 
self who carried out the moral transgression. The gap has been explained either in terms of 
cognitive dissonance that may arise when the immoral actions have negative consequences 
(Cooper & Fazop, 1984, Festinger, 1957), or feelings of inauthenticity to the true self (Gino, 
Kouchaki & Galinsky, 2015). This gap can result in feelings of impurity or guilt (Gino et al., 
2015; Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007), which for example can motivate the individual to 
engage in actions to communicate remorse (Nelissen, 2011) or re-establish a moral self-image 
or self-worth by moral compensation (Sachdeva et al., 2009). 
 
Most models aiming to explain this moral self-regulation process take a form of a ‘balance 
model’. For example, the moral credits model (e.g. Nisan, 1991; Zhong, Liljenquist & Cain, 
2009), posits that someone’s moral status is like a bank account. When people act immorally or 
unethically, they lose moral credits. To make up for this loss, they need to act morally to balance 
the scales and fill up the account again. If they have been good, however, they have some extra 
credits to spare and may feel licensed to act unethically subsequently. There is also a moral 
credentials model (Monin & Miller, 2001), which posits that after having been either good or bad, 
people have either established credentials as a good, moral person, or lost credentials as a bad, 
immoral person. In comparison to the more internal balancing of the moral credits model, the 
moral credentials model indicates that how we think others view us is essential. That is, if a 
person carried out a good act after having been bad, they hope this will change how others 
might view the initial unethical act. These two models likely describe two different processes 
that would come into play in different contexts and whether or not the initial and subsequent 
behaviour is in the same domain or not (Merritt et al., 2010).  
 
Overall, although exact process of moral self-regulation is unclear (Blanken et al., 2015), what 
it demonstrates is a tendency for people to want to compensate for being bad or feel free to be 
bad after having been good. As such, if eating is moralised, similar self-regulation strategies 
should be used in an eating context. In the next section I will review the limited evidence of 
this.  
 
2.4.2.2 Moral compensation in a food context 
People sometimes compensate for failures in dieting by becoming more physically active (Fleig, 
Küper, Lippke, Schwarzer & Wiedermann, 2015) or eating less (Tomiyama, Moskovich, 
39 
 
Haltom, Ju & Mann, 2009). This type of self-regulation is similar to the moral compensation 
reviewed in the previous section: both sets of behaviours are aiming to achieve a balance and 
to ‘make up for’ previous mistakes. There is some evidence to suggest, however, that not only 
do people compensate for increased calorie intake by reducing calorie intake, but they also 
compensate morally.  
 
In the first experiment to establish this behavioural tendency, Sheikh and colleagues (2013) 
allocated participants to one of two groups: the first group was asked to recall a time they had 
eaten ‘way too much’, or a control condition in which they either completed no task (Study 1) 
or recalled an ordinary day (Study 2). They found that participants who had recalled eating too 
much reported more moral emotions and produced more cleansing related words, such as 
‘shower’, ‘wash’ and ‘soap’, in a word-completion task (Study 1) and were more likely to choose 
a cleansing product over a pen (Study 2). These findings mirror the Macbeth effect shown by 
Zhong and Liljenquist (2006). Furthermore, overeating recall has also been found to lead to 
increased self-inflicted pain akin to self-punishment. Schei, Sheikh and Schnall (submitted) 
found that participants who recalled eating too much felt guiltier and more ashamed and held 
their hand in painfully cold water for almost twice as long as those who recalled their regular 
journey to work/study.  
 
In sum, after doing wrong – or eating the wrong food – people have a tendency to try to make 
up for their transgressions by acting in otherwise moral ways. Study 2 in this thesis extends the 
work on moral compensation after overeating recall.  
 
2.4.2.3 Moral- and self-licensing in a food context  
In comparison to the research showing that unhealthy eating behaviour can lead to acts of 
moral compensation (Schei et al., submitted; Sheikh et al., 2013), another avenue of research 
has been that of moral licensing within a food context. A study by Eskine (2013) showed that 
simply being exposed to organic food in comparison to neutral (e.g. mustard, white rice) and 
comfort foods (e.g. ice cream, cookies) made participants less likely to volunteer time to help a 
stranger. They were also harsher in their judgements of other people`s moral transgressions, 
indicating a degree of moral superiority. Although Eskine`s study compared `organic` food, all 
the products were conventionally healthy items such as apples, spinach and carrots. Although 
this limits the degree to which statements can be made about the effect of `organic` food on 
prosociality and moral judgements per se, it does demonstrate an effect of healthy in 
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comparison to less healthy food products. However, a later, well-powered study (Moery & 
Calin-Jageman, 2016) did not replicate the findings of Eskine’s small-sampled study (N = 62 
divided in three groups). Eskine (2013) did also not provide any power calculations to justify 
the sample sizes. Although the direction of the effect was similar, the differences were not 
significant. With only two studies, uncertainty remains about whether moral licensing is present 
within the food domain in such a way that healthy foods might be associated with an increase 
in perceived ‘bad’ behavior. Study 1 in this thesis goes some way to address this uncertainty.  
 
There is limited available evidence for explicit moral licensing within the food domain. Rather, 
the majority of related research focuses on self-licensing, an overarching concept of 
justification-based gratification (See Box 2.2, De Witt Huberts, Evers & De Ridder, 2013). As 
seen previously, self-control plays an important part in moral behaviour. In many ways, self-
control goals are seen as a virtue in themselves (Moijiman et al., 2018). Thus, it has been found 
that after having enacted self-control, people are more likely to choose an unhealthy chocolate 
cake over a healthier salad (Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009). It is unclear, however, whether 
people would be more likely to eat unhealthy after having carried out other ethical acts, or 
when feeling moral. Study 4, 5, 6 and 7 attends to this lack of research by examining whether 
giving a food item a label indicating moral goodness might act as a justification for consumption 
in line with moral licensing. 
 
2.5 Conclusions and next chapter 
The current chapter has outlined some of the historical and contemporary associations between 
food and morality, from religious notions of gluttony to the moral commands of eating healthy 
today. However, the consequence of such moralisation is little studied.  
 
The thesis explores this by way of three research questions: 
1. Do people compensate morally for unhealthy eating behaviours? 
2. How prevalent is the tendency to associate morality with eating and food? 
3. What is the impact on self-reported desire and observed behaviour of associating moral terms with food?   
 
Each research question addresses a different side to the link between morality and eating. This 
is graphically represented in Box 2.3. 
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These questions are addressed in seven studies, summarised below: 
 
Study 1 is a laboratory based experiment examining whether recalling an overeating memory 
in comparison to a neutral memory makes participants compensate morally by spending more 
time on a prosocial task.  
 
 
Box 2.3 Graphical representation of how the association between morality and eating has shaped each research question 
 
                                Morality                Eating 
The first research question concerns the association between and the impact of eating behaviour on morality. 
This is addressed in Study 1 and 2. 
 
Morality      Food/eating 
The second research question concerns the prevalence of the association between morality and food/eating. 
This is addressed in Study 3. 
 
           Morality              Food/eating 
   
The third research question concerns the impact of morality on desire for and consumption of food. This is 
addressed in Study 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
 
 
 
Study 2 is a laboratory based correlational study examining the association between participants’ 
own chocolate consumption and moral judgement of others’ wrongdoings. The study also 
examines the moderating role of the moral foundation in which the wrongdoing takes place.  
 
Study 3 is a review of moral concepts in food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplement 
advertising from 2002 to 2017 in popular women’s magazines. The study also examines 
whether the prevalence of the use of moral concepts in this context has changed over time or 
is dependent on the healthiness of the advertised product.  
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Study 4 is an online experiment which examines whether participants’ desire for a healthy or 
unhealthy food is impacted by a moral or immoral label. The study also explores the potential 
moderating influence of individual characteristics including restrained eating tendency and 
moral identity.  
 
Study 5 is a laboratory based experiment investigating whether participants’ consumption of 
healthy and unhealthy food depends on whether they are labelled as moral or immoral. The 
study also explores the potential moderating influence of individual characteristics including 
restrained eating tendency, moral identity and impulse control.  
 
Study 6 is a field-based experiment examining the effect of either a moral or immoral label on 
participants’ selection of a healthy or unhealthy food. 
 
Study 7 is an internal meta-analysis of Study 4, 5 and 6 examining the overall effect of either 
moral or immoral label on participants desire for and selection and consumption of healthy or 
unhealthy food.  
 
The next chapter presents Study 1, which tests whether participants are likely to compensate 
for past overeating behaviour by acting more prosocially.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
Study 1 
 
Amount of chocolate consumed and 
moral judgement: a correlational study 
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Summary 
Background 
Food consumption can affect leniency and harshness in judgment and treatment of others 
(Eskine, 2013) and previous research has shown that feeling virtuous leads to harsher 
judgements of others’ wrongdoings (Zhong et al., 2010). Hence, the current study tests the 
postulate that chocolate consumption is associated with moral judgement, such that eating 
more chocolate is associated with less harsh moral judgements of other people’s transgressions. 
It was further predicted that restrained eating moderates this relationship.  
 
Methods 
Eighty-eight student participants were recruited to take part. To increase the range of the 
amount of chocolate consumed, participants were randomised to receive either a large (150g) 
or small (75g) portion size of chocolates, a manipulation that affects amount consumed 
(Hollands et al., 2015). Participants were told they were free to eat chocolate while doing the 
study if they wanted. At the same time, they were asked to rate a range of moral foundation 
vignettes on wrongness of the behaviour. At the end of the study participants completed a 
measure of restrained eating.  
 
Results 
There was no statistically significant difference in the amount of chocolate consumed between 
the two portion sizes, W = 841.5, p = .30, ∆ˆ = -3.00, 95% CI [-10.00, 3.00].  Participants who 
ate less chocolate gave harsher judgements of transgressions overall, β = -.12, SE = .06, t (85) = 
-1.94, p = .05, 95% CI [-.24, .00]. Restrained eating did not moderate this association β = .09, 
SE = .08, t (85) = 1.11, p = .48, 95% CI [-.07, .26].  
 
Conclusion 
The results suggest that chocolate consumption and moral judgement are associated in a 
student population, but further research is needed in other populations, and to establish 
whether this association is causal and if so, the direction of causality.  
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3.1 Background 
Moral judgements are not only arrived at through rational and effortful deliberation. Whether 
an action is judged as immoral or not can be affected by the affective state in which the person 
making the judgement finds themselves. This has been described as affect-as-information 
theory (Schwarz, 2010). These theories put forward the view that people use their physical state 
as an information heuristic when judging certain situations. For example, in a study by Schwarz 
and Clore (1983, Experiment 2) a female experimenter phoned unknowing participants on 
either a sunny or a rainy day. As she was supposedly calling from far away, she asked half of 
the participants what the weather was like before going on to asking everybody about how 
satisfied they were with their entire life at that moment. Participants who had been made to 
pay attention to the weather were not affected by whether the weather was sunny or rainy on 
their satisfaction ratings. Conversely, those who had not been asked the weather question were 
significantly less satisfied with their life on the rainy day than the sunny day.  
 
Drawing on the theoretical framework of affect-as-information, Haidt (2001) put forward the 
theory that moral judgements often occur in much the same way as the person deciding 
whether their life is good or bad depending on the weather. That is, moral judgements are 
arrived at by the use of so-called ‘moral intuitions’. These intuitions are quick, automatic and 
often occur outside conscious awareness. For example, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) found that 
when they hypnotically induced disgust in participants they became harsher in their 
judgements of moral transgressions, a finding that has also been shown by Schnall and 
colleagues (2008). Going beyond disgust, Horberg and colleagues (2009) found that anger also 
predicted harsher moral judgements, especially those related to breaches of justice. The 
physical state of being in pain has also been found to harshen moral judgements (Olatunji, 
Puncochar & Cox, 2016) 
 
In the majority of these studies, the emotion is usually without a target, coming from an external 
target unrelated to the judgement or triggered by the event that is being judged. In these 
situations, the emotion can be misattributed to the moral transgression, in the same way as the 
weather influenced life satisfaction in the example by Schwarz and Clore (1983). There has 
been less focus on the effect of emotions that are triggered by personal behaviours or 
characteristics of the judge, in which case the emotion is less likely to be misattributed. 
Extending the research on emotion and moral judgement, Olatunji, David and Ciesleksi (2012) 
explored the effect of self-directed disgust on moral judgements. In opposition to the findings 
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that feeling incidental disgust harshens moral judgements, they found that participants who felt 
disgusted at themselves rated other’s wrongdoings as less disgusting and they felt the offender 
to be less deserving of punishment.  
 
A similar field of research is that which explores the effect of cleanliness on moral judgement. 
In contrast to the finding that self-disgust lessens harshness of judgement, feeling clean has been 
shown to make people more judgemental. When Zhong, Strejcek and Sivanathan (2010) had 
participants clean their hands with an antiseptic wipe or engage in a visualisation task where 
they imagined themselves being clean, they found that participants rendered harsher moral 
judgements. They theorised that this is likely due to an association between a clean and moral 
self and a dirty and immoral self as an indication of moral standing. This concept is exemplified 
by the metaphor ‘cleanliness is next to godliness’. Indeed, in the study by Zhong and colleagues 
(2010) participants in the clean conditions rated themselves as more moral than those in the 
control conditions – a sense of moral superiority - a self-characteristic that mediated the 
relationship between cleanliness and harsher moral judgements.  
 
If, as was proposed in Chapter 2, there is a congruency between morality and health and 
immorality and ill health, feeling healthy should in line with the affect-as-information theory 
(Schwarz, 2010) and the moral intuition theory (Haidt, 2001) harshen judgements of moral 
transgressions. The aim of the current study was to test this presupposition by investigating the 
association between consumption of an unhealthy food (chocolate) and moral judgement. 
Looking at the relationship between food and moral judgement Eskine (2013) exposed 
participants to healthy foods such as apples, spinach and carrots, or to unhealthy foods such as 
brownies and ice cream. She found that those exposed to healthy foods judged other people’s 
wrongdoings more harshly than those exposed to unhealthy foods. Moreover, Eskine, Kacinik 
and Prinz (2011) showed that experiencing different tastes also affected moral judgement. 
Participants were given either a sweet, bitter or control (water) beverage while completing a 
task assessing judgements of moral transgressions. They found that participants who drank the 
bitter drink rated the transgressions as significantly more wrong than the participants who 
drank the sweet and control drinks. The participants who received the sweet drink were most 
lenient in their judgments, although not significantly different from participants in the control 
condition. However, a more recent effort to replicate this effect proved unsuccessful (Moery & 
Calin-Jageman, 2016). The studies by Eskine and colleagues reveal that the types of foods we 
are exposed to and how they taste could have effects on our judgements of other people’s moral 
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transgressions. Building on this research, it was predicted that the amount of chocolate 
consumption is negatively related to moral judgement. 
 
The study also aimed to explore whether chocolate consumption is related to judgements of 
morality in general or specifically of certain issues. In trying to map out descriptive morality, 
researchers have put forward different categories into which moral considerations usually fall. 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, Turiel (1983) proposed that moral concerns could be grouped into 
either justice, rights or harm, but research from other non-western societies showed that 
people’s moral domains were broader than this. Shweder, Mahapatra and Miller (1987) showed 
that what people considered moral included issues of respect and hierarchy and purity/sanctity. 
Wanting to describe the full range of moral issues across cultures, Haidt and Joseph (2004) 
reviewed the breadth of moral domain theories and concluded with their own set of five moral 
foundations: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and 
purity/sanctity. Later, liberty/oppression has been argued to also be a moral foundation 
(Haidt, 2012; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto & Haidt, 2012). They argue that the human mind 
is organised in such a way that people, as they grow up and are exposed to a range of social 
issues, are likely to moralise these six.  
 
However, few studies have measured moral judgements specified by moral foundation (e.g. 
Moran et al., 2011; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, Haidt, Clore & Jordan, 2008). This was 
the case of Eskine and colleagues, who used moral vignettes describing a range of moral 
transgressions from consensual second-cousin incest, to shoplifting and accepting bribes. The 
other most common approach to moral judgement has tapped into the sanctity/purity domain 
(Horberg, Oveis, Keltner & Cohen, 2009) with respect to the influence of disgust. Hence, to be 
able to analyse each moral foundation separately a stimulus set developed by Clifford, Iyengar, 
Cabeza and Sinnott-Armstrong (2015) was used in the current study. The stimulus set contains 
a series of moral vignettes in Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity and Liberty, which 
allowed for analysis of each foundation separately and overall.  
 
The final aim was to investigate the moderating role of restrained eating in the relationship 
between unhealthy food consumption and moral judgement. Restrained eating, the degree to 
which someone restricts their food intake with the aim to either maintain or lose weight, has 
been previously shown to be related to moral characteristics. Schei and colleagues (submitted) 
found that women participants who restrained their food intake and felt guilty about breaking 
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their restraint were more likely to report putting other people’s needs in front of their own and 
other behaviour characteristics of being a ‘good woman’. It is likely that among a sample of 
participants who score highly on restrained eating, eating large amounts of chocolate is 
perceived as wrong, while restricting chocolate consumption is perceived as right. As such, it 
was predicted that the relationship between chocolate consumption and moral judgement 
would be moderated by restrained eating tendencies.  To assess restrained eating a commonly 
employed measure was used, the Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire (van Strien, Frijters, 
Bergers & Defares, 1986). This scale consists of three subscales: external eating behaviour, 
emotional eating behaviour and restrained eating behaviour. The scale was chosen due to its 
focus on everyday dieting behaviour rather than behaviour which is symptomatic of disordered 
eating. Only the restrained eating behaviour subscale was employed.  
 
To increase the variance of consumption, portion size was manipulated. Larger portion sizes 
have been consistently shown to increase food consumption (see Hollands et al., 2015 for a 
review). For example, recruiting normal-BMI participants from a university population, Rolls 
and colleagues (2006) found that increasing portion size by both 150% and 200% significantly 
increased food intake across food types (entrées, starches, fruit and vegetable side dishes, 
desserts, condiments, beverages and snacks). Similarly, Raynor and Wing (2012) found that 
when they gave participants either a baseline portion of candies or a doubling of the portion 
size, participants ate approximately 60% more on average. This reflects a proportional increase 
in portion size and increases in food consumption. It is theorised that the increased food intake 
is because the portion size sets the standard of the right amount to eat (Herman & Polivy, 2005; 
Steenhuis & Vermeer, 2009) or because people perceive the portion size as a single unit. Thus, 
portion size was manipulated in the current study to increase the range of consumption among 
participants. In line with previous research (e.g. Raynor & Wing, 2012; Rolls et al., 2006) the 
large portion size of chocolate (150g) was twice the weight of the small portion size (75g).  
 
The current study tested two hypotheses: 
1. Eating more chocolate is associated with less harsh moral judgements of other people’s 
transgressions.  
2. Restrained eating moderates this relationship.  
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3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants.  
To calculate sample size, the effect size for the difference between healthy and unhealthy food 
on moral judgements from Eskine (2013) was used as a guide, r = .51, which is conventionally 
understood as a large effect size. To account for differences between the two studies, sample 
size was calculated based on a more moderate medium effect size, r = .30. Using this effect size, 
a sample of 84 participants was calculated as the required minimum to find a statistically 
significant relationship between chocolate consumption and moral judgement with 80% power 
at 5% significance. Ninety-eight participants were recruited via online advertisements and 
volunteer mailing lists to take part in the study in exchange for £4. Ten participants had to be 
removed from the sample due to either guessing the purpose of the study or a technical 
malfunction, leaving a final sample of 88 participants. Four participants beyond the estimated 
84 participants were included due to already being organised to take part in the research. The 
data was not examined until data collection finished. 
 
3.2.2 Intervention.  
Participants were given a bowl of chocolate pieces (Minstrels) before the start of the moral 
judgement task. The bowl was pre-weighed and contained either 75g of chocolate or 150g of 
chocolate. Participants were randomly allocated to receive either the large portion size or the 
small portion size.   
 
3.2.3 Measures  
3.2.3.1 Moral judgement.  
Moral judgements were measured using an adapted version of the Moral Foundations 
Vignettes developed by Clifford et al. (2015). The vignettes reflect each moral foundation: Care 
(e.g. “You see a girl laughing at another student forgetting her lines at a school play.”), Fairness 
(e.g. “You see someone cheating in a card game while playing with a group of strangers.”), 
Liberty (e.g. “You see a man telling his girlfriend that she must convert to his religion.”), 
Sanctity (e.g. “You see a family eating the carcass of their pet dog that had been run over.”), 
Authority (e.g. “You see a girl repeatedly interrupting her teacher as he explains a new 
concept.”) and Loyalty (e.g. “You see a man leaving his family business to go to work for her 
main competitor.”), in addition to control vignettes describing non-moral behaviour.  
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Twelve vignettes were excluded due to not being relevant for a British audience (e.g. “You see 
a girl saying that another girl is too ugly to be a varsity cheerleader”), and vignettes using US 
terminology were adapted to British terms (e.g. “You see the US ambassador joking in Great 
Britain about the stupidity of Americans.” was adapted to “You see the Prime Minister joking 
in America about the stupidity of British people.”). Overall, participants rated the perceived 
wrongness of 105 vignettes by indicating their response to the question “How wrong do you 
find this?” on a slider scale from 0 (“Not wrong at all”) – 100 (“Extremely wrong”). The 
survey was answered on a computer using the survey tool Qualtrics. Internal consistency was 
very high for all the moral foundations, α = .91 - .96. 
 
3.2.3.2 Restrained eating.  
Restrained eating was measured by the restrained eating subscale of the Dutch Eating Behavior 
Questionnaire (DEBQ), consisting of 11 items (van Strien et al., 1986). Participants rated the 
degree to which they engaged in food restriction (e.g. “When you have put on weight, do you 
eat less than you normally do?”) by indicating their responses on a scale from 1 (“Never”) – 5 
(“Very Often”). Internal consistency was excellent in the current sample, α = .93.  
 
3.2.4 Demographics 
Participants were also asked to indicate their age, gender, ethnicity, height and weight and the 
time of their last meal.  
 
3.2.5 Procedure  
The study procedure was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at the 
University of Cambridge (ref. 2015-16[16]). Participants took part in what they believed to be 
a study on how personality influences moral judgements. While reading and signing the 
informed consent form, the experimenter opened a packet of chocolate, poured the contents 
into a bowl and placed it next to the participant. When placing the bowl, the experimenter said 
that “the researchers in the lab next door have just finished running their study and have given 
us all their unused leftover chocolate, so I will give you some in case you want a snack during 
the study”. The experimenter then proceeded to launch the Moral Foundation Vignettes via 
Qualtrics and left the participants alone to follow the instructions on the screen. When the 
participants finished, the experimenter re-entered the room, moved the chocolate away from 
the participant and replaced the bowl with a face-down sheet of paper concerning receipt of 
payment. This was done to stop the participant from continuing to snack while completing the 
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rest of the study and distract the participant with use of the sheet of paper. Thereafter, the 
participants completed the DEBQ and demographics. The DEBQ was distributed after the 
chocolate consumption and Moral Judgement Vignettes to avoid suspicion of the role of the 
chocolate offered to participants. At the end of the study all participants were probed for 
suspicion of the study aims, debriefed, compensated and thanked for their participation.  
 
3.3 Data analysis 
All analyses were carried out in R (version 3.3.3). The effect of the portion size intervention on 
chocolate consumption was analysed using a t-test. The relationship between chocolate 
consumption and moral judgement was analysed using multiple regression, while controlling 
for the difference in portion size. All moderation analyses were also analysed by use of multiple 
regression models. For exploratory subgroup analyses of moral foundations, p-values were 
adjusted using a Bonferroni-Holm correction. In cases where test-assumptions were not met, 
transformations were first attempted. When transformations did not correct violation of 
assumptions, a non-parametric test was used instead. 
  
3.3.1 Assumptions  
The key dependent variable, moral judgement, was assessed in both portion size conditions 
for normality. The variable was found to meet assumptions of normality (small, W = .98, p 
= .48, large: W = .97, p = .18), and the variance did not differ significantly between groups, 
Levene’s test F (1, 93) = 2.33, p = .13.  The consumption variable (grams of chocolate eaten) 
was found to be positively skewed in both conditions (small: W = .83, p <.001, large: W = 
.81, p <.001), and there was a trend for the variance to differ between groups, Levene’s test 
F (1, 86) = 3.68, p = .08. No transformation (square root, logarithm, cube root, box cox) 
reduced the skew to approach a normal distribution, thus a non-parametric test was used 
in lieu of a t-test to analyse the effect of portion size on the consumption variable. When 
this variable was used in regression analyses, the residuals for the models were found to be 
normal and no further transformations were used.  
 
3.3.2 Randomisation checks 
To check that randomisation had been successful, demographic characteristics of the two 
randomised groups were compared. Using a Mann-Whitney U test to account for the negative 
skew of age and BMI, it was found that participants in the two groups did not differ in terms of 
age, W = 958, p = .20, or BMI, W = 921, p = .57. Chi-square tests also showed that the two 
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groups were not statistically different in terms of gender, χ2 (2) = 1.08, p = .58, ethnicity, χ2 (6) 
= 5.60, p = .47, or the time of their last meal, χ2 (5) = 4.919, p = .43.  
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Participants 
The sample comprised 59 women and 28 men. One person did not disclose their gender. The 
mean age was 24.08 (SD = 7.17) years, with a normal average BMI (M = 21.82, SD = 3.04). 
The ethnicity composition of the sample was majority Caucasian (n = 57). See Table 3.1 for a 
breakdown of demographics in each condition. 
Table 3.1 
Participant demographic characteristics across the two randomised groups and overall 
Demographic characteristics 
Small portion size  
n = 46 
Large portion size  
n = 42 
Total  
N = 88 
Gender % (n) (female)  38.03 (30) 25.76 (29) 67.05 (59) 
Age M (SD) 22.13 (3.36) 26.21 (9.36) 24.08 (7.17) 
BMI M (SD) 21.59 (3.21) 22.09 (2.86) 21.82 (3.04) 
Ethnicity % (n) (White) 31.82 (28) 32.95 (29) 64.77 (57) 
 
3.4.2 Manipulation check  
A Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test revealed that participants did not eat more chocolate in the 
large portion size condition (M = 24.88, SD = 17.52) than in the small portion size condition 
(M = 16.37, SD = 17.52), W = 841.5, p = .30, ∆ˆ = -3.00, 95% CI [-10.00, 3.00]. Thus, the 
manipulation to vary amount of chocolate consumed was not successful and the two groups 
were combined for further analyses.  
 
3.4.3 Hypothesis 1: Eating more chocolate leads to less harsh moral judgements 
of other people’s transgressions  
In order to test the first hypothesis, a linear regression between amount of chocolate eaten (g) 
and moral judgement rating across all moral foundations was carried out. Portion size was 
included in the model because it systematically varied between groups. The correlation 
between chocolate consumption and moral judgement, without controlling for portion size, 
was not significant, r = -.14, p = .19. For the regression model, including the portion size 
variable as a covariate, the results showed a significant negative association between amount of 
chocolate eaten and harshness of moral judgement, β = -.12, SE = .06, t (85) = -1.94, p = .05, 
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95% CI [-.24, .00]. This means that the less chocolate participants ate, the harsher their moral 
judgements were. See Figure 3.1 for a plot of the relationship.  
 
Figure 3.1. Association between chocolate consumption (g) and harshness of moral judgement with 95% CI.  
 
Portion size was also significantly associated with moral judgements, β = 7.78, SE = 2.88, t (85) 
= 2.7, p = .008, 95% CI [2.05, 13.50], such that participants who ate from a large portion size 
(M = 65.07, SD = .14.86) judged the vignettes as significantly more wrong than participants 
who ate from the small portion size (M = 60.09, SD = 12.39). The R2 of the model was .10. 
 
An exploratory analysis of the effect of the interaction between portion size and amount of 
chocolate eaten on the moral judgement of vignettes was also conducted. The regression model 
showed that there was no significant interaction effect between portion size and amount eaten, 
β = -.047, SE = .14, t (84) = -.34, p = .73, 95% CI [-.31, .22], R2 = .07. 
  
To assess whether there was a difference in judgements between moral foundations, linear 
regression analyses for each foundation was run separately. Portion size was controlled for in 
each analysis. To address the inflated rate of Type II error due to multiple comparisons, 
Bonferroni-Holm corrections were applied. The results showed a negative relationship between 
chocolate consumption and moral judgements within the Care foundation, and a trend towards 
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a relationship within the Fairness foundation. No other signification relationships were found 
between the chocolate consumption and the other moral foundations (see Table 3.2)  
 
For the Care vignettes, several were related to body-shaming, which might have been driving 
the relationship between the chocolate consumption and the Care foundation. However, the 
Care foundation remained significantly correlated with chocolate eaten after the body-shaming 
vignettes were separated out β = -.15, SE = .06, t (85) = -2.51, p = .05, 95% CI [-.27, -.03]. 
 
Table 3.2 
Linear regression results for chocolate consumption (g) and moral foundations overall and separately for each foundation. 
Moral Foundation β SE t p 95% CI 
Across moral foundations -.12 .06 -1.94 .05 -24, .00 
Care -.17 .06 -2.83 .04 -.29, -.05 
Fairness -.15 .07 -2.26 .06 -.29, -.02 
Loyalty -.18 .09 -1.23 .10 -.37, .01 
Authority -.12 .09 -1.32 .26 -.31, .06 
Sanctity -.07 .08 -.91 .43 -.24, .09 
Liberty -.02 .07 -.25 .81 -.15, .12 
 
Table 3.3 
Linear regression results for moderation analyses between restrained eating and chocolate consumption (g) on moral judgement overall 
and separately for each moral foundation. 
Moral Foundation β SE t p 95% CI 
Across moral foundations*Restrained Eating .09 .08 1.11 .48 -.07, .26 
 Care*Restrained Eating .14 .08 1.69 .44 -.02, .30 
Fairness*Restrained Eating .13 .09 1.49 .44 -.04, .31 
Loyalty*Restrained Eating -.01 .13 -.10 .92 -.27, .24 
Authority*Restrained Eating .16 .12 1.32 .44 -.08, .41 
Sanctity*Restrained Eating .09 .11 .79 .61 -.13, .31 
Liberty*Restrained Eating .04 .09 -.47 .75 -.14, .22 
 
3.4.4 Hypothesis 2: Restrained eating moderates this relationship.  
In order to test whether restrained eating moderated the association between amount of 
chocolate eaten and the harshness of moral judgement, regression models were carried out on 
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the harshness judgements of the foundations overall and separately. P-values were adjusted 
with Bonferroni-Holm corrections and the portion size variable was kept in as a control. No 
statistically significant interactions between chocolate consumption and restrained eating were 
found on any moral foundation or overall. See Table 3.3 for an overview of test statistics. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
3.5.1 Summary of findings 
The results of Study 1 revealed no statistically significant effect of portion size on chocolate 
consumption, but portion size was associated with moral judgement. Participants who were 
given the large portion size were also found to judge the moral transgressions as more wrong, 
while those who were given the small portion size were also found to be more lenient. There 
was a negative correlation between chocolate consumption and moral judgements. This means 
that the more chocolate participants ate, the less wrong they thought other people’s moral 
wrongdoings were, or the less chocolate they ate, the harsher they were in their judgements. 
Because the results are correlational, it could also mean that the harsher participants judged 
others’ wrongdoings, the less chocolate they ate. For each individual moral foundation, there 
was only a significant relationship between chocolate consumption and care, and a trend 
towards significance for fairness and loyalty. Finally, restrained eating did not moderate any of 
the associations. 
 
The finding that portion size did not predict amount of food consumed is contrary to previously 
established findings (Hollands et al., 2015). It could be that the voluntary nature of the 
consumption, in which participants did not have to eat any chocolate, meant that a larger 
proportion of participants did not eat any chocolate. The role of portion size in this type of 
scenario is not well established. The majority of studies require participants to eat some of the 
food, to answer questions about characteristics of the food (e.g. Argo, & White, 2012; 
Cavanagh, Vartanian, Herman & Polivy, 2014), or the portions are varied in situations where 
participants would eat food in any case, such as in a restaurant (Diliberti, Bordi, Conklin, Roe 
& Rolls, 2004) or at mealtimes (e.g. Ahn, Han, Kwon & Min 2010; Burger, Fisher & Johnson, 
2012; Jeffery et al., 2007; Koh & Pilner, 2009; Levitsky & Youn, 2004; Rolls, Morris & Roe, 
2002, Wansink, van Ittersum & Painter, 2004).  In these cases, food consumption is either 
necessary to complete the set task or in accordance with the situation, i.e. one eats food at meals 
such as dinner or lunch. Another study using a similar setup as the current study, where 
participants were told they could eat some M&Ms if they wanted while they watched a TV 
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show, found no difference in consumption between the two portion sizes (Marchiori, Corneille 
& Klein, 2012). 
 
No effect of portion size on consumption was found, and there was no interaction between 
portion size and amount eaten on the judgement of moral transgression. Rather, the results 
showed that portion size was associated with moral judgement. Participants who were given a 
large portion size were also harsher in their moral judgements than those who were given a 
small portion size. This would seem to go against the negative correlation between actual 
consumption and moral judgement. There could be several explanations for this finding. 
Because portion size did not affect the amount of chocolate consumed, it is possible that the 
association between portion size and moral judgement is simply down to chance. It could also 
be due to a failure of randomisation on an explanatory variable that was not measured. 
Alternatively, it could be that a large portion size might make participant believe they have 
eaten proportionally less chocolate than a small portion size because their intake would be less 
noticeable in the bowl. If one piece of chocolate is taken from a bowl containing a large amount 
it will make less of a dent than if it is taken from a bowl with a small amount. It also follows that 
in the later situation, participants could be more able to gauge their food intake. When 
participants then perceive they have eaten less from the large portion size as opposed to more 
from the small portion size this should influence their moral judgement in line with the negative 
relationship between consumption amount and harshness of judgement. Another explanation 
could be that a small portion size might invite thoughts of moderation, while a large portion 
size could bring about thoughts of gluttony and excess. The portion size could set a standard 
for consumption (Steeinhuis & Vermeer, 2009), making participants think the average portion 
is larger or smaller depending on the condition. Thus, a large portion size could make 
participants believe the average person would eat a larger amount, and when they do not they 
could feel more morally superior, which could influence their judgements. However, these 
interpretations would need further testing.  
 
The finding that amount of chocolate consumed was negatively associated with harshness of 
moral judgement can have several meanings, due to the correlational nature of the test. First, 
it could be that participants’ chocolate consumption led to changes in moral judgement. This 
would be in line with the study by Eskine (2013) where she found that being exposed to healthy 
food made participants’ moral judgements harsher than being exposed to unhealthy food. 
Building upon the findings by Zhong et al. (2010) in which participants who cleaned themselves 
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also felt morally superior and subsequently gave harsher moral judgements, it is possible that a 
similar process is taking place in the current study. In the western dieting context pride is often 
presented as a consequence of resisting unhealthy temptation and it has also been found to be 
associated with resisting in people with eating disorders (Skårderud, 2007). Furthermore, as 
seen in Chapter 2, people often view those who consume healthy food as ‘better’ people than 
those who consume unhealthy food (Stein & Nemeroff, 1994). Taken together, it is possible 
that participants’ chocolate consumption was negatively related to their own positive self-
concept, which in turn may have influenced how they viewed others’ wrongdoings. Participants 
might have reframed others’ wrongdoings as less bad to feel better about themselves. On the 
other end of the consumption scale, it is possible that participants who consumed a large 
amount of chocolate might have felt disgusted at themselves making them judge others’ 
transgressions less severely. This would go in line with the findings of Olatunji et al. (2012) 
presented in the introduction and the theories of moral intuition (Haidt, 2001) and affect-as-
information (Schwarz, 2010).  
 
At the same time, it is possible that severity of moral judgement affected chocolate consumption 
instead. Drawing on the disgust literature presented in the introduction, it could be that the 
more wrong participants thought the behaviour presented in the moral vignettes was the more 
disgusted they felt. Several strands of research have shown that moral transgressions can trigger 
feelings of disgust (e.g. Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999; Tybur, Lieberman & 
Griskevicius, 2009). Feeling disgusted is most likely an appetite suppressant (Legget, Cornier, 
Rojas, Lawful & Tregellas, 2015), thereby possibly reducing the amount of chocolate 
participants ultimately consume. Finally, a third interpretation of the relationship could be that 
people who eat a certain amount of chocolate also judge moral transgressions in a certain way, 
with no causal relationship between the two. Instead, a third variable could be responsible for 
both chocolate consumption and moral judgement. Therefore, to establish a causal 
relationship, further research should be carried out.  
 
Not only was chocolate consumption associated with moral judgement across moral 
foundations when controlling for differences in portion sizes, but consumption was particularly 
associated with judgements of care and fairness transgressions. There could be several 
explanations for this. First, it is possible that the sample size was not sufficiently powered and 
that these differences are spurious findings. Second, if the differences in moral foundations are 
reflections of an underlying relationship, there could be two potential reasons. It has been 
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shown that people from western cultures are more sensitive to transgressions of care or fairness 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007). This is theorised to be the case for WEIRD (western, educated, 
industrial, rich and democratic) individuals in particular, which would describe the majority of 
the current sample (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010). In this case, if there is an association 
between unhealthy eating behaviours and morality, it could be that chocolate consumption 
affects issues already included within participants’ moral domain. Alternatively, the relationship 
between chocolate consumption and care could be explained by the idea that maintaining a 
slim figure and being healthy is part of the concept of the ‘good person’ (Stein & Nemeroff, 
1994). In women, it has been shown that restrained eating is associated with a desire to put 
other people’s care in front of one’s own, a stereotypical image of a ‘good woman’ (Schei et al., 
submitted). If participants are restraining their own intake by eating less chocolate, it could be 
that they subsequently find harm to others more wrong.  
 
3.5.2 Strengths and limitations of the current study 
In comparison to the study by Eskine (2013) that used exposure to healthy or unhealthy food, 
the current study used actual food consumption. From her study it is unclear how exposure to 
certain food types would influence moral judgement. The results of the current study suggest 
that participants might imagine themselves eating the food, or otherwise engaging with it, 
which in turn influenced their judgement of other people.  
 
However, because the relationship between chocolate consumption and moral judgement was 
correlational, it is not possible to make any conclusions with regards to causality. It is unclear 
whether the relationship is caused by different amounts of chocolate eaten, or whether some 
other underlying characteristic distinguishing the participants who ate a large vs. a small 
amount is responsible for the change in moral judgement. One of these characteristics could 
be tendency to restrain food intake, such that those who regularly restrain their food intake 
show different moral judgements than those who do not. The results did not reveal such a 
moderation by restrained eating. However, the study was likely underpowered to detect a 
significant moderation effect of restrained eating. Furthermore, the restrained eating measure 
was given at the end of the session. Although this was done to not cause any suspicion that the 
chocolate was part of the study, it is possible that having already been faced with a consumption 
choice changed participants’ responses on the questionnaire. Thus, it might not have been a 
valid measure of an individual characteristic. Alternatively, other characteristics that might 
explain an association between chocolate consumption and moral judgement could be a 
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proclivity towards a healthy lifestyle that is not captured by the restrained eating measure: for 
example, those who tend to think unhealthy eating is wrong. As such, they should show 
temperance in chocolate consumption and might be more sensitive to moral transgressions in 
general, thus judging others more harshly.  Order of moral vignettes presentation was not 
recorded in the current study. This would have been a useful variable to assess potential 
causality, by analysing whether moral judgements changed over time as participants consumed 
more chocolate. Future studies should include such a variable so that this link can be explored. 
 
Similarly, although the results of the study would be in line with the affect-as-information 
(Schwarz, 2010) and moral intuition (Haidt, 2001) theories, affect was not measured directly, 
and it is unclear whether participants experienced certain emotions that could have influenced 
their judgements or food consumption. Future experiments to establish the causal direction of 
the effect should additionally measure affect to further understand how food consumption and 
moral judgements affect each other. However, it would be paramount to not draw participants 
attention to the reason for their affective reaction, as Schwarz and Clore (1983) previously 
found that when the source of the affect is known it no longer affects judgements. This could 
be controlled for by using an implicit measure. 
 
A limitation of the current study is the sample. Even though the sample size was sufficient to 
detect previously found effect sizes, it was not large enough to test moderation analyses. Thus, 
the moderation analyses reported here were exploratory in nature. The participants were also 
recruited from a student population – sometimes described as WEIRD (western, educated, 
industrial, rich and democratic, Henrich et al., 2010). This population differs on a range of 
characteristics, such as moral judgement discussed above. This means that the findings cannot 
be generalised beyond this group. 
 
3.6 Conclusions and the next chapter 
The results suggest that chocolate consumption and moral judgement are associated in a 
student population, but further research is needed in other populations. Further research is also 
needed to establish whether this association is causal and if so, the direction of causality. Study 
1 focused on moral judgement, which is not equivalent to moral behaviour. In exploring this 
further, the next chapter presents Study 2, which tested the effect of recalled unhealthy eating 
behaviour on prosociality. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
Study 2 
 
Atoning Past Indulgences:  
Recalling a past overeating event and 
its impact on moral compensation 
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Summary 
Background 
Previous research showed that moral failures increase compensatory behaviours such as 
increasing prosociality and self-punishment, as strategies to re-establish one’s moral self-image. 
Do similar compensatory behaviours result from recalling unhealthy eating episodes? It has 
been found that recalling an overeating event led participants to want to physically ‘wash the 
sin off their hands’ by selecting cleansing products (Sheikh et al., 2013) and to spend longer on 
a painful cold-pressor task (Schei et al., submitted). The current study examines whether 
recalling an overeating episode might also leads to increased prosocial efforts. 
 
Methods 
Sixty female participants took part in a laboratory-based experiment on ‘life events and episodic 
memory’. Participants were randomly allocated to one of two recall groups: overeating event 
or neutral event. After their written recall, participants believed they would complete an 
episodic memory task on a computer. When the computer task ostensibly failed, participants 
were paid and told they were free to leave. Upon exiting the testing rooms, they were asked 
whether they would be willing to help the experimenter with a different task, involving a long 
mathematics questionnaire. Helping behaviour was recorded as time spent on the mathematics 
questionnaire.  
 
Results 
All participants said yes to helping with the mathematics questionnaire. As predicted, 
participants recalling an overeating (vs. neutral) event provided more help, t (58) = 3.60, p 
<.001, η2 = .18, 95% CI [5.42, 19.13].  
 
Conclusion 
In sum, recalling an overeating episode elicited compensatory prosocial behaviour in terms of 
helping the experimenter with a mathematical questionnaire. In conjunction with previous 
research showing that recalling an overeating event leads to increased levels of moral emotion 
such as guilt and shame and subsequent compensatory efforts, these results provide support for 
the hypothesis that overeating is perceived as a transgression of moral standards. 
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4. 1 Background 
As outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.4.2.1), people who had committed an unethical act were 
found to behave more prosocially thereafter (e.g. Carlsmith & Gross 1968; Ding et al., 2016; 
Jordan et al., 2011). There is some evidence that overeating leads people to compensate for 
their behaviour by acting in moral ways more generally. For instance, recalling an overeating 
event has been shown to increase a desire to physically ‘wash the sin off one’s hands’ by 
choosing cleansing products over non-cleansing products (Sheikh et al., 2013). Recalling an 
overeating event has also been found to lead participants to inflict more pain on themselves in 
a cold-pressor task (Schei et al., submitted). In Study 1 (Chapter 3), it was found that chocolate 
consumption was negatively associated with moral judgement, with those eating smaller 
amounts of chocolate also judging moral scenarios to be more morally bad than those who ate 
larger amounts of chocolate and vice versa. In sum, food consumption does not seem to be 
morally neutral, but rather it seems to have judgemental and behavioural consequences in the 
moral realm. Thus, the aim of the current study was to investigate whether people act more 
prosocially because of unhealthy eating practices. 
 
Prosocial behaviour is a broad classification of acts that are beneficial to others but may incur 
a cost to the self. Examples of prosocial behaviour can be varied and include actions such as 
offering to help a friend move, sharing your food with a sibling, assisting a stranger whose car 
has broken down, donating money to charity or recycling containers for environmental reasons. 
Several subgroups of prosociality have been identified; from altruism and volunteerism to 
helping and cooperation (Schroeder & Graziano, 2015). In much of the social psychology 
literature, however, prosociality has been operationally defined as one person helping another 
person (Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio & Piliavin, 1995).  
 
Similarly, in the current study prosociality was operationally defined as the participant 
helping the experimenter. Helping was assessed using a paradigm developed by Bartlett and 
DeSteno (2006) and later used in several experiments (e.g. Schnall et al., 2010; Schnall & 
Roper, 2012; Ding et al., 2016). In the paradigm, participants are given the chance to help 
the experimenter with a tedious task: a questionnaire consisting of 68 multiple choice 
mathematics problems. Because research has shown that many people find mathematics both 
boring and difficult (Brown, Brown & Bibby, 2008; Onion, 2004), filling out the questionnaire 
would constitute a cost to the participant.  In addition, using a paradigm that allows for 
helping behaviour rather than intentions to help has several advantages. Although intentions 
63 
 
are a pretty good indicator of later behaviour, people’s intentions are not a perfect predictor 
of the behaviour that they might carry out (see Sheeran 2002 for a meta-analysis of meta-
analyses). Manipulations that change intentions have also been found to have smaller effects 
on actual behaviour (Fife-Schaw, Sheeran, & Norman, 2007; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
Furthermore, reported intentions could be influenced by impression management motives 
rather than a desire to help.  
 
Why would people carry out a behaviour that is beneficial to another person but at times costly 
to themselves? There are several theories as to why people behave prosocially, with the majority 
classified as either altruistic or egoistic. Batson (2011) helpfully distinguished between these two 
types of prosociality depending on the primary target of the behaviour: the performer or the 
receiver. According to him, in altruistic theories, the receiver’s welfare is in focus and the 
performer is understood to be driven by their experience of empathic concern for the receiver. 
In egoistic theories, the focus is on the performer and the motivations are to increase personal 
welfare or decrease personal adversity. Cialdini’s negative state relief model (e.g. Cialdini, 
Darby & Vincent, 1973; Cialdini et al., 1987) posits that people are motivated to engage in 
prosocial behaviours because they want to reduce negative emotional states such as sadness, 
distress and guilt. He found that people who experienced negative mood states after having 
harmed another person were more likely to offer help than those whose negative mood states 
were improved before being given the chance to help (Cialdini et al., 1973).  
 
One such negative emotion, guilt, has been particularly researched in terms of motivating 
prosocial behaviour. In comparison to other negative emotions, guilt is often triggered by a 
failure to uphold a personal or social moral standard and drives the individual to make amends 
for their wrongdoings (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et 
al., 2007) by confessing, apologising or acting prosocially (e.g. Baumeister, Stillwell & 
Heatherton, 1994; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1995; De Hooge, Zeelenberg & 
Breugelman, 2007; Ketalaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen, Dijker & De Vries, 2007).  
 
Guilt has been shown to accompany unhealthy eating behaviours (e.g. Kuijer & Boyce, 2014; 
Steenhuis, 2009), especially in situations where the individual believes they have eaten the 
‘wrong’ type of food (e.g. chocolate, Benton, Greenfield & Morgan, 1998) or too much food 
(Schei et al., submitted; Sheikh et al. 2013). For example, showing images of chocolate has been 
found to trigger feelings of guilt in dieters but not in non-dieters (Fletcher, Pine, Woodbridge 
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& Nash, 2007) and eating a chocolate bar was followed by guilt, while eating an apple was not 
(Macht & Dettmer, 2006). In Sheikh and colleagues’ (2013) studies and Schei and colleagues’ 
(submitted) studies, guilt was also elicited by recalling a past overeating event in comparison to 
a neutral event. However, the current study did not directly assess participants’ mood states, 
because drawing attention to how they are feeling might attenuate any possible effect of the 
overeating manipulation on helping behaviour (Schwarz & Clore, 1986). Furthermore, it has 
been shown in two separate studies that recalling an overeating episode results in increased 
levels of guilt (Schei et al., submitted; Sheikh et al., 2013).  
 
In line with previous research (Schei et al., submitted, Sheikh et al., 2013) the current study 
uses memory recall in lieu of actual overeating behaviour. Recalling a specific life event is a 
method that has been used consistently in the moral research literature (e.g. Barkan, Aval, Gino 
& Ariely, 2012; Bastian et al., 2012, Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1997; Mulder & 
Aquino, 2013, Jordan et al., 2011; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Asking participants to recall an 
overeating memory has been previously demonstrated to trigger feelings of guilt in participants 
(Schei et al., submitted; Sheikh et al., 2013) and the autobiographical method minimises the 
ethical considerations associated with guilt-related events (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1995; 
McGraw, 1987; Tangney, 1992). Furthermore, in comparison to other methods such as making 
participants copy a story involving others’ unethical behaviour (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006, 
Study 2), recalling a personal event ensures that any consequences that occur are due to 
behaviour carried out by the participant, rather than a judgement of others’ behaviour. There 
is evidence suggesting that recalling another person’s unethical act has little or different effects 
on one’s own later moral behaviour (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan et al., 2011; Sachdeva et 
al., 2009). It has been suggested that remembering behaviour performed by other people 
activates a different process because it is not self-relevant (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Sachdeva et 
al., 2009).  
 
By using the recall of an overeating event rather than making participants eat large amounts of 
food circumvents potential confounds related to individual difference in blood-glucose levels 
and prosociality. Xu and colleagues (2014) found that when they gave one set of participants a 
sugary beverage and another set of participants a diet beverage (which does not increase blood-
glucose), the sugary beverage group felt guiltier after a game in which their errors harmed 
another person and as a consequence were more likely to help another participant. This implies 
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that available blood glucose might be necessary for prosociality and using a recall task keeps 
the groups more comparable in terms of blood glucose levels.  
 
Although specific advantages of using the autobiographical method exist, the method also has 
the disadvantage of memories being biased through distortion and self-serving motives. Recent 
research suggests that memories of moral deeds are more vivid, detailed and fade less over time 
than memories of moral transgressions (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016). Negative memories of past 
behaviour can often conflict with the person’s motivation to uphold a positive self-image 
(Alicke, 1985) and are likely suppressed through a process of motivated forgetting (Anderson & 
Hanslmayr, 2014). Kappes and Crockett (2016) propose that this motivated forgetting of 
immoral actions could to some extent explain why remembering ethical acts leads to stronger 
consistent moral behaviour than remembering unethical acts. As such, in the current study the 
group recalling an overeating event, previously established as a negatively valenced memory 
(Schei et al., submitted, Sheikh et al, 2013), was compared with a neutral control rather than a 
memory of a positively valenced event. However, a neutral event can still be positive in 
comparison to a negative event. To assess the contribution of valence, each recalled event was 
coded for general positive and negative affect by two independent research coders.  
 
Only female participants were recruited to take part in this study for two reasons. First, the 
gender of the experimenter (female) might interact with that of the participant – with 
existing evidence suggesting greater helping behaviour from males when the experimenter 
is female (Eagley & Crowley 1986). This would have reduced the power of the study to 
detect an effect. Second, the behaviour of interest may be unique to women. For example, 
Sheikh et al., (2013) found that the effect of recalling an overeating event on moral cleansing 
was only found among women.  
In summary, moral transgressions have been found to lead to guilt and subsequent 
compensatory prosocial actions. Overeating has also been shown to lead to guilt and 
compensatory actions such as cleansing and self-punishment. Thus, based on the previous 
literature reviewed here and in Chapter 2, it was predicted that in the current study 
participants recalling an overeating memory would help the experimenter with the 
mathematical questionnaire for a longer time than those recalling a neutral control 
memory.  
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4. 3 Methods 
4.3.1 Participants 
Sixty-three female students from the University of Cambridge participated in the study in 
exchange for monetary compensation of £7.50. One participant withdrew from the study 
before completion and two participants were removed due to guessing the purpose of the 
study, leaving a sample of 60. Based on the large effect size from Schnall and colleagues 
(2010, Study 2), η2p = .32, this sample gave .99 power at a .01 level of significance to detect 
a significant effect of type of memory recall on time spent on the mathematical 
questionnaire. 
 
4.3.2 Manipulation 
Participants were randomly assigned to recall a specific time they overate or a neutral 
memory, with instructions taken from Sheikh et al. (2013) and Schnall et al. (2010), 
respectively. The recall instructions were the same apart from where the overeating recall 
instructed participants to “please think back to a time you ate too much” while the neutral 
recall read “please think of your typical journey to work/place of study”. Participants were told 
to describe the memory in as much detail as possible and that they would have eight minutes 
to do so. 
 
4.3.3 Procedure  
The study procedure was approved by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Cambridge (ref. Pre.2013.91). A female experimenter tested 
participants individually in a laboratory. Participants were given a cover story that the study 
concerned episodic memory, involving the recall of an autobiographical memory and then 
carrying out a memory task on a computer. Importantly, it was specified at recruitment that 
the study would last one hour. Participants were randomly assigned to recall either an 
overeating memory or a neutral memory and were given eight minutes to write down their 
assigned memory. The experimenter was not present while the participants completed the 
memory task to ensure the potentially sensitive memories remained as anonymised as 
possible. The experimenter was also blind to group assignment.  Once the allotted time was 
up, the experimenter returned to the room and went on to initiate the ostensible episodic 
memory task on a computer. The experimenter unsuccessfully tried to launch the computer 
task three times with each time resulting in a technical error that had been pre-programmed.  
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When the task did not launch, participants were paid and told they were free to leave. Upon 
gathering their things, the experimenter asked as an apparent afterthought whether they 
would be willing to help with a separate study in which the experimenter needed to establish 
some mathematical norms. The experimenter went on to explain that the mathematics 
questionnaire was unfortunately rather long and boring, but any help the participant could 
offer would be appreciated. It was emphasized to participants that there was no obligation 
to help and that they were free to stop whenever they wanted. If participants complied with 
the request for help they were given a questionnaire consisting of 65 mathematics problems. 
The experimenter remained in the room under the pretence of attempting to fix the 
technical computer error and secretly timed participants’ work. However, the experimenter 
did not face the participant and could not see how many mathematical questions they had 
answered. This was done to minimise social desirability effects. The timer was stopped when 
participants indicated that they did not want to continue. At the end participants were 
probed for suspicion, debriefed and thanked for their time.  
 
4.3.4 Measures 
4.3.4.1 Primary outcome measure 
Helping was operationally defined as the time participants spent on a booklet consisting of 
65 mathematical questions (Bartlett and DeSteno, 2006). The total possible time to spend 
on the mathematics tasks was estimated to take no longer than what remained of the study 
session after the recall task (40 minutes). 
 
4.3.4.2 Secondary outcome measures 
The number of items attempted was recorded, along with the number of items answered 
correctly.  
 
4.3.4.3 Control variable 
To rule out a potential confound we also assessed enjoyment of mathematics on a scale 
from 1(“Not at all”) to 7 (“Very much so”). 
 
4.3.4.4 Affect coding  
A procedure developed by McAdams and colleagues (2008) to analyse open-ended life 
narratives was used to guide the coding of general negative and positive affect in the written 
memory recalls provided by participants. Any positive and negative emotional words or 
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pictures were used to guide the rating. All narratives were coded by two independent coders 
on the presence of the theme on a scale ranging from 1 (‘very little presence’) to 7 (‘very 
much presence’). The ratings were averaged across the two coders and had acceptable 
interrater reliability, ICC = .70-.78. 
 
4.4 Data analysis 
All statistical analyses were carried out in R (version 3.3.3). The effect of memory recall on 
the time spent helping the experimenter with the mathematical questionnaire was analysed 
with an independent t-test. Analyses of effect of memory recall on the secondary outcome 
variables (number of items attempted and solved) and the difference between the two types 
of recall in terms of coded affective tone were also analysed using independent t-tests. In 
cases where test-assumptions were not met, transformations were first attempted. When 
transformations did not correct violation of assumptions, a non-parametric test was used 
instead. 
 
4.4.1 Assumptions 
The key dependent variable (time spent on the mathematics questionnaire) was assessed in 
both conditions for normality. The variable was found to meet assumptions of normality 
(overeating, W = .99, p = .99, neutral: W = .95, p = .15), and the variance did not differ 
significantly between groups, Levene’s test F (1, 58) = 1.61, p = .21. The variables detailing 
the positive emotional valence of the recalled memory for each group (overeating, W = .54, 
p <. 001, neutral: W = .76, p <.001) and negative emotional valence for the overeating 
group (overeating, W = .78, p <. 001, neutral: W = .92, p = .03) did not meet assumptions 
of normality. No attempted transformation (square root, logarithm, cube root, box cox) was 
successful, thus a non-parametric test was chosen (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). All other 
test assumptions were met for the remaining analyses.  
 
4.4.2 Randomisation checks 
To make sure the participants were randomly allocated, differences between the two groups 
on relevant variables were assessed. It was found that participants in the two groups did not 
differ in terms of age (t (57.78) = .63, p = .53) or mathematics enjoyment, (t (55) = .53, p = 
.59). To test whether ethnicity differed between the two groups, a Fisher’s exact test was 
conducted due to eight out of ten cells having a minimum expected frequency below 5. The 
test showed that ethnicity did not differ significantly between groups, Fisher’s exact test, p = 
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.88. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Participants 
Participants were between the ages of 18 and 35 (M = 21.7, SD = 3.16). 71% identified as 
White, 15% as East-Asian, 4% as Asian-Indian, 6% as Mixed; 4% did not disclose their 
ethnicity.  
 
4.5.2 Primary outcome measure 
All participants offered to stay behind and help the experimenter. An independent samples 
t-test tested whether participants who recalled an overeating memory would help for longer 
than those who recalled a neutral event. The overeating group (M = 38.03, SD = 12.13) 
spent significantly more time on the mathematics questionnaire than the neutral group (M 
= 25.76, SD = 14.20), t (58) = 3.60, p < .001, η2 = .18, 95% CI [5.42, 19.13]. See Figure 
4.1 for the difference between the two groups on helping time and Table 4.1 for a 
breakdown of descriptive statistics and results.  
 
Every participant had 40 minutes left of their allocated study session when they were free to 
leave. This means that staying beyond the 40 minutes would constitute a higher cost to 
individuals. As an exploratory analysis, looking at the number of participants who stayed 
beyond 40 minutes in each group revealed that more participants in the overeating group 
worked beyond the total study allocated time (n = 16) than in the neutral group (n = 6), χ2 (1) 
= 4.04, p = .04, OR = 3.10, thus incurring a higher cost.  
 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive statistics and t-test results showing the difference between recall groups on the time spent on the mathematical questionnaire, 
the number of questionnaire items attempted and the number of questionnaire items solved correctly.  
 
Overeating  
M (SD) 
Neutral 
M (SD) 
t df p η2 95%CI 
Time (min) 38.03 (12.13) 25.76 (14.20) 3.60 58 .001 .18 5.42, 19.13 
No. items 52.80 (11.34) 41.48 (14.69) 3.05 58 .004 .14 3.54, 17.08 
No. correct 
items 
40.30 (10.65) 31.33 (12.29) 2.62 58 .01 .11 1.86, 14.06 
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Figure 4.1. Minutes (mean (95% confidence intervals)) participants spent helping. 
 
4.5.3 Secondary outcome measures 
Number of items attempted and solved 
It could be that increased completion time in the overeating group was not a reflection of 
helping, but due to exhaustion after recalling an emotional memory. Indeed, recalling an 
overeating event has previously been shown to elicit negative feelings such as guilt, shame, 
disgust and anger at the self (see Study 2, Sheikh et al., 2013) and negative emotions have 
been found to impair participants’ working memory and problem solving capacity 
(Cavalera & Pepe, 2014). However, independent t-tests showed that the overeating group 
tackled more items (M = 52.80, SD = 11.34) than the neutral group (M = 41.48, SD = 
14.69), t (58) = 3.05, p = .004, η2 = .14, 95% CI [3.54, 17.08] and answered more questions 
correctly (M = 40.30, SD = 10.65) than the neutral condition (M = 31.33, SD = 12.29), t 
(58) = 2.62, p = .01, η2 = .11, 95% CI [1.86, 14.06].  
 
4.5.4 Qualitative analyses of emotions  
Each written memory was coded for negative and positive valence. Several narratives did not 
have any overall valence and were simply either a list of what was eaten or a neutral recount of 
a daily commute. However, some narratives gave clear emotional accounts, with examples of 
positive and negative events in both conditions. In the overeating condition, several participants 
described negative feelings associated with the eating event. One participant described “I felt 
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sick stuffing myself – physically and emotionally disgusting (all the bad negative thoughts 
towards myself and my own body)…” However, several participants also gave details of what 
was a happy overeating occasion, such as “The food was so tasty that I felt extremely satisfied 
and excited to be eating a dish which would otherwise be too expensive for me to order. (…) 
Overall, I felt really happy. I'm a person who lives to eat, not eats to live.”  
 
In the neutral condition, in which participants were asked to describe their daily commute, 
many people recounted a daily journey without emotional content. For some, a specific event 
stood out, which was usually of an emotional nature. For example, one participants recalled a 
positive journey to Cambridge in which she was “Looking up at the board on the wall to see if 
the train to Cambridge was listed I recall a sense of anticipation: such that I was so looking 
forward to returning to share the experiences I had heard about with committee.” Others 
recalled a journey with a more negative twist, “It was pitch black outside and I felt a sense of 
foreboding and anticipation, wondering what kind of shift would be in a store for me tonight”. 
 
 
Table 4.2 presents the means and standard deviations for the overeating and neutral condition, 
along with intraclass correlations for the coding by two independent raters. To assess whether 
the increased helping behaviour in the overeating group was associated with a general change 
in affect, a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test was carried out on the difference between the two 
conditions. The results revealed that the two groups did not differ in terms of general positive 
affect, W = 506.5, p = .12, and general negative affect, W = 497, p = .22.  
 
An exploratory analysis was carried out to assess whether there was an association between 
memory valence and time spent helping. Neither positive affect, r = .077, p = .056, 95% CI [-
.18, .33], nor negative affect, r = -.15, p = .25, 95% CI [-.40, .11] was significantly associated 
with helping time.  
 
Table 4.2  
Descriptive statistics and intraclass correlations of positive and negative affect in recalled overeating and neutral memories 
Affect Overeating M (SD) Neutral M (SD) ICC  
Positive Affect 1.19 (1.54) 1.56 (1.19) .70  
Negative Affect 2.07 (1.81) 1.88 (1.4) .78  
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4.6 Discussion 
4.6.1 Summary of findings 
The results of the study support the hypothesis that recalling an overeating event increases 
prosocial behaviour. Participants asked to recall a time they overate helped for 12 minutes 
longer than those who were asked to recall a neutral memory, a statistically significant 
difference. Analyses also showed that not only did participants in the overeating condition help 
for longer but they also incurred a higher costs of time spent in the session:  All participants 
had 40 minutes left of their study session to help with the mathematics questionnaire and 
significantly more participants in the overeating group stayed beyond the allocated time.  
 
It could be argued that participants who recalled an overeating memory became more 
distracted and exhausted than those recalling a neutral memory. This side-effect could have 
made participants slower at solving mathematical problems and responsible for the increased 
time. However, participants put in more effort by correctly answering a greater proportion of 
the mathematical questions. This rejects the alternative explanation that increased time was 
due to poorer problem solving ability.  Thus, the current findings indicate that among a female-
only student sample, unhealthy eating behaviours such as overeating induce increased 
prosociality.  
 
Consequently, the results add further evidence to the theory that moral behaviour is regulated 
via a balance model. When unethical acts are carried out, they are later compensated for by 
ethical behaviour (Jordan et al., 2011). Specifically, the findings presented here point to 
overeating having acquired similar connotations as other immoral behaviour. Overeating in 
this sample also leads to prosocial compensations in line with behaviour such as causing another 
individual pain (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Cialdini, Darby & Vincent, 1973), ruining an 
experiment due to negligence (Regan, 1971) or recalling general immoral activities (Jordan et 
al., 2011). It also provides further evidence to the distinction between theories proposed to 
explain the moral balance model: moral credits and moral credentials. Both models are moral 
balance theories but differ in the mechanism proposed to be driving the balancing. In the moral 
credits theory, the participants have a ‘bank account’ that contains moral credits, which can be 
drained or filled up. The aim is that the bank account contains a constant sum of credits, and 
the behaviour seen after either moral or immoral acts are understood to respond to a loss or 
acquisition of credits. This leads to filling up the account with moral behaviour after an immoral 
act has been committed, or licensing immoral behaviour through an excess of moral credits. In 
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comparison, the moral credentials theory explains a similar balancing of moral behaviours but 
proposes that the reason for the inconsistency of behaviour is that when an immoral act is 
carried out, the individual loses moral credentials in the eyes of others, or in contrast has an 
abundance of moral credentials when a moral behaviour has been enacted. In the current 
study, the participants were not observed by the experimenter when completing their 
overeating episode recall and their written material was anonymised. This goes some way to 
show that participants did not help for longer because they felt they had lost moral credentials 
in the eye of the experimenter, but rather lends support to a moral credits theory. However, 
further studies need to test this further, for example by manipulating the presence of an 
audience.  
 
Although the overall function may be to wipe the slate clean and rebalance the moral scales, 
the mediating factors involved were not directly assessed. As reviewed in the introduction, there 
are many theories of what drives people to act prosocially. It is possible that the overeating 
recall prompted increased prosocial behaviours because participants wanted to reduce the 
negative emotions associated with doing something ‘wrong’. In line with the negative state-
relief model proposed by Cialdini and colleagues (1973), it could be argued that recalling an 
overeating event leads to increased general negative affect, causing participants to want to help 
the experimenter in an attempt to increase their positive mood. For example, in a study by 
Cialdini and Kenrick (1976), participants who were experimentally ‘saddened’ showed greater 
benevolence thereafter. In the current study, however, the written recalls in the overeating and 
neutral condition were not significantly different in terms of general negative affect This 
suggests that there was something about recalling an overeating event per se, rather than just a 
negative event, that resulted in the increased helping. Of course, it is possible that participants 
in the overeating group may have experienced a greater negative mood even if their written 
recalls did not reflect this. 
 
Based on previous research using the same manipulation (Schei et al., submitted; Sheikh et al., 
2013) it is likely that the women who recalled an overeating memory felt increased guilt, rather 
than a general negative mood. Guilt is categorised as a moral emotion and signals to the 
individual that they have broken a moral rule (Tangney et al., 2007). Research on guilt suggests 
a special relationship with compensatory tendencies and enacts reparative actions, including 
an urge to confess one’s wrongs, apologise and attempt to reinstate one’s moral status. Sheikh 
and Janoff-Bulman (2010) argued that guilt orients a person towards approaching the ‘good’ 
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through positive obligations such as helping others. The underlying mechanism in the current 
study is likely to be increased feelings of guilt triggered by the overeating event.  However, 
because guilt was not measured in the current study this needs to be examined further.  
 
4.6.2 Strengths and limitations 
One strength of the current study was the use of a paradigm that provided participants with 
the chance to not only offer voluntary helping behaviour but also allowed a continuous 
measurement of helping, i.e. time. In comparison to research looking at intentions to help (e.g. 
Schnall et al., 2010, Study 1, Gino & Galinsky, 2012, Study 2 and 4), using a measure of 
behaviour circumvents questions about whether the intention will predict the behaviour 
(Baumeister, Vohs & Funder, 2007). However, one limitation of the use of a mathematics 
questionnaire is that participants might have been motivated by a need to demonstrate or test 
their own competency instead of a desire to help the experimenter. To test this alternative 
explanation, further research should be carried out with the use of a non-skill based measure 
of helping.  
 
The use of a recalled overeating behaviour rather than real life food consumption has both 
benefits and limitations. One benefit is that by using recall of an overeating event rather than 
actual food consumption, differences in blood glucose levels did not vary systematically between 
the two groups. As discussed in the introduction, there is some evidence suggesting that 
available blood glucose, in comparison to depleted blood glucose levels, increases prosocial 
behaviour (Xu et al., 2014). For this reason, the finding that participants helped more after 
recalling an overeating memory cannot solely be explained by increased blood glucose in this 
group. A limitation of the manipulation was the large variety of memories recalled due to the 
open-ended instructions. Although they all described a time they ate what they perceived as 
‘too much’, the appraisal of the behaviour ranged from positive to negative. This means that 
there is no direct evidence that it was an individual participant’s judgement of wrongness that 
was driving their increased prosocial behaviour. However, it has previously been established 
that among female students, recalling an overeating memory triggers feelings of guilt compared 
to a more neutral memory. As such, the underlying factors for increased prosociality after 
overeating recall and the role of guilt, in particular, remains unknown and needs to be explored 
further.  
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A further limitation of the current study is the sample. Although the sample was powered to 
test for a significant difference between two groups in terms of time spent helping with the 
mathematical questionnaire, it is likely that the effect size used as a guide for sample size 
estimation (Schnall et al., 2010, Study 2) was larger than the true effect size (Button et al., 2013). 
Thus, further research needs to be carried out with a larger sample to establish the validity of 
the reported effect. Another limitation of the sample was that it comprised a female student-
only sample. Although previous research has found that recalling an overeating memory only 
increased moral cleansing in a female sample (Sheikh et al., 2013), it is unclear from the current 
study whether increased prosociality after overeating recall would occur in the population at 
large. Research has shown that students are more likely to show eating disturbances and this 
prevalence has increased over time (White, Reynolds-Malear & Cordero, 2011). They are also 
more preoccupied with health and food consumption. An international survey carried out by 
Sodexo (2017) showed that students report healthy eating intentions at a higher rate than the 
global average. Even though this might not translate to actual healthy food consumption it 
signals a greater awareness and desire for healthy food. Studies have also found that individuals 
with a higher education have a lower average BMI than those without (Hermann et al., 2011). 
Together, these studies suggest that recalling an overeating memory might have different 
consequences in this sample than for the general population, who appear less preoccupied with 
food and health overall.  
 
The design of the study was only able to assess whether recalling an overeating memory leads 
to increased prosociality. Although this could be indicative of overeating being construed as a 
moral transgression, it does not necessitate that it is. There could be other reasons why 
participants might have helped more in the overeating condition than in the neutral 
condition. For example, although the experimenter was not facing participants during the 
study, she was still in the room while they were completing the mathematics questionnaire. 
This means that there is a possibility that participants helped more due to affiliation affects. 
When people feel threatened, they are more likely to want to connect with others (Kulik & 
Mahler, 2010). It could be that the participants in the current study felt more threatened from 
recalling an overeating memory than a neutral memory and were more likely to seek 
affiliation with the experimenter by helping her for longer. Affiliation effects could be 
controlled for in future studies by not having an interpersonal helping measure. Furthermore, 
the next experiments in this study should assess directly whether participants judge unhealthy 
and healthier food to be different in terms of morality.  
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4.7 Conclusions and the next chapter 
The results of Study 1 and Study 2 indicate that eating behaviours are not perceived as 
morally neutral among a student population. Rather, what and how much is eaten was found 
to have judgmental and behavioural consequences. Chocolate consumption was found to 
influence the harshness of moral judgements while memories of overeating motivated 
participants to behave more prosocially. In conclusion, the first section of this thesis provides 
some evidence that unhealthy eating behaviours have moral compensatory consequences. 
 
In contrast to the focus on the moral consequences of unhealthy eating behaviours, the next 
section of the thesis focuses on the eating consequences of moralised food products. The 
overall aim is to assess the prevalence of moralised food products (Study 3) and the impact of 
moral food labels on desire, selection and consumption of the labelled food item (Studies 4, 5, 
6 and 7). Study 3, reported in the next chapter, provides an estimate of the extent to which 
food is moralised in an everyday context by reviewing the frequency with which moral 
concepts have been used in food advertisements in women magazines over a 15-year period. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
Study 3 
 
Moral concepts in food advertisements in 
UK women’s magazines from 2002-2017: an 
analysis of content and change over time  
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Summary 
Background. Moral language and imagery are sometimes used to promote and sell food 
(Griffin & Berry, 2003), but the frequency of this is unknown. The current study examined the 
presence of moral concepts in food advertisements in women’s magazines published in the UK 
in 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017. 
 
Method. 17 magazines published in June in the years 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 were 
sampled and screened for food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplement advertisements, 
resulting in 444 unique advertisements. Each advertisement was coded for the presence or 
absence of moral concepts as defined by Moral Foundations Theory or their likelihood of 
eliciting moral emotions. The healthiness of the products was also estimated, using (a) objective 
grouping of items by nutritional profile and (b) public perceptions.  
 
Results. The percentage of food advertisements containing a moral concept was 29.50 % 
overall. The difference between the years (2002 = 29.06 %, 2007 = 31.82 %, 2012 = 32.14 %, 
2017 = 25.49 %) was not significant, all ps > .1 Their use was also similar in adverts for food, 
non-alcoholic drinks and nutritional supplements, χ2 (2) = 3.78, p = .15. Neither healthiness 
grouped by (a) nutritional profiles, χ2 (2) = .05, p = .98, nor (b) public perception significantly 
predicted presence of moral concepts in advertisements, β = .16, SD = .11, z = 1.42, p = .16. 
The frequency of moral concepts present in advertisements varied across magazine types, p = 
0.009, although pairwise comparisons showed that no comparisons were significantly different. 
 
Discussion. Moral concepts were present in about one-third of food and non-alcoholic drink 
advertisements in women’s magazines published in the UK, unchanged since 2002. Their 
presence did not differ by objective or subjective healthiness of the product or type of women’s 
magazine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
5.1 Background 
Study 2 and 3 showed that recalled and actual food consumption can have an influence on 
moral judgement and behaviour. To further assess the moralisation of eating, the current study 
is an exploratory analysis on the use of moral concepts in advertising for food, non-alcoholic 
drink and nutritional supplements. Moral concepts are sometimes used in everyday language 
about food and dieting (Mycroft, 2008; Spoel, Harris & Henwood, 2012): People are ‘good’ if 
they stick to a diet and ‘bad’ if they break it. This kind of language is also used by companies 
to brand their products, such as ‘Innocent’ smoothie, ‘Halo top’ ice cream or ‘Divine’ 
chocolate. Jean Kilbourne wrote a pertinent attack of food and non-alcoholic drink advertising 
aimed at women in 1994, highlighting the way food is often sold as both sinful temptation and 
as salvation. From her analysis, she found that unhealthy foods such as ice cream or chocolate 
was positioned as a decadent almost sexual indulgence, and the diet versions of such 
foods/drinks being marketed as the salvation.  
 
In the same vein, in an analysis of Christian language and imagery in food advertisement, 
Griffin and Berry (2003) found that words such as ‘heaven’ and images of halos are used to 
market food in women’s magazines in the UK. According to their analysis, the advertised food 
product is also often sold as salvation. However, the extent to which these moral concepts are 
used is unknown. Furthermore, moral concepts are not limited to Christian ideas. As discussed 
previously in Chapters 2 and 3, the common consensus in psychology is that the topics that 
people consider moral are multifaceted and include concerns such as care/harm, 
purity/sanctity and fairness/justice among others (e.g. Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007; Shweder 
et al., 1984, 1993). When such moral rules are either broken, or followed, certain emotions are 
likely to be triggered such as guilt, shame and pride (Tangney et al., 2007).  Therefore, to extend 
the work of Griffin and Berry (2003) and Kilbourne (1994) the current study goes beyond 
Christian notions of morality and aims to perform a more comprehensive analysis of the use of 
moral concepts in food advertising.  
 
To do so, the presence of moral concepts in food advertisements in UK women’s magazines 
from 2002-2017 was measured. Examining advertisements is a commonly used method to 
explore societal trends in attitudes and beliefs (Dyer, 2015). Although much attention has 
recently been given to television advertising (Boyland et al., 2016), magazines remain a popular 
source of nutritional information (Cash, Desbrow, Leveritt & Ball, 2014), with the UK 
government highlighting magazines as a way to communicate information about diets 
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(Hansard, 2010). According to the National Readership Survey (October 2016 - September 
2017), 71% of British people above the age of 15 years read magazines, 41% read women’s 
monthly magazines and 23% read women’s weekly magazines. This is a large proportion of 
the population that are exposed to advertisements for food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional 
supplements. Furthermore, the foods and non-alcoholic drinks advertised in UK women’s 
magazines often have a poor nutritional profile, contributing to an unhealthy diet (Adams & 
White, 2009; Adams, Simpson & White, 2011). 
 
The study presented here specifically used women’s magazines to examine the use of moral 
concepts in food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplement advertisements. The term 
women’s magazine is taken from the National Readership Survey. This includes celebrity 
magazines, cooking and food magazines, home and interior design magazines, supermarket 
publications and lifestyle, health and fitness magazines aimed at women. Women’s magazines 
were chosen due to the larger proportion of food, drink and nutritional supplement 
advertisements in comparison to other types of magazine such as political, news or economics 
publications, or magazines traditionally marketed at men. Furthermore, by examining 
women’s magazines a comparison can be made with previous analyses (Griffin & Berry, 2003).  
 
People have become increasingly interested in what is healthy in recent years. For example, as 
seen in Chapter 2, Google searches for the term ‘healthy’ have increased by 50% since 2004. 
However, the available information on what is healthy is often unclear and often contradictory: 
Fat is presented as unhealthy but some diets such as the High Fat Low Carbohydrate diet argue 
for a large intake of high fat products. With a greater selection of food available, the choice is 
left up to the individual. Simultaneously, keeping healthy, or treating the body as a temple, has 
for a long time been understood as a virtue (see chapter 2 for a historical overview). The last 
ten years have also seen a rise in the health movement ‘clean eating’. Like the Google searches 
for the term ‘healthy’, ‘clean eating’ have seen similar surges and subsequent falls (see Figure 
5.1). As such, it is possible that the use of moral concepts in food advertisements has increased 
together with the interest in health. To test this, advertisements were sampled from the June 
edition of magazines from 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017. A 15-year period was chosen to 
incorporate changes including both interest in ‘healthy’ and ‘clean eating’. Only magazines 
every five years were sampled in order to make the number of advertisements to analyse 
feasible. The June edition was chosen out of convenience. 
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Figure 5.1. Relative change in worldwide Google searches for the term ‘clean eating’ from 2004-2017.  
 
As seen in both Kilbourne (1994) and Griffin and Berry (2003), the use of moral concepts was 
often linked to the supposed healthiness of the product. A product would be presented as a 
healthier alternative by the use of Christian concepts such as halos – communicating that the 
product is ‘innocent’ or ‘virtuous’. Thus, the current study also measured the healthiness of the 
advertised product (both objective and perceived) and whether the healthiness was related to 
the use of moral concepts. Both a subjective measure of healthiness, in which a group of 
participants were asked to rate how healthy they thought the product was, and an objective 
coding based on nutritional profiles was used. Using two measures of healthiness goes some 
way to address the often biased judgements of healthiness by the public. For example, cereal 
bars are often thought to be healthy while containing as much sugar as a chocolate bar 
(Vasiljevic, Pechey & Marteau, 2015). However, determining with certainty the objective 
healthiness of a food item is difficult. As such, a coding scheme developed by Johnson, Mander, 
Jones, Emmett and Jebb (2008) to roughly categorise products by healthiness was used. This 
scheme groups products into healthier, neutral and less healthy items based on their general 
nutritional profile and has been utilised in research on food purchasing (Pechey et al., 2013).  
 
There is a large body of research showing that reading certain magazines, such as women’s 
fashion magazines, can have a negative impact on women (López-Guimerà, Levine, Sánches-
Carracedo & Fauquet, 2010). Specifically reading these magazines can decrease body image 
satisfaction (e.g. Botta, 2003; Thomsen, Weber & Brown, 2002) and contribute to eating 
disturbances (e.g. Thompson & Stice, 2001). There is also some research showing that 
specifically advertisements in such magazines can have negative effects on women and that 
advertisements differ between for example fashion and fitness/health magazines (Rudman & 
Verdi, 1993). Adams et al. (2011) for example showed that alcohol advertisements were more 
common in Lifestyle and Beauty magazines, while advertisements for starchy foods were more 
common in General interest women’s magazines. To account for these differences and to 
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analyse whether moral concept use was more frequent in any one publication type, a selection 
of women’s magazines with a readership above 250,000 (National Readership Survey, 2016-
2017) was included. For the purpose of the current study, a women’s magazine is defined as the 
magazines categorised as ‘women’s magazines’ according to the National Readership Survey. 
These include for example magazines published by supermarkets (e.g. Sainsbury’s, Tesco), 
women’s fashion magazines (e.g. Marie Claire, Cosmopolitan), cooking magazines (e.g. BBC 
Good Food, Jamie), weight loss magazines (e.g. Weight Watchers, Slimming World) and 
general women’s lifestyle magazines (e.g. Good Housekeeping, Yours). Women’s magazines 
were also sampled because they contained a large proportion of food, non-alcohol drink and 
nutritional supplement advertisements, and are a frequent target of advertising analysis (e.g. 
Adams et al., 2011; Barr, 1989; Duerksen et al., 2005; Pitts, Burke & Adams, 2014).  
 
The current study had two overarching aims:  
1) to examine the extent to which moral concepts are used in food, non-alcoholic drink 
and nutritional supplement advertisements in women’s magazines in the UK and 
whether this has changed from 2002 through 2007, 2012 and 2017; and  
2) to examine whether the use of moral concepts in advertisements differs by (a) product 
type (food, non-alcoholic drink, nutritional supplement), (b) healthiness of the advertised 
product, and (c) the magazine type in which the advert appears. 
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Sample 
Women’s magazines with a readership above 250,000 in the period October 2016 – September 
2017 based on the National Readership Survey (NSR) were selected for initial screening. Only 
those with a publication date before June 2012 were included. For monthly publications June 
editions were chosen, for weekly publications editions published in the first week of June were 
chosen, and May/June for Bi-Monthly Magazines. June publications were chosen out of 
convenience. Only magazines that were available either online (Readly.co.uk, 
Pocketmags.co.uk) or in the Cambridge University Library or the British Library were 
included. If the weekly magazines did not include food or drink advertisements in the first week 
of June, the last week of May was selected instead to keep the time frame consistent with the 
monthly and bi-monthly magazines. Monthly Magazines that did not include at least one food 
or non-alcoholic drink advertisements in their June 2017 issue were excluded (Vogue, 
Glamour, Elle, Ideal Home, Country Living, House Beautiful, Prima, 25 Beautiful Homes, 
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Country Homes & Interiors, Homes & Gardens, House & Garden, Take a Break, Chat, Closer, 
Heat, Woman’s Weekly, That’s Life!, Woman’s Own, Pick me Up, Woman, Bella, People’s 
Friend). The remaining 17 publications were sampled in June across 2002, 2007, 2012 and 
2017. Complete publications were only available for 12 of the magazines, due to two magazines 
being published after June 2002 (Tesco Magazine: 2004; Women’s Health: 2012; Jamie: 2008), 
and two magazine publications missing from both the British Library and Cambridge 
University Library (BBC Good Food, June 2007; Women & Home, June 2007). This resulted 
in a total sample of 61 magazines (Table 1). 
 
Table 5.1 
Overview of sampled magazines  
Magazine 
Monthly  
readership (k) 
Magazine  
Type 
Missing  
years 
No.  
advertisements 
BBC Good Food 668 Food  57 
Cosmopolitan 1021 Fashion  35 
Good Housekeeping 1164 Lifestyle  57 
Hello! 748 Celebrity  31 
Homes & Gardens 376 Home  9 
Jamie 263 Food 2002, 2007 12 
Marie Claire 463 Fashion  36 
Mother & Baby 281 Parenting  22 
OK! 841 Celebrity  29 
Red 323 Lifestyle  42 
Sainsbury’s Magazine 1220 Supermarket  111 
Slimming World 1482 Weight loss  43 
Tesco Magazine 3669 Supermarket 2002 59 
Weight Watchers 384 Weight loss  56 
Woman & Home 532 Home 2007 26 
Women’s Health 475 Health 2002, 2007 12 
Yours 329 Lifestyle  12 
 
5.2.2 Data abstraction. 
All advertisements displaying food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplements were 
included. Product placements in articles, breast milk replacement and advertisements for 
supermarkets were excluded. 649 advertisements were recorded across the 61 magazines. Of 
the 649 advertisements, 444 were unique (duplicates were discarded for coding).   
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5.2.3 Magazine type 
Magazines were categorised according to content: Celebrity, Food, Health, Home, Parenting, 
Supermarket, Weight loss, Fashion, Lifestyle (Table 5.1) 
 
5.2.4 Healthiness 
Healthiness of the advertised food product was evaluated by two separate methods. One 
method aimed to establish an estimate of healthiness based on the nutritional profile of the 
advertised item, and another method obtained the perceptions of the public as regards to the 
healthiness of the advertised product. 
 
5.2.4.1 Objective healthiness based on nutritional profile 
Based on the 43 food and drink groups established by Johnson et. al. (2008) and later used by 
Pechey et. al. (2013), the food and drink advertisements were categorised into one of three 
categories: less healthy, neutral, and healthier. Categorisation was settled in terms of the 
products’ nutritional profiles and the food categories used by Pechey et al. (2013) was used (see 
Appendix 5.2 for further details). For example, food products such as sweet snacks, processed 
meats, high-energy drinks and low-fibre bread products were categorised as ‘less healthy’, food 
products like morning goods, dairy drinks and spreads and condiments were categorised as 
‘neutral’, and vegetables, food products like high-fibre bread products and low-energy drinks 
were categorised as ‘healthier’. The nutritional supplements were not coded in terms of 
healthiness due to their ambiguity.  
 
5.2.4.2 Subjective healthiness based on public perception 
A separate online survey was carried out to measure the subjective perception of healthiness 
for each advertised food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplement item. Four hundred 
and sixty-six separate products were extracted. In cases where an advert displayed more than 
one product, the product was presented separately and the average of the ratings was 
calculated. The sample consisted of 720 UK participants. The mean age was 35.37 (SD =12.22) 
and 50% were women. They each saw 50 different products and each product was rated by 75 
participants. Products were randomly distributed across participants using Qualtrics’ 
randomisation method. An image of the product in the advertisement was presented to 
participants with information about the product name and type. They were then asked how 
healthy they thought the food product was on a scale from 1 (‘Very unhealthy’) – 6 (‘Very 
healthy’).  
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5.2.5 Categorisation of presence of moral concept 
Advertisements were coded as containing a moral concept if the advertisement met the 
operational definition of moralisation: An advertisement was moralising and coded as containing 
a moral concept if any of the following occurred: 
 
1. Moralisation of food in an advertisement included one or more verbal terms and/or images 
that implied a judgement of right or wrong.  
2. The content aimed to either elicit moral emotions* or prevent/avoid moral emotions from 
occurring, in either the consumer or others observing the consumer. Moral emotions were 
considered as: guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride, elevation, awe, gratitude, anger, 
contempt, disgust, and compassion (Tangney et al., 2007, Haidt, 2001, 2003). 
3. The content reflected aspects of morality as defined by Haidt’s (2012) moral foundations: 
Care, Fairness, Loyalty or in-group, Authority, Sanctity or purity and Liberty. 
 
An advertisement was not moralising if: 
It only included purely aesthetic judgments or purely taste judgements such as “looks good” or 
“tastes good”. 
 
5.2.6 Coding 
A pilot coding was initially conducted where 88 of the advertisements were independently 
coded by myself and a trained, independent coder. Differences between the two coders in terms 
of the moral concepts present or absent in the advertisements were discussed until agreement 
was reached. The different moral concepts that were extracted during this pilot coding 
provided the initial coding structure for the remaining 444 advertisements. All advertisements 
were then coded for either presence (1) or absence (0) of the established categories. As coding 
progressed, if no suitable category was available, a new category was created with new 
advertisements being coded as either having a presence or absence of this category. All 
advertisements were coded by myself and 20% were coded by a trained, independent second 
coder. In cases where disagreements occurred, the two coders discussed the differences until a 
consensus was reached. The final coding scheme contained 36 different moral concepts divided 
into moral themes (text or imagery) and immoral themes (text or imagery). Moral themes were 
categorised as those that allude to concepts of moral goodness (e.g. Love/Care, Goodness, 
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Angel/God/Saint), while immoral themes were those that elude to concepts of moral badness 
(e.g. Bad, Guilty, Devil). See the appendix 5.1 for an overview of the different concepts. 
 
5.3 Data analysis 
All statistical analyses were carried out in R (version 3.3.3). The presence of moral concept in 
food advertisements over time was analysed using a mixed model controlling for fixed effects 
of magazine. In cases where a cell had an expected value below 5, Fisher’s exact test was used. 
Models with interactions and/or continuous predictors and categorical outcomes were 
analysed using logistic regression models.   
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Presence of Moral Concepts 
Thirty-six different moral concepts were observed (see Appendix 5.2 for an overview and Box 
5.1 for examples). Nineteen were verbal descriptions of moral goodness themes (e.g. Divine, 
Bliss, Care) and six were moral goodness imagery (e.g. Heaven, Halo, In group imageries such 
as flags). For moral badness themes, ten were verbal descriptions (e.g. Guilty, Devil, Sinful) and 
one was moral badness imagery (engaging in something illicit). Across the four time points, 
29.50 % of advertisements contained a moral concept. Dividing the concepts into moral 
goodness or badness themes showed that 22.74 % of the advertisements used moral goodness, 
while only 3.82 % used moral badness. 2.70 % of advertisements had both themes present. See 
table 5.2 for a breakdown of each year. 
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Table 5.2 
Percentage of advertisements having a presence of moral concept, and moral goodness and badness themes overall and with the 
advertisements divided by food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplements 
 2002 
n = 117 
2007 
n = 110 
2012 
n = 112 
2017 
n = 102 
Total 
N = 444 
Presence of moral concept % (n) 29.06 (34) 31.82 (35) 32.14 (36) 25.49 (26) 29.50 (131) 
     Food 30.44 (28) 33.33 (29) 34.18 (27) 25.97 (20) 31.05 (104) 
     Non-alcoholic Drink 25.00 (5) 30.00 (6) 36.00 (9) 20.00 (4) 28.23 (24) 
     Nutritional supplement 20.00 (1) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 40.00 (2) 12.50 (3) 
     Moral goodness % (n) 23.08 (27) 27.43 (31) 27.68 (31) 23.76 (24) 25.45 (113) 
        Food 23.91 (22) 28.74 (25) 29.11 (23) 24.68 (19) 25.57 (89) 
        Non-alcoholic Drink 20.00 (4) 30.00 (6) 32.00 (8) 20.00 (4) 25.88 (22) 
        Nutritional supplement 20.00 (1) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 25.00 (1) 8.70 (2) 
     Moral badness % (n) 10.26 (12) 7.08 (8) 7.14 (8) .99 (1) 6.53 (29) 
       Food 10.87 (10) 9.20 (8) 8.86 (7) 1.30 (1) 7.76 (26) 
       Non-alcoholic Drink 5.00 (1) 0.00 (0) 4.00 (1) 0.00 (0) 2.35 (2) 
       Nutritional supplement 20.00 (1) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 4.35 (1) 
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Box 5.1.  
Examples of advertisements containing moral concepts.  
A) Advert shows imagery of ‘engaging in an illicit activity’, b) advert shows both ‘angelic’, ‘heaven’ and ‘halo’ 
imagery, as well as reference to using the cooking oil as making the user ‘saintly’, c) advert shows both ‘angelic’, 
‘heaven’ and ‘halo’ imagery, as well as references to this yoghurt not being ‘sinful’ and ‘wicked’, d) shows text 
indicating ‘superior ingroup’ by referring to ‘never forget where it comes from’, e) shows reference to the 
chocolate as ‘devils’. 
 
       
a) Marie Claire, June 2017 p 26      b) Weight watchers June 2012, p 12      c) Slimming World, May/June  
          2002, p 7       
 
               
           d) BBC Good Food, April 2007, p 50            e) Sainsbury’s magazine, June 2002, p 26         
 
Photos removed due to copyright reasons. 
Photos removed due to copyright reasons. 
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5.4.2 Change over time 
To assess whether the use of moral concepts in advertising food products has changed since 
2002, a linear mixed model controlling for the fixed effects of magazine was conducted. It 
revealed that there was no significant difference between years (see Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2). 
The use of concepts with a moral goodness theme was also not different between years, but the 
use of concepts with a moral badness theme was (see Figure 5.3). There was a 91.29 % decrease 
in the use of moral concepts with a moral badness theme when comparing 2002 with 2017, β 
= -2.44, SE = 1.06, z = -2.30, p = .02, OR = .09, 95% CI for OR [.01, .70]. 
 
Table 5.3 
Linear mixed model results for change in moral concept use between years, as well as subgroup analyses for the use of concepts with 
moral goodness and badness themes.  
Comparison years β SE z p OR 95% CI for OR % change 
2002 & 2007 .10 .30 .33 .74 1.10 .62, 1.97 10.39% increase 
    Moral goodness .23 .32 .72 .48 1.25 .67, 2.34 25.43% increase 
    Moral badness -.34 .50 -.67 .50 .71 .27, 1.90 28.57% decrease 
2002 & 2012 .17 .29 .58 .57 1.18 .66, 2.11 18.47% increase 
    Moral goodness .26 .32 .81 .42 1.29 .69, .2.40 29.07% increase 
    Moral badness -.23 .50 .46 .64 .79 .30, 2.12 20.61% decrease 
2002 & 2017 -.19 .31 -.60 .59 .83 .44, 1.53 17.22% decrease 
    Moral goodness .06 .33 .18 .86 1.06 .55, 2.03 5.97% increase 
    Moral badness -2.44 1.06 -2.30 .02 .09 .01, .70 91.29% decrease 
Note. Moral goodness and moral badness are measured within advertisements containing moral concepts.  
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Figure 5.2. Proportion of all advertisements containing a moral concept for each sampled year. Error bars represent 
95% CIs (binomial). 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Proportion of moral goodness and moral badness themes in advertisements containing a moral concept 
for each sampled year. Error bars represent 95% CIs (binomial). 
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5.4.3 Product Type  
When combining all time points, a chi square showed that moral concept was not used 
significantly more often to advertise for food, non-alcoholic drink or nutritional supplements, 
χ2 (2) = 3.78, p = .15.  Moral goodness and moral badness themes were also not used 
significantly differently across food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplement 
advertisements, Fisher’s exact test, p = .19.   
 
5.4.4 Healthiness 
5.4.4.1 Objective healthiness based on nutritional profile 
The majority of food advertisements were for less healthy products (n = 246), while the majority 
of non-alcoholic drink advertisements were for healthier products (n = 48). See Table 5.4 for 
an overview of food and non-alcoholic drinks categorised by healthiness. To assess whether 
moral concepts were differentially used to advertise products depending on healthiness, several 
analyses were conducted. First, a chi-square with healthiness (less healthy, neutral, healthier) 
and moral presence showed that there was no difference in the presence of moral concepts 
across less healthy, neutral and healthier products, χ2 (2) = .05, p = .98. Second, a logistic 
regression model was used to analyse whether healthiness affected the use of moral concepts 
differently depending on whether the advert was for a food or a non-alcoholic drink product. 
The model showed that the relationship between healthiness and moral presence differed 
depending on whether the advert was for food or non-alcoholic drink (see Figure 5.4). The 
interaction was driven by non-alcoholic drink advertisements, where less healthy drinks were 
more likely to be advertised using a moral concept than healthier drinks, β = -2.64, SD = 1.07, 
z = -2.47, p = .04. All other comparisons were statistically not significant, p > .10.  
 
Table 5.4 
Number of food and non-alcoholic drink advertisements in each healthiness category, with the percentage of advertisements 
containing a moral concept within each healthiness category. 
 Less healthy Neutral Healthier 
Food n 246 47 42 
Non-alcoholic drink n 29 8 48 
Moral presence n (%) 76 (38.19%) 18 (48.64%) 34 (60.71%) 
    Moral goodness n (%) 53 (53.53%) 16 (16.16%) 30 (30.30%) 
    Moral badness n (%) 14 (82.35%) 0 (0.00%) 3 (17.65%) 
Note. Percentage of advertisements containing a moral concept is calculated by rows. 
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Figure 5.4. Predicted probability of an advert containing a moral concept by item type and healthiness. Error 
bars represent 95% CIs.  
 
When only examining the advertisements containing moral concepts, Fisher’s exact test showed 
a trend towards healthiness and use of moral goodness and badness themes were dependent on 
each other, p = .06. Although less healthy products were more likely to have both moral 
goodness and badness themes, moral badness themes were mainly used to advertise less healthy 
food and non-alcoholic drinks. See Table 5.4 for a breakdown of themes across healthiness 
categories. 
 
5.4.4.2 Subjective healthiness based on public perception 
Most products were rated as neither very healthy nor very unhealthy but somewhere in between 
(median = 3.41). See Figure 5.5 for the frequency distribution of healthiness ratings for 
advertised products by product type. Analysing perceived healthiness (e.g. healthiness rated by 
participants), a logistic regression showed no relationship with the use of moral concept for all 
advertised products, β = .16, SD = .11, z = 1.42, p = .16. A logistic regression also showed no 
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interaction between subjective healthiness and advertised item type (food, non-alcoholic drink, 
or nutritional supplements), all ps >.1. However, using a logistic regression to analyse the 
relationship between perceived healthiness and whether the moral concept had a theme of 
moral goodness or moral badness, showed that less healthy advertisements were more likely to 
contain a moral badness theme and vice versa, β = -.88, SD = .29, z = -2.93, p = .003. (see 
Figure 5.6).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Frequency distribution of advertisements across healthiness ratings for non-alcoholic drink, food and 
nutritional supplement. 
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Figure 5.6. Predicted probability of an advertisement containing an immoral theme as a function of healthiness. 
Bands show 95% CIs.  
 
5.4.5 Magazine Type 
To examine the use of moral concept in different magazine types, all advertisements (including 
duplicates) were analysed. This was to account for the same advert appearing in different 
magazines.  Fisher’s exact test showed that the presence of moral concept was not equal across 
magazine types, p = 0.009 (see Figure 5.7). However, when breaking it down using a post-hoc 
test with Bonferroni-Holm corrections, no single comparison reached significance p >.05. 
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Figure 5.7 Proportion of moral presence across magazine types. Error bars represent 95% CIs (binomial). 
 
 
5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1 Summary of findings 
The results of the study showed that moral concepts were used in advertisements for food, non-
alcoholic drinks and nutritional supplements in about one third of all sampled magazines for 
all years combined. Within the advertisements containing a moral concept, the use of text or 
imagery containing moral goodness themes (e.g. angel, divine, superior in-group) were also 
used more often than moral badness themes (e.g. devil, illicit activity). The rate of moral 
concept use was consistent over the 15 years sampled. Within the advertisements containing a 
moral concept, the change in moral goodness themes stayed the same while there was a 
decrease in moral badness themes. There were no statistically significant differences between 
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advertisements for food, non-alcoholic drinks, or nutritional supplements in terms of moral 
concept usage.  
 
When the advertised products were categorised by healthiness according to their nutritional 
profile – objective healthiness, most advertisements were for unhealthy food products. 
Although there was no significant difference in the use of moral concept depending on objective 
healthiness overall, healthy non-alcoholic drink advertisements were more likely to contain a 
moral concept. When only advertisements containing moral concepts were analysed, results 
showed that unhealthy products were more likely to be advertised using themes of moral 
badness.  
 
A sample of participants also gave their subjective ratings of healthiness for all products. There 
was no overall significant relationship between subjective healthiness ratings and the use of 
moral concept, and this relationship did not depend on whether the advertisements was for 
food, non-alcoholic drink or nutritional supplement. Analysing the use of moral goodness and 
badness themes within the advertisements containing moral concepts showed that the less 
healthy the product was perceived to be, the more likely the advertisement was to contain a 
theme of moral badness. Finally, no difference between any two magazine types was found in 
the use of moral concepts. 
 
The finding that about one third of advertisements contained a reference to ideas of morality 
is of significance. Considering 23-41% of the UK population read women’s monthly and 
weekly magazines, the types of messages that are contained therein have the possibility of 
influencing people’s attitudes and beliefs. In the same way that being continuously exposed to 
the fashion models presented in magazines can cause body image dissatisfaction (e.g. Thomsen 
et al., 2002; Botta, 2003) and eating disturbances (e.g. Thompson & Stice, 2001) due to the 
unachievable goal of the ‘thin-ideal’, a repeated association between food and morality could 
have other so far unknown consequences. For example, a repeated association between 
unhealthiness and moral badness might increase the belief that those who eat unhealthily are 
‘bad’ people (Vartanian, Herman & Polivy, 2007). 
 
Although the public has become more interested in healthiness, there was not a significant 
associated change in the use of moral concepts from 2002 to 2017. The use of moral goodness 
themes was also not significantly different across time points, but the use of moral badness 
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themes had decreased. However, due to a small number of advertisements containing moral 
badness themes these trends should be interpreted with caution. The results indicate that even 
though there is a longstanding association between morality, food and health (as discussed in 
Chapter 2), this does not mean a direct increased interest in healthiness results in an increased 
use of moral concepts to present food products. A larger period could be sampled to establish 
whether longer-term changes have occurred. For example, as religion lost some importance in 
Western societies in the last century, this could impact the use of morality in advertisements. 
Over this longer period, it could either be that moral imagery of the religious kind has lessened, 
or that the lack of moral guidance through the church has left a vacuum that has to a larger 
degree been filled by health and body concerns (Cedeström & Spicer, 2015), thereby increasing 
the use of moral concepts to communicate about food.  
 
In previous research Griffin and Berry (2003) pointed out that Christian imagery such as angels 
is used to sell a ‘healthier’ alternatives to a less healthy product. Extending this analysis, the 
current study found that an advert was more likely to have a theme with moral badness rather 
than moral goodness the less healthy the product. This is also in line with the idea that moral 
goodness is associated with good health, self-control and treating the body like a temple, while 
moral badness is more associated with pleasure, hedonism and indulgence, such as one of the 
seven sins gluttony. As seen in Chapter 2, people think those who eat unhealthy foods like 
burgers are ‘bad’ and those who eat healthy foods like salads are ‘good’ (Vartanian et al, 2007). 
By playing on these associations, advertising companies may be increasing liking and thereby 
sales due to already established bonds (Green, Wind & Jain, 1972). Furthermore, magazines 
have been found to provide a source of nutritional information (Cash et al., 2014). Because 
healthiness and moral goodness have a cultural and historical association, products that contain 
high levels of fat and sugar could be perceived as healthier if they are advertised using a moral 
goodness theme. Although research has shown that some associations, such as those with 
organic or fair trade labels, can shift a product to be perceived as healthier (Schuldt, Müller & 
Schwarz, 2012, Schuldt & Schwarz, 2010), further research needs to establish whether moral 
concepts such as those presented here have similar effects. Studies 4, 5, 6 and 7 provides a first 
investigation. 
 
5.5.2 Strengths and limitations 
In comparison to previous analyses of Christian notions of morality in food advertisements 
(Griffin & Berry, 2003; Kilbourne, 1994), the current study examined a large proportion of 
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advertisements and the degree to which morality was used. By using a definition of morality 
that included concepts beyond religion, such as ingroup superiority and ideas around morality 
in psychology today, the mapping was more comprehensive than that previously carried out by 
Griffin and Berry (2003) and Kilbourne (1994).  
 
Moreover, two forms of healthiness estimates were used: healthiness coded based on a rough 
estimate of nutritional characteristics, and perceptions of healthiness as rated by a group of 
participants sampled from the general population. This meant that analyses could be carried 
out to test for associations with what the public’s judgements of subjective healthiness were in 
comparison to a more objective measure of product healthiness. However, due to the difficulty 
of estimating ‘true’ healthiness, this is also one of the limitations of the study. Complete 
nutritional content is needed to make a more comprehensive evaluation, which was not 
available for most products. As such, a rough objective estimate and public subjective 
perception was used in lieu of this. Future work would benefit from more thorough 
categorisation of healthiness if the nutritional information is available.  
 
Out of convenience, only magazines from June publications were used. Although this method 
controls for possible seasonal variations, it limits the generalisability of the results to other 
months. For example, a large proportion of moral goodness themes could be due to marketing 
companies directing their messages towards summery, lighter themes and are also wary of their 
customer’s potential desire to lose weight and embark on a healthier diet (Madden, 2017). 
Research has also found that there are seasonal differences in what types of food being 
advertised (Adams, et al., 2011), which again could contribute to changes in moral concept use 
depending on the time of year. To further examine this, publications from each season could 
be tested. 
 
5.6 Summary and the next chapter 
The study reported in this chapter found that about one third of advertisements for food, 
non-alcoholic drinks and nutritional supplements in women’s magazines in the UK between 
2002 and 2017 contained moral concepts. This rate seems to have remained constant over 
the last 15 years. Little is known, however, about the effects such messages might have on 
how people respond to foods that are presented together with a moral concept. The next 
chapter presents a series of studies that examine the effect of moral labels on the desire, 
consumption and selection of a less healthy and a healthier food product. 
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Study 4, 5, 6 and 7 
 
Impact of moral labels on desire, selection and 
consumption of food: Three experimental 
studies and a meta-analysis 
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Summary 
Background.  Food is sometimes marketed using moral terms. Little is known about the 
impact of this association between food, eating and morality. Three studies formed the first test 
of the impact of food labels denoting a moral or an immoral concept on people’s desire (Study 
4), consumption (Study 5) and selection (Study 6) of healthier and unhealthier food. The results 
of these three studies are synthesised in Study 7. Whether increased desire, consumption and 
selection conformed to a pattern of congruency (moral concept-healthy food and immoral 
concept-unhealthy food) was tested.  
 
Methods: Three studies (Study 4: n = 725, Study 5: n = 210, Study 6: n = 276) tested whether 
two moral labels (‘Angelic’ and ‘Devilish’), differentially affected (a) desire to consume (Study 4 
and 5), (b) consumption (Study 5) and (c) selection (Study 6) of healthier (cereal bar) and 
unhealthier (chocolate bar) food. For the meta-analysis, Studies 4 and 5 were analysed together 
to discern any overall effect on desire to consume. To meta-analyse the consumption and 
selection outcomes in Study 5 and 6, the consumption variable was dichotomised based on 
whether participants ate more of the cereal bar or the chocolate bar into a combined 
‘behavioural’ measure.  
 
Results: Study 4 showed that, overall, participants desired chocolate bars more than cereal 
bars. This effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction whereby chocolate bars 
with an immoral label were more desired than those with a moral label, η2p = .01, p = .07: a 
Devilish labelled chocolate bar was more desired than a ‘Devilish’ labelled cereal bar. There 
was no difference in desire between for Angelic labelled food. In Study 5 participants desired 
chocolate bars more and label did not influence desire for any bar, d = .07, p = .62. For 
consumption, participants consumed more cereal bars regardless of label, d = .19, p = .18. 
When the variable was dichotomised, the results followed the congruency pattern: cereal bars 
were most consumed when labelled as ‘Angelic’, while chocolate bars were most consumed 
when labelled as ‘Devilish’, OR = 1.58, p = .04, In Study 6, selection also followed a congruency 
pattern: participants were more likely to select a cereal bar with an ‘Angelic’ label and a 
chocolate bar with a ‘Devilish’ label than the other way around, OR = 1.95, p = .01. 
Synthesising the results of these three experiments (Study 7), showed no effect of label type on 
desire, d = .08, 95% CI [-.06, .22], but a statistically significant effect of label type on the 
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combined behavioural measure (consumption and selection), log OR = .55, 95% CI [.21, .88].  
Specifically, a Devilish label increased participants’ behaviour towards a chocolate bar and an 
Angelic label increased participants’ behaviour towards a cereal bar. 
 
Conclusions: Results across three studies and their synthesis in a meta-analysis suggest that 
food labelled with congruent labels affect behaviour (selection and consumption), but do not 
affect participants’ self-reported desire to consume the food. A chocolate bar with an immoral 
label and a cereal bar with a moral label (congruent) were preferred over a chocolate bar with 
a moral label and a cereal bar with an immoral label (incongruent).  
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Background 
When estimating the objective healthiness or calorie content of food products, people are often 
inaccurate (Stanton & Tips, 1990). The calorie content of food perceived as ‘healthy’ is 
underestimated but overestimated for perceived ‘unhealthy’ foods (Carels, Harper & Konrad, 
2006; Carels, Konrad & Harper, 2007). Such errors are not uncommon. When making quick, 
everyday decisions people rely to a large degree on automatic processes and heuristics 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Tversky & Kahmeman, 1974). These processes often fall prey 
to impulses and desires (Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012; Rook, 1987) and can 
easily be influenced by so-called ‘nudges’ – cues in the environment that prompt perceptions 
or behaviours in a certain direction. When an entity is unknown, complex or ambiguous, signals 
extrinsic to the object are especially influential in the formation of perceptions of intrinsic 
properties. In the case of food perceptions, a range of external cues influence estimates 
(Provencher & Jacob, 2016). For example, research has shown that people are biased by cues 
such as nutritional labels (e.g. Kozup, Creyer & Burton, 2003), red/green colour labels (e.g. 
Schuldt 2013; Temple, Johnson, Archer, LaCarte & Epstein, 2011), stereotypes about brand 
names (e.g. Cavanagh & Forestell, 2013; Oakes, 2005) the perceived healthiness of the 
restaurant (Chandon & Wansink, 2007) or the presence of a healthy side dish (Forwood, Ahern, 
Hollands, Fletcher & Marteau, 2013). 
 
Labels are powerful communicators and are used by marketing companies to conjure up ideas 
and emotions in the consumer (Wansink, van Ittersum & Painter, 2004). Value-based claims 
such as ‘organic’ and ‘fair-trade’ have received attention due to their effect on perceived 
healthfulness (e.g. Lee, Shimizu, Kniffini & Wansink, 2013; Sörqvist et al., 2015; Schuldt & 
Hannahan, 2013; Schuldt et al., 2012; Schuldt & Schwarz, 2010). Schuldt and colleagues 
(2012) found that the ‘fair trade’ label, which indicated that workers have been paid and treated 
fairly, lowers the estimates of calorie content of chocolate.  Moreover, the products from a 
company that displays corporate social responsibility are perceived as lower in calorie than 
from a control company (Peloza, Ye & Montford, 2015). Similarly, although organic 
production methods have limited impact on nutritional content (Smith-Spangler et al., 2012), 
participants rated cookies labelled as having been ‘produced with organic flour and sugar’ as 
lower in calories than conventionally labelled cookies (Schuldt & Schwarz, 2010). This has been 
dubbed the ‘health halo’. In halo effects, one good aspect of the item influences the evaluation 
of the item as a whole (e.g. Andrews, Burton & Netemeyer, 2000; Asch, 1946, Thorndike, 
103 
 
1920). For example, attractive individuals are thought to have more favourable personality 
traits and become more successful in life (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani & Longo, 1991). In the 
case of fair trade or organic food labels, the knowledge that a food item has been produced 
ethically biases people to judge the item as healthier than it is. 
 
Both fair trade and organic labels are ethical labels that reflect an aspect of the product. 
However, as seen in Chapter 5, many marketing companies also utilise moral descriptions that 
are otherwise unrelated to aspects of the ingredients or production method of the product 
(Griffin & Berry, 2003; Kilbourne, 1994). For example, there is ‘Virtue Ice Tea’, ‘Innocent 
Smoothies’, ‘Divine Chocolate’ and ice cream marketed as ‘Seven Deadly Sins’. Tapping into 
the halo effect, the moral theme is likely used to sell an idea and to communicate properties or 
attributes outside of the products themselves. 
 
When a product receives a halo, people could justify eating larger portions of a product they 
would otherwise consume less of, while at the same time maintaining the belief that they have 
been healthy. A consistent positive self-image, such as personal moral status, is an important 
aspect of many people’s identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This need for consistency, the degree 
to which a person believes they are good or bad, motivates effortful behaviour to both confirm 
personal goodness or fight potential threats to it, prospectively or subsequently (Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2007). As seen in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, people change their behaviour in line with a 
moral balance theory (Merritt et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001), where bad behaviour 
motivates people to compensate with good behaviour and good behaviour licenses bad 
behaviour. In relation to food, carrying out an effortful word task has been found to increase 
hedonistic behaviour such as eating snacks (de Witt Huberts et al., 2012), and when purchasing 
a green product people have been found to later cheat and steal more than when purchasing a 
conventional product (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Exposure to healthy organic food products has 
also been found to decrease the amount of time people volunteer to help someone else (Eskine, 
2013).  
 
This type of self-licensing has not only been found to occur sequentially, but the hedonistic act 
can also be licensed by the presence of the halo effect. A recent review of food, alcohol and 
tobacco labelling (Shemilt, Hendry & Marteau, 2017) found some evidence that labels such as 
‘Low fat’, ‘Reduced calories’ and similar can shift people’s opinion of these products. For 
example, low-fat labelled snacks were perceived as having fewer calories, tasted better and had 
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better health attributes than the regular labelled snacks (Ebneter, Latner & Nigg, 2013). A study 
in which participants were given either foods labelled with ‘Lower fat’ or ‘Normal fat’ or 
‘Higher fat’, participants said they were more likely to buy the Lower fat’ in comparison to both 
the ‘Normal fat’ or ‘Higher fat’ labelled foods (Westcombe & Wardle, 1997). Looking at 
selection of food, margarine labelled as ‘Reduced fat (40% fat)’ or ‘Full fat (80% fat)’ was 
selected more than the ‘Reduced fat’ margarine (Aaron, Mela & Evans, 1994). Energy intake 
has also been found to increase by 3% of food labelled as ‘low energy/fat’ in comparison to 
baseline and ‘high energy/fat’ labels (McCann et al., 2013). However, there was not enough 
high-quality evidence for a conclusion about whether this leads to licensing behaviour in terms 
of selection or consumption overall. A more recent study by Vasiljevic and colleagues suggested 
that lower strength alcohol labels may carry similar effects to the labelling of food and tobacco 
by increasing alcohol consumption (see Vasiljevic, Couturier, Frings, Moss, Albery, & Marteau, 
2018). In sum, prior research indicates that labels that signal healthiness such as ‘low fat’ etc. 
can alter perceptions of food products and this has the potential to induce self-licensing to justify 
higher consumption of food that could be unhealthy overall.  
 
It is possible that moral labels also have a halo effect and can impact perception and 
consumption of the labelled food product. However, limited prior research has looked at 
whether positively-valued and negatively-valued labels affect healthy and unhealthy foods 
independently. The Gestalt concept of unity-in-variety suggests that people expect certain 
properties to go together and like products with a high goodness-of-fit (Green et al., 1972). 
From research on actual versus expected food experience (Yeomans, Chambers, Blumenthal 
& Blake, 2008), results seem to suggest that the actual consumption experience is compared 
with the expected consumption experience. If there is a discrepancy between the two entities 
people use either assimilation or contrast effects to account for the difference. In assimilation 
effects, the actual experience of the product is changed to more closely match the expected 
experience. In contrast effects, the discrepancy is exaggerated. Okamoto and colleagues (2009) 
found that participants rated food samples as tastier when they had labels matching the taste 
(such as ‘lemon’ for a sour taste) than when it was not matching the taste (such as ‘lemon’ for 
an umami taste).  
 
As seen above, extrinsic properties such as the label can influence perceptions of the intrinsic 
properties such as healthiness or calorie content. Comparably, the label can also influence the 
formation of the consumers’ expected experience. A moral label is likely to create different 
105 
 
expectations than an immoral label. As seen in prior research on ethical production labels, a 
fair-trade label is likely to create expectations of healthiness (Schuldt et al., 2011). Conversely, 
it is possible that an immoral label could create expectations of unhealthiness. In the studies 
presented here, both a moral and an immoral label were used together with either an unhealthy 
or healthy product, giving four combinations: morally labelled healthy food, morally labelled 
unhealthy food, immorally labelled healthy food and immorally labelled unhealthy food. A 
chocolate bar was chosen as the unhealthy product and a cereal bar was chosen as a healthy 
product. Although both foods are comparable in terms of nutritional content, people perceive 
cereal bars as healthier than chocolate bars (Urala & Lähteenmäki, 2006, Vasiljevic, Pechey & 
Marteau, 2015).  
 
From the literature on the ‘need for consistency’ (e.g. Festinger, 1957; Reynolds & Ceranic, 
2007) discussed above, there is evidence suggesting that when there is a congruency between 
the value of the label and personal value, the positive perception of the food increases and 
people are more likely to choose the product (Sirgy, 1982; Litvin & Kar, 2004). For example, a 
study by Allen, Gupta and Monnier (2008) showed that participants who valued an exciting life 
(a self-concept stereotyped by ‘Coca Cola’ advertisements), rated a soft drink as tastier when 
labelled as ‘Coca Cola’ then as ‘Woolworth cola’. Similarly, in the study by Schuldt and 
colleagues (2011), in comparison to those who did not value ethical production methods, 
participants who valued ethical production methods thought the fair trade labelled food 
products were lower in calories than the conventional labelled products. Thus, the current 
studies also assessed the potential moderating influence of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 
2002) and whether moral labels would affect a self-identifying moral person differently. There 
is also some evidence that those who restrain their food intake are differentially influenced by 
brand associations. Cavanagh and Forestell (2013) found that restrained eaters ate more cookies 
that had a ‘healthy-sounding’ brand rather than an ‘unhealthy-sounding’ brand. As such, a 
measure of restrained eating was included as an additional moderator. 
 
Overview of studies 
Although moral food labelling is widespread, no research has been carried out on the influence 
of such labels. Three experiments were conducted to determine the impact of moral labels on 
the self-reported desire for (Study 4 and 5), and the observed behaviour towards (Study 5 and 
6) chocolate bars and cereal bars. In addition, individual differences in moral identity (the 
degree to which someone thinks being moral is a core part of their identity), and restrained 
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eating (the degree to which someone restrains their food intake to lose or maintain weight), 
were assessed as moderators in Study 4 and 5. In Study 5, impulsivity was also assessed as a 
moderator. Study 7 is an internal meta-analysis of self-reported desire to consume and observed 
behaviour (selection and consumption combined) towards the food as a function of the moral 
labelling.  
 
6.1 Study 4 
The primary aim of Study 4 was to test the impact of moral labels on desire to consume 
unhealthy and healthier food.  
 
Four hypotheses were tested: 
1. Participants will report a higher desire to consume chocolate than cereal bars.  
2. Participants will report a higher desire for the morally labelled food than the food 
without a moral label.  
3. There will be an interaction between food type and moral label on desire to consume. 
4. The interaction between moral label type and food type on the desire to consume will 
be moderated by a) restrained eating and b) moral identity. 
 
6.1.1 Method 
6.1.1.1 Study design 
A 2 (food type: chocolate bar vs. cereal bar) x 3 (label type: moral vs. immoral vs. no moral 
connotation) between-subjects design. Out of the six possible combinations of food and label 
type, one combination was randomly presented to participants. 
 
6.1.1.2 Participants 
A sample of 725 adults was recruited by a research agency and was nationally representative 
across age, gender, socioeconomic status and geographical region in the UK. Only participants 
who successfully passed the attention checks embedded in the online survey were included in 
analyses. The required sample size was based on an effect size taken from a study with a similar 
design that reported a small to medium sized interaction effect of food and label type (η2 = .02) 
on self-reported tastiness of food (Vasiljevic et al., 2015). Because the study reported a very 
small effect on desire to consume (η2 = .005) the related outcome of tastiness was chosen as a 
more feasible effect size.  This sample size provided 90% power at 5% level of significance to 
detect a small to medium sized interaction between food type and label type. It also allowed 
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me to detect a significant difference in the simple main effects when decomposing the 
interaction with 80% power at 5% level of significance. 
 
6.1.1.3 Intervention 
Participants either saw a chocolate bar (unhealthy) or cereal bar (healthier option). The food 
label was altered to reflect either a moral (‘Angelic Chocolate/Cereal Bar’), immoral (‘Devilish 
Chocolate/Cereal Bar’) or no moral connotation [control condition] (‘Chocolate Bar/Cereal 
Bar’).  The food was displayed without packaging, with the label presented above the product 
(Figure 6.1). A pilot study was conducted to decide the moral words to pair with the food. 
Twenty-two moral words were paired separately with a chocolate and a cereal bar and 
displayed to a sample of 86 participants (55 female, mean age = 20.12, SD = 12.98) in exchange 
for the possibility of winning a £20 Amazon voucher. The participants rated each labelled food 
on how likely they were to buy and eat the food, how likely was that such a product existed and 
how appealing it was (‘attractive’, ‘eye-catching’, ‘cool’, ‘fun’ and ‘worth looking at’). The labels 
Angelic and Devilish emerged as the word pair with the highest credibility and appeal ratings 
(see Appendix 6.1 for more detail). 
 
Figure 6.1. Sample labels on a cereal and chocolate bar. 
 
6.1.1.4 Procedure 
The study was carried out online, using the testing platform Qualtrics. The study was approved 
by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee of the University of Cambridge (ref: 
2015/16-18). After giving informed consent, participants completed questions pertaining to 
their demographics. In the central part of the study participants were shown a labelled food 
item and asked to complete a series of questions concerning the food and their perceptions of 
it, as well as their predictions regarding their future eating behaviours. Participants were 
randomly assigned to see one of the food and label combinations through the Qualtrics 
randomization function. Participants were also administered an attention check, in which they 
were asked “When was the last time you have flown to Mars?” Any participant choosing an 
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answer other than “Never” was not included in the final sample.  Finally, the Dutch Eating 
Behaviour Questionnaire (van Strien et al., 1986) and Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 
2002) were administered before participants were debriefed.  
6.1.1.5 Measures 
6.1.1.5.1 Primary outcome: Self-reported desire to consume 
This item was adapted from Vasiljevic et al. (2015): ‘How much would you like to eat this 
chocolate (cereal) bar now?’, with answers recorded on a visual analogue scale from 0 (‘Not at 
all’) to 100 (‘Very much so’). The cursor was placed in the middle of the scale as a starting 
position.  
 
6.1.1.5.2 Secondary outcomes 
Tastiness. Perceived tastiness was measured by the following question: ‘Compared to other bars 
like this, how tasty is this chocolate (cereal) bar?’, with answers recorded on a VAS ranging 
from 0 (‘Less tasty’) to 100 (‘More tasty’). 
 
Healthiness. The healthiness of the product was measured by: ‘Compared to other bars like this, 
how healthy is this chocolate (cereal) bar?’, with responses ranging from 1 (‘Less healthy’) to 
100 (‘More healthy’).  
 
Calories. Estimated calorie value was measured by the question: ‘Compared to other bars like 
this, how many calories do you think this chocolate (cereal) bar contains?’, with answers 
recorded on a VAS ranging from 0 (‘Less calories’) to 100 (‘More calories’). 
 
6.1.1.5.3 Other measures 
Self-Licensing. How much participants might compensate by changing their consumption after 
being exposed to a ‘Devilish’ or ‘Angelic’ labelled food item was measured by two questions 
answered on a scale from 1 (‘Strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘Strongly agree’): ‘If I were to have this 
chocolate (cereal) bar now, I would feel like I deserved something sweeter for my next snack’ 
and ‘If I were to have this chocolate (cereal) bar now, I would feel like I could have more than 
my usual number of snacks’. The internal reliability for this scale was r = .70, p < .001.  
 
Motivation to reduce consumption. Three further questions were asked about participants’ behaviour 
in the next six months: ‘I intend to eat fewer snacks', ‘I want to eat fewer snacks' and ‘I will try 
to eat fewer snacks'. The internal reliability for this scale was good, a = .82. 
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Restrained Eating. The eating restraint subscale of the Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire 
(van Strien et al., 1986) was administered to measure participants' tendency to restrain their 
food intake [e.g., ‘Do you take into account your weight with what you eat?' and ‘Do you eat 
less at meal times then you would like to eat?']. Participants provided answers to 11 items on 
scales ranging from 1 (‘Never') to 5 (‘Very Often'). The scale had excellent internal reliability in 
the current study, a = .93. Two items were added to the scale: participants were also asked 
whether they have had or currently have an eating disorder (Anorexia Nervosa, Bulimia 
Nervosa and Binge-eating Disorder) and if it was diagnosed by a clinician.   
 
Moral Identity. The Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) was used to capture how central 
morality is to participants’ self-concept, by asking to what degree they relate to a series of moral 
traits (e.g. ‘caring’, ‘compassionate’, ‘honest’): ‘It would make me feel good to be a person who 
has these characteristics’ and ‘Having these characteristics is an important part of my sense of 
self’ on a 1 (‘Strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘Strongly disagree’) Likert-type scale (a = .83). The scale 
is comprised of 13 items.  
 
6.1.1.5.4 Control variables 
Hunger was measured on a scale from 1(‘Very hungry’) to 7 (‘Full’) with the question: ‘How 
hungry do you feel right now?’. Participants also provided their age, gender, ethnicity, height 
and weight, political affiliation and indices of socio-economic status (profession of highest 
earner, yearly salary).  
 
6.1.2 Data Analysis 
All analyses were carried out in R (version 3.3.3). The primary and secondary outcomes were 
analysed using factorial ANOVAs with food type, label type and the interaction between the 
two as predictors. Separate models were conducted for the three-way interactions with 
restrained eating and moral identity. To breakdown any significant interactions, Bonferroni-
Holm was used.  
 
6.1.2.1 Assumptions 
All models were checked for assumptions. The distribution of desire to consume was bimodal, 
resulting in non-normally distributed model residuals (see Appendix 6.2 for further details). To 
account for the distribution several different models were explored. However, neither provided 
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a useful improvement in comparison to a factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). To improve 
the final model the continuous variables hunger, age and BMI were included in addition to the 
main predictors of interest: Food type (cereal bar or chocolate bar) interacting with Label type 
(Angelic, Devilish or Control).  All other assumptions were met for the remaining models.  
6.1.2.2 Randomisation checks 
To ensure successful randomisation, the groups were compared on relevant measures and 
demographics. The groups were not significantly different in terms of age, F (5, 719) = .77, p = 
.58, gender, χ2 (5) = 1.56, p = .91, ethnicity, χ2 (5) = 23.08, p = .81, BMI, F (5, 703) = .49, p = 
.79 and SES, χ2 (55) = 44.90, p = .83. Participants hunger reports were also not significantly 
different by group, F (5, 719) = 2.65, p = .02. Including hunger in the models did not change 
the conclusions of the analyses (see Appendix 6.3). 
 
6.1.3 Results 
6.1.3.1 Participants.  
Participants (n = 725) had a mean age of 46.62 years (SD = 16.96) and 50.48% were women. 
The sample was majority White (92.97%), with a mean BMI of 25.4 (SD = 24.77).  See Table 
6.1 for an overview of participant characteristics. 
 
6.1.3.2 Primary Outcome: Self-reported desire to consume 
See Table 6.2 for an overview of test statistics and Table 3 for means and standard deviations. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Participants will report a higher desire to consume chocolate than 
cereal bars. The model showed that the chocolate bars (M = 53.71, SD = 33.61) were more 
desired than the cereal bars (M = 44.09, SD = 32.27), F (1, 700) = 18.08, p <.001, η2 = .02. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Participants will report a higher desire for the morally labelled food 
than the food without a moral label.  
The results showed that there was no significant difference between the labels on desire to 
consume (Angelic M = 47.95, SD = 34.28, Devilish M = 50.18, SD = 32.66, Control M = 48.21, 
SD = 32.91), F (2, 700) = .34, p = .71, η2p = .001. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There will be an interaction between food type and moral label on 
desire to consume.  
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There was a marginally significant interaction between food type and label, F (2, 700) = 2.63, 
p = .07, η2p = .01. Planned comparisons indicated that participants did not desire the cereal bar 
more when it was labelled as Angelic (M = 46.64, SD = 34.49) than when labelled as Devilish 
(M = 43.28, SD = 31.22), F (1, 238) = .36, p = .62, η2p = .002. However, the Devilish chocolate 
bar (M = 57.31, SD = 32.72) was more desired than the Devilish cereal bar (M = 43.28, SD = 
31.22), F (1, 238) = 11.46, p = .007, η2p = .05, and the control chocolate bar (M = 54.47, SD = 
33.75) was more desired than the control cereal bar (M = 42.39, SD = 31.13), F (1, 232) = 8.48, 
p = .02, η2p = .03 (see Figure 6.2. and Table 6.4) 
 
Hypothesis 4: The interaction between moral label type and food type on the 
desire to consume will be moderated by a) restrained eating and b) moral identity.  
Neither the three-way interaction between food type, label, and restrained eating (continuous), 
F (2, 707) = .16, p = .85, η2p = .003, nor with moral identity (continuous), F (2, 707) = .48, p = 
.62, η2p <.001, on desire to consume was found to be significant. 
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C
hocolate 
(n = 117) 
D
evilish 
C
ereal 
(n = 122) 
D
evilish 
C
hocolate 
(n =
118) 
C
ontrol  
C
ereal 
(n = 127) 
C
ontrol  
C
hocolate 
(n = 118) 
 T
otal  
(n = 725) 
A
ge M
 (SD
) 
46.89 (16.33) 
47.44 (17.16) 
44.30 (17.37) 
45.91 (16.23) 
47.09 (17.69) 
48.14 (16.97) 
46.62 (16.96) 
G
ender [Fem
ale] %
 (n) 
51.22 (63) 
52.99 (62) 
46.72 (57) 
50.00 (59) 
48.82 (62) 
53.39 (63) 
50.48 (366) 
Ethnicity [W
hite]%
 (n) 
95.12 (117) 
94.87 (111) 
95.08 (116) 
92.37 (109) 
88.19 (112) 
92.37 (109) 
92.97 (674) 
Education [U
niversity 
    degree] %
 (n) 
34.96 (43) 
35.90 (42) 
41.80 (51) 
33.05 (39) 
37.80 (48) 
37.29 (44) 
36.83%
 (267) 
BM
I M
 (SD
) 
25.39 (5.20) 
25.04 (5.10) 
24.97 (4.42) 
25.51 (5.84) 
25.77 (5.91) 
25.74 (5.23) 
25.40 (5.30) 
H
unger 
3.57 (1.28) 
3.58 (1.34) 
3.61 (1.29) 
3.80 (1.29) 
3.98 (1.28) 
3.45 (1.29) 
3.67 (1.30) 
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Table 6.2 
Results of ANOVAs for the primary outcome (Desire to Consume) and secondary outcomes (Tastiness, Healthiness and Calories) 
by food type, label type, RE and MI. 
Predictor F df p η2p 
   Desire to Consume     
      Food 18.08 1, 700 <.001 .02 
      Label .34 2, 700 .71 .001 
      Food *Label 2.63 2, 700 .07 .01 
      Food *Label*RE .16 2, 707 .85 .003 
      Food *Label*MI .48 2, 707 .62 <.001 
  Tastiness     
      Food .27 1, 719 .60 .0004 
      Label 1.22 2, 719 .30 .003 
      Food *Label 5.86 2, 719 .003 .02 
      Food *Label*RE .65 2, 713 .53 .002 
      Food *Label*MI 1.45 2, 713 .24 .004 
  Healthiness     
      Food 64.29 1, 719 <.001 .08 
      Label 1.49 2, 719 .23 .004 
      Food *Label 4.48 2, 719 .01 .01 
      Food *Label*RE .87 2, 713 .42 .002 
      Food *Label*MI 1.95 2, 713 .14 .005 
  Calories     
      Food 5.68 1, 719 .02 .008 
      Label .46 1, 719 .63 .001 
      Food *Label .69 2, 719 .50 .002 
      Food *Label*RE .34 2, 713 .71 .001 
      Food *Label*MI .13 2, 713 .87 .0004 
Note. RE = Restrained Eating, MI = Moral Identity. 
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Figure 6.2.  Interaction between food and label type on desire to consume food type. Error bars are 95% CIs. 
 
6.1.3.3 Secondary Outcomes.   
See Table 6.2 for the test statistics and Table 6.3 for breakdowns of means and standard 
deviations of Table 6.4 for simple main effects of significant interactions.  
  
Tastiness.  
A 2 (Food type: cereal bar or chocolate bar) x 3 (Label type: Angelic, Devilish or Control) 
ANOVA revealed that chocolate bars (M = 56.87, SD = 20.55) were not perceived as tastier 
than cereal bars (M = 56.05, SD = 21.85), F (1, 719) = .27, p = .60, η2p = .0004, and there was 
no difference in tastiness between the Angelic (M = 57.06, SD = 20.35), Devilish (M = 57.57, 
SD = 20.93) and Control bars (M = 54.76, SD = 22.27), F (2, 719) = 1.22, p = .30, η2p = .003.  
Although no main effects were significant the two predictors interacted (Figure 6.3). Simple 
effects with Bonferroni-Holm corrections showed that a cereal bar was rated as tastier when 
labelled as Angelic (M = 60.38, SD = 21.79) than when labelled with no moral descriptors (M 
= 52.45, SD = 22.53), F (1, 248) = 8.00, p = .04, η2p = .03, while a chocolate bar was rated as 
tastier when labelled as Devilish (M = 59.77, SD = 21.17) rather than Angelic (M = 53.56, SD 
= 18.16), F (1, 233) = 5.82, p = .05, η2p = .02. Furthermore, Angelic labels made participants 
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rate cereal bars (M = 60.38, SD = 21.79) as marginally tastier than chocolate bars (M = 53.56, 
SD = 18.16), F (1, 238) = 6.90, p = .04, η2p = .03. No other effects were significant.  
  
Table 6.3 
Means and standard deviations for Desire to Consume, Tastiness, Healthiness and Calories by both food type and label type 
separately and in total.  
  Food type   
Label Total M (SD) Cereal bar M (SD) Chocolate bar M (SD) 
Desire to Consume    
    Angelic 47.95 (34.28) 46.64(34.49) 49.32 (34.16) 
    Devilish 50.18 (32.66) 43.28 (31.22) 57.31 (32.72) 
    Control 48.21 (32.91) 42.39 (31.13) 54.47 (33.75) 
    Total 48.77 (33.26) 44.09 (32.27) 53.71 (33.61) 
Tastiness    
    Angelic 57.06 (20.35) 60.38 (21.79) 53.56 (18.16) 
    Devilish 57.57 (20.93) 55.43 (20.56) 59.77 (21.17) 
    Control 54.76 (22.27) 52.45 (22.53) 57.24 (21.81) 
    Total 56.45 (21.21) 56.05 (21.85) 56.87 (20.55) 
Healthiness    
    Angelic 55.09 (19.02) 63.38 (17.54) 46.37 (16.51) 
    Devilish 52.65 (19.41) 56.72 (19.80) 48.43 (18.14) 
    Control 52.50 (20.15) 56.40 (20.51) 48.30 (18.96) 
    Total 53.40 (19.55) 58.81 (19.55) 47.70 (17.88) 
Calories    
    Angelic 52.83 (51.31) 52.25 (15.92) 15.92 (14.69) 
    Devilish 53.05 (15.42) 51.79 (15.71) 54.36 (15.06) 
    Control 51.76 (16.16) 49.60 (16.13) 54.08 (15.93) 
    Total 52.54 (15.62) 51.19 (15.92) 53.95 (15.20) 
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Figure 6.3. Interaction between food and label type on perceived tastiness of food. Error bars are 95% CIs.  
 
Healthiness.  
A 2 (food type: cereal bar or chocolate bar) x 3 (label type: Angelic, Devilish or Control) factorial 
ANOVA showed that the cereal bars (M = 58.81, SD = 15.92) were thought to be healthier 
than the chocolate bars (M = 47.70, SD = 17.88), F (1, 719) = 64.29, p <.001, η2p = 08, but 
there was no difference between the three labels on perceived healthiness (Angelic M = 55.09, 
SD = 19.02, Devilish M = 52.65, SD = 19.41, Control M = 52.50, SD = 20.15), F (2, 719) = 
1.49, p = .23, η2p = .004. The main effect of food bar was qualified by a statistically significant 
interaction between label and food type, F (2, 719) = 4.48, p = .01, η2p = .01. Post hoc analyses 
using simple main effects with Bonferroni-Holm corrections showed that cereal bars labelled 
as Angelic (M = 63.38, SD = 17.54) were perceived as healthier than those labelled as Devilish 
(M = 46.37, SD = 16.51), F (1, 243) = 7.77, p = .01, η2p = .03 (see Figure 6.4).  
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Figure 6.4. Interaction between food and label type on the perceived healthiness of the food. Error bars are 95% 
CIs.  
 
Calories.  
A 2 (food type: cereal bar or chocolate bar) x 3 (label type: Angelic, Devilish or Control) factorial 
ANOVA indicated that participants thought the chocolate bars (M = 53.95, SD = 15.20) 
contained more calories than the cereal bars (M = 51.19, SD = 15.92), F (1,719) = 5.68, p = 
.02, η2p = .008, but there was no effect of label F (2, 719) = .46, p = .63, η2p = .001 , and no 
interaction between food type and label type, F (2, 719) = .69, p = .50, η2p = .002 (see Figure 
6.5). 
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Figure 6.5. Interaction between food and label type on the estimated number of calories of the food. Error bars are 
95% CIs. 
 
Moderation by restrained eating and moral identity.  
For perceived tastiness, there were no significant 3-way interactions between food type, label 
and restrained eating F (2, 713) = .65, p = .53, η2p = .002, or between food type, label and 
moral identity, F (2, 713) = 1.45, p = .24, η2p = .004. For perceived healthiness, there were also 
no 3-way interactions between label, food type and restrained eating, F (2, 713) = 4.48, p = .42, 
η2p = .002, or moral identity, F (2, 713) = 1.94 p = .14, η2p = .005. Finally, there were also no 
3-way interactions between label, food type and restrained eating, F (2, 713) = .34, p = .71, η2p 
= .001, or between label, food type and moral identity on perceived calories, F (2, 713) = .13, 
p = .87, η2p = .0004. 
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Table 6.4 
Simple main effects with Bonferroni-Holm corrections for the significant interactions between food type and label type for Desire to 
Consume, Tastiness and Healthiness  
Predictor F df p η2 
Desire to Consume     
         Angelic Cereal – Angelic Chocolate .36 1, 238 .62 .002 
         Devilish Cereal – Devilish Chocolate 11.56 1, 238 .007 .05 
         Regular Cereal – Regular Chocolate 8.48 1, 232 .02 .03 
         Angelic Cereal – Devilish Cereal .64 1, 243 .62 .003 
         Angelic Cereal – Regular Cereal 1.05 1, 248 .55 .004 
         Devilish Cereal – Regular Cereal .05 1, 247 .82 <.001 
         Angelic Chocolate – Devilish Chocolate 3.56 1, 233 .20 .01 
         Angelic Chocolate – Regular Chocolate 1.35 1, 233 .55 .006 
         Devilish Chocolate – Regular Chocolate .43 1, 234 .61 .002 
Tastiness     
         Angelic Cereal – Angelic Chocolate 6.90 1, 238 .04 .03 
         Devilish Cereal – Devilish Chocolate 2.59 1, 238 .16 .01 
         Regular Cereal – Regular Chocolate 2.85 1, 243 .16 .01 
         Angelic Cereal – Devilish Cereal 3.34 1, 243 .15 .01 
         Angelic Cereal – Regular Cereal 8.00 1, 248 .04 .03 
         Devilish Cereal – Regular Cereal 1.19 1, 247 .31 .005 
         Angelic Chocolate – Devilish Chocolate 5.82 1, 233 .05 .02 
         Angelic Chocolate – Regular Chocolate 1.97 1, 233 .21 .01 
         Devilish Chocolate – Regular Chocolate .82 1, 234 .37 .003 
Healthiness     
         Angelic Cereal – Angelic Chocolate 59.75 1, 238 <.001 .20 
         Devilish Cereal – Devilish Chocolate 11.42 1, 238 .004 .05 
         Regular Cereal – Regular Chocolate 10.27 1, 243 .005 .04 
         Angelic Cereal – Devilish Cereal 7.77 1, 243 .01 .03 
         Angelic Cereal – Regular Cereal 8.34 1, 248 .009 .03 
         Devilish Cereal – Regular Cereal .02 1, 247 .96 <.001 
         Angelic Chocolate – Devilish Chocolate .83 1, 233 .52 .004 
         Angelic Chocolate – Regular Chocolate .69 1, 233 .52 .003 
         Devilish Chocolate – Regular Chocolate .003 1, 234 .95 <.001 
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6.2 Study 5 
Study 4 showed that overall participants desired chocolate bars more than cereal bars. This 
effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction whereby chocolate bars were more 
desired with an immoral label than a moral label. No significant effect of label was found for 
cereal bars. For health and taste, participants thought a cereal bar was healthier but less tasty 
than a chocolate bar. This was qualified by significant interactions, such that a cereal bar was 
perceived as tastier and healthier with a moral label, and a chocolate bar was perceived as 
tastier with an immoral label. Even though participants perceived chocolate bars to contain 
more calories than cereal bars, there was no effect of label and no interaction between label 
and food type. The effects were not moderated by any of the individual difference variables 
measured.   
 
Study 4 assessed self-reported desire and perceptions about food characteristics. To investigate 
whether moral labels impact food consumption, in Study 5 participants were offered small 
pieces of cereal and chocolate bars in two separate bowls, which either had a moral or immoral 
label. Although participants seemed to prefer healthy food with a moral label and unhealthy 
food with an immoral label, it is unclear whether participants explicitly associate healthiness 
with morality. Therefore, participants’ moral judgements of cereal and chocolate bars were 
also assessed. Participants were also asked to judge the moral goodness and badness of 
themselves and others when eating cereal or chocolate bars, to address the lack of direct 
measures of moral judgments of food and eating in Study 2. In addition to the individual 
characteristics assessed in Study 4, measures of impulsivity and sustainable shopping habits 
were included. Trait impulsivity has been shown to moderate the impact of environmental 
features, such as food variety or increased taxes, on consumption (Giesen, Havermans, 
Nederkoorn & Jansen, 2012; Guerrieri, Nederkoorn & Jansen, 2008). For example, past 
research has found that people who regularly engage with food labels and buy organic and fair 
trade products are less susceptible to the halo-effect of these labels (Lee et al., 2013).  
 
It was predicted that participants would consume more of the chocolate than the cereal bar 
and no difference in consumption between the labels. Rather, an interaction between food type 
and moral label was expected whereby participants would consume more chocolate bars with 
an immoral label than a moral label, and no effect of label on the consumption of cereal bars.  
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6.2.1 Method 
6.2.1.1 Pilot, sample size calculation and participants 
A pilot was conducted to obtain an estimate of the predicted effect size for the study. 
Participants completed the experiment as detailed below, but did not fill out the individual 
difference measures. Thirty participants took part in the pilot (Lancaster, Dodd & Williamson, 
2004). One participant guessed the purpose of the study, leaving a sample of 29. The results of 
the pilot indicated that participants ate more food when it was labelled as ‘Devilish’ than when 
it was ‘Angelic’, p < .05, which was not in line with the expected pattern. However, when 
controlling for age, gender, BMI, last time of eating, hunger and SES, the finding that 
participants consumed more of a ‘Devilish’ food was explained by an unlucky randomisation 
process (see Appendix 6.4). Thus, the effect size calculation was performed by a Monte Carlo 
simulation. The results of the simulation showed that a sample size of 210 would allow us to 
detect a significant medium effect of labels (d = 0.5) on the intake of healthy and unhealthy food 
with a probability of 0.8 by means of a Wilcoxon test. The results also showed that a mixed 
model, controlling for fixed effects, was superior in comparison to t-tests in terms of power. 
Mixed models were therefore the preferred method of analysis.  
 
Two-hundred and twelve participants were recruited through volunteer mailing lists, online 
and local advertising. Three participants were removed due to not spending the set time on the 
taste task, an error with the display of labels and a missing weight recording, leaving a final 
sample of 209 (Angelic n = 105, Devilish n = 104). All participants were screened for relevant 
food allergies and intolerances. They were reimbursed £10 for their time. 
 
6.2.1.2 Study design 
The design was a 2 (within-subjects food type: chocolate bar vs. cereal bar) x 2 (between-
subjects label type: moral vs. immoral) repeated measures design. Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of two label groups: ‘Angelic’ or ‘Devilish’. Within each group, they were all 
simultaneously presented with one bowl of cereal bar pieces and one bowl of chocolate bar 
pieces, with counterbalanced order presentation of the bowls.  
 
6.2.1.3 Study setting  
Participants attended an individual study session in a testing room in the Department of 
Psychology, University of Cambridge. The testing room consisted of a table where the food 
bowls were placed and a chair positioned in front of the table. The proximity of the food bowls 
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was kept constant at 35cm from the table edge. Each testing session lasted approximately 45 
minutes. 
 
6.2.1.4 Intervention  
The moral status of the food label was manipulated: 1) moral = ‘Angelic’, 2) immoral = 
‘Devilish’. Two types of food were used: 1) Cereal bar, 2) Chocolate bar. The food was cut up 
into varying sizes to maximise variability. The pieces were piled on top of each other, as 
previous research has found that larger portions of food increase food consumption (see 
Hollands et al., 2015 for a review). The baseline weight of the bowl and food totalled circa 
200g. The bowl was weighed before and after the study session.  
 
6.2.1.5 Procedure  
The study protocol was approved by the University of Cambridge Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee (ref: 2015-16/32). To standardise levels of satiety, the experimental sessions 
were run between 11am-7pm. The participants were required not to eat any food two hours 
before the experiment (see Evers, de Ridder & Adriaanse, 2009; Sproesser et al., 2014). Upon 
agreeing to take part in the study, each participant was presented with pieces of cereal bars and 
chocolate bars in two separate bowls, with the label being given just above the bowl. 
Participants were told to evaluate each product on taste, healthiness, calories, structure and 
perception of the foods, as well as willingness-to-pay (WTP). Before tasting, they were asked to 
indicate their desire for the item, before moving on to sampling and filling out the rest of the 
survey. They were told that they could eat as much of each food as they would like and they 
were given 30 minutes alone in the room to complete the survey. Unbeknownst to the 
participants, each bowl was weighed in advance of the taste test and after the participant had 
left, so that the amount consumed per participant could be ascertained. At the end of the study, 
participants were also asked for their demographics, before being debriefed and thanked for 
their participation.  
 
6.2.1.6 Measures 
6.2.1.6.1 Primary observed behavioural outcome: Consumption of the food (g) 
The primary outcome measure was the consumed amount of each type of bar in grams (g). 
This took the form of a difference score between the bowl weight before and after the taste test. 
To facilitate the later synthesising with Study 6’s binary measure of selection into an observed 
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behaviour variable, the consumption variable was dichotomised. Dichotomisation was based 
on whether the participant consumed more cereal (coded as 1) than chocolate (coded as 0).   
 
6.2.1.6.2 Secondary outcomes  
Self-reported measures of desire to consume, tastiness, healthiness, and calorie estimation were 
the same as in Study 4. Participants were asked to report their desire before the taste test, and 
the tastiness and healthiness during tasting. 
 
Willingness-to-pay. At the end of the taste task, participants were asked to indicate the highest 
amount of money (in £, p) they would be willing to pay for the food item (e.g., Schulze & 
Wansink, 2012) 
 
Filler items and taste ratings. To fill up the time participants spent on the taste test and encourage 
consumption, several taste-related items were asked (see Appendix 6.5).  
 
6.2.1.6.3 Individual difference measures 
Sustainable shopping habits. To measure participants’ use of nutrition labels and ethically sourced 
foods they were asked the questions: ‘I usually read nutrition labels on foods’, ‘I usually buy 
organic food’ and ‘I usually buy fair trade foods’, with answers recorded on a VAS ranging 
from 0 (‘Strongly disagree’) – 100 (‘Strongly agree’).  
 
Impulsivity. To measure individual differences in impulsivity the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(BIS-11; Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995) was used. The BIS is a 30-item self-report 
questionnaire assessing 6 assets of impulsivity (Attention [e.g. ‘I don’t pay attention’], Motor 
[e.g. ‘I do things without thinking’], Self-Control [e.g. ‘I plan tasks carefully], Cognitive 
Complexity [e.g. ‘I like to think about complex problems’], Perseverance [e.g. ‘I change jobs’] 
and Cognitive Instability [e.g. ‘I have racing thoughts’]. The items were answered on a 1 
(‘Rarely/Never’) – 4 (‘Almost Always’) Likert scale.  The BIS-11 had acceptable internal 
reliability, a = .74. 
 
Restrained Eating. The restrained eating measure, Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire (van 
Strien et al., 1986), was the same as in Study 4. The internal reliability in the current study was 
good, a = .90. 
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Moral Identity. The Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) was the same as in Study 4 (a 
= .88).  
 
6.2.1.4 Control variables and demographics  
Participants were also asked to rate how hungry they are (‘How hungry do you feel right now?’ 
answered on a 7-point rating scale anchored at -3 = Very hungry, 0 = Neither hungry nor full, 
+3 = Very full), as well as their weight and height to calculate BMI. In addition, participants 
were asked to indicate their age, gender, ethnicity, political views and socio-economic status. 
Socio-economic group was identified by the NRS Social Grade classification tool developed by 
the British National Readership Survey and is derived by the profession of highest earner (NRS, 
2018). 
 
6.2.2 Data analysis  
All analyses were carried out in R (version 3.3.3). The primary outcome, number of grams of 
food consumed, was analysed using a linear mixed model (LMM) controlling for fixed effects 
and with a random term for participants. The dichotomised consumption variable was also 
analysed using a chi-square to examine the effect of label on behaviour. All secondary outcome 
variables and moderation analyses were also analysed using LMMs. ‘lmer’ from the ‘lme4’ 
package was used to carry out the analyses. In cases where test-assumptions were not met, the 
outcome variable was transformed instead (see section 6.2.2.1). 
 
6.2.2.1 Assumptions  
All model residuals were assessed by both visual inspections (histograms, QQ plots) and 
statistical assessments (Shapiro-Wilk test). The LMM analysing the effect of food and label 
type on the primary outcome, total grams of food consumed was found to violate 
assumptions of normality (W = .91, p <.001). Using the cube-root of the outcome variable 
was found to correct for non-normality. For the secondary outcomes, all models were found 
to violate assumptions of normality (desire to consume: W = .96, p < .001, tastiness: W = 
.95, p <. 001, healthiness: W = .97, p <.001 and calories: W = .97, p <.001, WTP: W = .56, 
p < .001.). Desire to consume and calories were positively skewed. Tastiness and healthiness 
were negatively skewed and were reflected before transformations were applied, and back-
reflected thereafter. All four variables were square-rooted before being entered into the 
LMMs, which amended the non-normality. The WTP variable was negatively skewed with 
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several univariate outliers. The variable was first Winsorized and then square-root 
transformed before being entered into the LMM. 
 
For the models assessing moral judgement, moral badness of the food, moral goodness and 
badness of the participant themselves consuming the food and others consuming the food 
were all non-normally distributed (all ps <. 001.). The log was taken of each variable before 
being entered into the final models.  
 
6.2.2.2 Randomisation checks 
To check that randomisation had been successful, relevant measures and demographic 
characteristics of the two randomised groups were compared.  Using a Mann-Whitney U test 
to account for the positive skew of age and negative skew of hunger, it was found that 
participants in the two groups did not differ in terms of age, W = 19026, p = .75 or hunger, W 
= 22024, p = .62. A t-test showed that participants were also matched on BMI, t (399.37) = -
.95, p = .34. Chi-square tests also showed that the two groups were not statistically different in 
terms of gender, χ2 (2) = .06, p = .97, but they were statistically different on ethnicity, χ2 (7) = 
26.77, p <. 001. This difference is likely due to the larger spread of ethnicities in the Angelic 
condition than in the Devilish condition. However, the largest ethnic group (Caucasian) was 
not statistically different across groups, χ2 (1) = .14, p = .71. As a sensitivity check, including 
ethnicity in the models did not change the conclusions of the analyses (these sensitivity analyses 
are reported in Appendix 6.6). 
 
6.2.3 Results 
6.2.3.1 Participants  
The mean age was 22.42 (SD = 3.48), with women making up 67.46 % of the sample. The 
sample was mostly White (63.64%), and had a BMI of 22.09 (SD = 2.89). See Table 6.5 for a 
full overview of participant characteristics.  
 
6.2.3.2 Primary observed behavioural outcome: Consumption of the food (g) 
See Table 6.7 for an overview of test statistics. 
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Hypothesis 1: Participants will eat more grams of chocolate than cereal  
The model showed that participants ate significantly more grams of cereal (M = 52.42, SD = 
39.38) than chocolate bar pieces (M = 38.27, SD = 28.84), β = -.44, SE = .09, t (207) = -4.79, 
p < .001, d = .66, 95% CI [-.62, -.26]. 
 
Table 6.5 
Participant characteristics 
 
Angelic 
(n = 105) 
Devilish 
(n = 104) 
Total 
(n = 209) 
Age M (SD) 22.51 (3.76) 22.32 (3.17) 22.42 (3.48) 
Gender [female] % (n) 67.62 (71)  67.31 (70) 67.46 (141) 
Ethnicity [White] % (n) 61.90 (65) 65.38 (68) 63.64 (133) 
BMI M (SD) 21.95 (2.88) 22.23 (2.91) 22.09 (2.89) 
Hunger M (SD)  5.81 (2.21) 5.66 (2.38) 5.73 (2.29) 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be an interaction between food type and moral label on 
consumption 
 When testing for an interaction between label type and food type on the number of grams of 
food consumed, the model did not reveal a statistically significant effect (see Figure 6.5), β = 
.18, SE = .13, t (207) = 1.36, p = .19, d = .19, 95% CI [-.08, .43]. 
 
Examining the dichotomised consumption variable, a chi-square showed that whether 
participants ate more chocolate than cereal, or cereal than chocolate, was dependent on 
label, c2 (1) = 4.38, p = .04, OR = 1.58. Although participants overall ate more cereal, when 
shown the ‘Angelic’ label there was a shift towards participants eating more cereal (n =78) 
than chocolate (n = 25) and when shown the ‘Devilish’ label the shift was towards the 
chocolate (n = 34) rather than the cereal (n = 67) (see Table 6.6 for an overview). 
 
Table 6.6             
Contingency table showing how many participants ate more cereal than chocolate or more chocolate than cereal depending on the 
label.              
 More cereal n (%) More chocolate n (%) Total 
Angelic 78 (75.73) 25 (24.27) 103 
Devilish 67 (66.34) 34 (33.66) 101 
Total 145 59 204 
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Exploratory analysis of individual differences 
Several moderation analyses were conducted to explore whether certain individual 
characteristics (restrained eating, moral identity, impulsivity, sustainable shopping habits) 
influenced any effect of label on food type for consumption. See Table 6.8 for an overview of 
test statistics. Including restrained eating in the model showed that it did not moderate the 
effect of food type and label type on amount of food consumed, β = .03, SE = .24, t (187) = .12, 
p = .91, d = .02, 95% CI [-.44, .50]. 
 
When moral identity was included as a moderator of the interaction effect, a significant effect 
was found (Figure 6.7), β = -.43, SE = .20, t (196) = -2.10, p = .04, d = .29, 95% CI [-.82, -.03]. 
Pairwise comparisons with a Tukey adjustment showed that participants with higher moral 
identity displayed decreased consumption of Devilish chocolate bar, β = -.28, SE = .13, p <.05, 
df = 340.1, 95% CI [ -.53, -.02]. No other groups were affected by moral identity.  
 
Impulsivity was not found to interact with food and label type on consumption of food, β = -
.15, SE = .43, t (185) = -.36, p = .72, d = .05, 95% CI [-.1.01, -.70]. No impact was found of 
shopping habits (regularly reading nutrition labels, buying organic and fair trade food) on the 
effect of labels and food type on consumption.  
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Figure 6.6. Interaction between food type and label type on amount of food consumed (cube-rooted). Error bars 
are 95% CIs.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Three-way interaction between food type, label type and moral identity. Error bars are 95% CI bands. 
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Table 6.7 
Results of LMMs for the primary outcome (consumption) and secondary outcomes (Desire to Consume, Tastiness, Healthiness, 
Calories and Willingness-to-Pay [WTP]). 
Predictor β SE df t p d 95% CIs 
   Consumption        
      Food -.44 .09 207 - 4.79 <.001 .66 -.62, -.26 
      Label -.07 .12 354.10 -.59 .56 .08 -.21, .17 
      Food *Label .18 .13 207 1.36 .18 .19 -.08, .43 
   Desire to Consume        
      Food .35 .08 206.40 4.52 <.001 .63 .20, .49 
      Label .02 .09 374.30 .18 .86 .02 -.16, .20 
      Food *Label -.05 .11 206 -.50 .62 .07 -.27, .16 
  Tastiness        
      Food .03 .08 205.50 .36 .72 .05 -.13, .18 
      Label -.09 .06 404.60 -1.03 .31 .14 -.25, .07 
      Food *Label .12 .11 206 1.06 .29 .15 -.10, .34 
  Healthiness        
      Food -.98 .07 206 -13.20 <.001 1.83 -1.12, -.83 
      Label .13 .09 385.80 1.53 .13 .21 -.03, .30 
      Food *Label -.06 .11 206 -.56 .58 .08 -.26, .15 
  Calories        
      Food .76 .19 206 4.05 <.001 .56 .39, 1.12 
      Label -.52 .32 290.40 -1.64 .10 .26 -1.32, .02 
      Food *Label -.03 .27 206 -.12 .90 .02 -.55, .48 
   WTP        
      Food -.01 .02 207 -.68 .50 .09 -.05, .02 
      Label -.01 .03 284.44 -.38 .71 .05 -.07, .05 
      Food *Label .01 .02 207 .43 .67 .06 -.04, .06 
Note. The following variables were transformed before being entered into the model: Consumption (cube-
rooted), Desire to Consume (square-rooted), Tastiness (square-rooted), Healthiness (square-rooted) and 
Calories (square-rooted). The reference categories are as follows: Food (Cereal Bar) and Label (Angelic). 
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Table 6.8 
Results of LMMs for the moderators for the primary outcome (Consumption) and secondary outcomes (Desire to Consume, Tastiness, 
Healthiness, Calories and Willingness-to-Pay [WTP]) of Study 5.  
Predictor β SE df t p d 95% CIs 
Consumption        
   Food *Label*Restrained Eating .03 .24 187 .12 .91 .02 -.44, .50 
   Food *Label*Moral Identity -.43 .20 196 -2.10 .04 .29 -.82, -.03 
   Food *Label*Impulsivity -.15 .43 185 -.36 .72 .05 -1.01, .70 
   Food *Label*Read Nutrition Labels .07 .04 202 1.63 .11 .23 -.01, ,15 
   Food *Label*Buy Organic .04 .05 203 .87 .39 .11 -.05, .13 
   Food *Label*Buy Fair Trade -.03 .05 202 -.65 .52 .09 -.12, .06 
Desire to Consume        
   Food *Label*Restrained Eating -.13 .21 186.90 -.65 .52 .09 -.53, .27 
   Food *Label*Moral Identity .16 .17 196.60 .93 .35 .13 -.17, .48 
   Food *Label*Impulsivity -.13 .34 184.70 -.38 .71 .05 -.81, .55 
   Food *Label*Read Nutrition Labels .05 .04 201.50 1.34 .18 .19 -.02, .12 
   Food *Label*Buy Organic .09 .04 202 2.23 .03 .31 .01, .16 
   Food *Label*Buy Fair Trade .03 .04 201.70 .84 .40 .12 -.04, .11 
Tastiness        
   Food *Label*Restrained Eating -.11 .21 186.80 -.51 .61 .07 -.52, .30 
   Food *Label*Moral Identity -.23 .17 195.80 -1.33 .18 .18 -.56, .11 
   Food *Label*Impulsivity -.50 .37 184.5 -1.34 .18 .19 -1.22, .22 
   Food *Label*Read Nutrition Labels .001 .04 203 .02 .99 .002 -.07, .07 
   Food *Label*Buy Organic -.01 .04 202.30 -.16 .87 .02 -.09, .07 
   Food *Label*Buy Fair Trade .003 .04 202.70 .08 .93 .01 -.08, .08 
Healthiness        
   Food *Label*Restrained Eating .30 .20 187 1.53 .13 .21 -.08, .69 
   Food *Label*Moral Identity -.08 .16 196 -.53 .59 .07 -.39, .23 
   Food *Label*Impulsivity .23 .35 185 .65 .52 .09 -.46, .92 
   Food *Label*Read Nutrition Labels -.01 .03 202 -.21 .84 .03 -.07, .06 
   Food *Label*Buy Organic -.03 .03 202 -.79 .43 .11 -.11, .04 
   Food *Label*Buy Fair Trade <.001 .04 202 .01 .99 .002 -.07, .07 
Calories        
   Food *Label*Restrained Eating -.78 .52 187 -1.50 .14 .21 -1.79, .23 
   Food *Label*Moral Identity .17 .42 196 .45 .66 .06 -.63, 1.00 
   Food *Label*Impulsivity -2.11 .89 185 -2.37 .02 .33 -3.84,-.38 
   Food *Label*Read Nutrition Labels .01 .09 202 .11 .91 .02 -.16, .18 
   Food *Label*Buy Organic -.06 .10 202 -.62 .54 .09 -.25, .13 
   Food *Label*Buy Fair Trade -.08 .06 202 -.86 .39 .12 -.27, .10 
 WTP        
   Food *Label*Restrained Eating .01 .05 187 .12 .91 .02 -.09, .10 
   Food *Label*Moral Identity -.03 .04 196 .87 .39 .12 -.11, .04 
   Food *Label*Impulsivity -.13 .08 185 -1.65 .10 .23 -.29, .02 
   Food *Label*Read Nutrition Labels -.004 .01 202 -.51 .61 .07 -.02, .01 
   Food *Label*Buy Organic .01 .01 202 1.34 .18 .19 -.01, .03 
   Food *Label*Buy Fair Trade -.01 .01 202 .74 .46 .10 -.02, .01 
Note. The models were run separately for each moderator. The following variables were transformed before being entered into the model: 
Consumption (cube-rooted), Desire to Consume (square-rooted), Tastiness (square-rooted), Healthiness (square-rooted) and Calories 
(square-rooted). The reference categories are as follows: Food (Cereal Bar) and Label (Angelic). The moderators are all continuous.  
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Table 6.9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Consumption, Desire to Consume, Tastiness, Healthiness and Calories by both Food and Label 
Type separately and in total. 
 Food 
 Transformed values Original values 
Label Total 
M (SD) 
Cereal 
M (SD) 
Chocolate 
M (SD) 
Total 
M (SD) 
Cereal 
M (SD) 
Chocolate 
M (SD) 
Consumption       
    Angelic 3.33 (.89) 3.55 (.95) 3.11 (.78) 45.14 (36.51) 54.49 (42.75) 35.79 (25.96) 
    Devilish 3.35 (.89) 3.48 (.88) 3.22 (.87) 45.55 (33.91) 50.32 (35.75) 40.78 (31.41) 
    Total 3.34 (.89) 3.52 (.92) 3.16 (.83) 45.34 (35.20) 52.42 (39.38) 38.27 (28.84) 
Desire to 
Consume 
      
    Angelic 1.35 (.68) 1.18 (.65) 1.53 (.70) 6.27 (2.45) 5.68 (2.52) 6.84 (2.26) 
    Devilish 1.34 (.68) 1.20 (.60) 1.49 (.60) 6.22 (2.41) 5.78 (2.28) 6.67 (2.47) 
    Total 1.35 (.68) 1.19 (.61) 1.51 (.71) 6.25 (2.34) 5.73 (2.40) 6.76 (2.36) 
Tastiness       
    Angelic 1.49 (.59) 1.48 (.53) 1.51 (.65) 6.86 (1.99) 6.89 (1.78) 6.84 (2.18) 
    Devilish 1.47 (.64) 1.39 (.58) 1.54 (.68) 6.72 (2.10) 6.54 (2.02) 6.91 (2.17) 
    Total 1.48 (.61) 1.44 (.56) 1.52 (.67) 6.80 (2.04) 6.72 (1.91) 6.87 (2.17) 
Healthiness       
    Angelic 1.35 (.79) 1.83 (.62) .86 (.63) 2.44 (2.22) 3.75 (2.14) 1.13 (1.36) 
    Devilish 1.45 (.81) 1.97 (.55) .93 (.69) 2.75 (2.32) 4.17 (2.08) 1.33 (1.56) 
    Total 1.40 (.80) 1.90 (.59) .89 (.66) 2.59 (2.27) 3.95 (2.12) 1.23 (1.46) 
Calories       
    Angelic 14.68 (2.10) 14.30 (2.15) 15.05 (1.99) 219.80 (57.33) 209.04 (57.55) 230.55 (55.30) 
    Devilish 14.14 (2.49) 13.78 (2.20) 14.51 (2.68) 204.24 (68.05) 193.03 (57.39) 215.44 (75.88) 
    Total 14.34 (2.51) 14.04 (2.20) 14.78 (2.37) 212.05 (63.29) 201.07 (57.89) 223.03 (66.62) 
WTP       
    Angelic .82 (.34) .81 (.33) .82 (.36) .94 (.72) 1.01 (.92) .88 (.42) 
    Devilish .79 (.33) .78 (.30) .80 (.36) .93 (.71) .92 (.55) .95 (.94 
    Total .8 (.34) .80 (.31) .81 (.36) .94 (.71) .96 (.76) .91 (.66) 
Note. The following variables were transformed: Consumption (cube-rooted), Desire to Consume (square-rooted), 
Tastiness (square-rooted), Healthiness (square-rooted) and Calories (square-rooted). 
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6.2.3.3 Secondary outcomes  
Unless otherwise stated, LMMs controlling for fixed effects of label were also used to analyse 
the secondary outcome variables. If the variable was transformed to correct for non-
normality, both original and transformed means and standard deviations are reported. Test 
statistics for all secondary outcomes are reported in Table 6.7, moderator results in Table 6.8 
and means and standard deviations in Table 6.9.  
 
Desire to consume   
Using a square root transformation of the desire to consume variable to correct for non-
normality (transformed values are reported), the LMM showed that participants desired 
chocolate (M = 1.51, SD = .71) more than cereal bar (M = 1.19, SD = .61), β = .35, SE = .08, 
t (206.40) = 4.52, p < .001, d = .63, 95% CI [.20, .49], but there was no difference between 
label types (Angelic M = 1.35, SD = .68, Devilish M = 1.34, SD = .68), β = .02, SE = .09, t 
(374.30) = .18, p = .86, d = .02, 95% CI [-.16, .20]. The model also revealed no interaction 
between the two, β = -.06 SE = .11, t (206) = -.50, p = .62, d = .07, 95% CI [-.27, -.16].  
 
Taste  
A LMM with food and label type predicting the square root of the taste variable was 
conducted. Transformed values are reported. The model showed that participants did not 
perceive cereal (M = 1.44, SD = .56) to taste better than the chocolate (M = 1.51, SD = .71), β 
= .03 SE = .08, t (205.50) = .36, p = .72, d = .05, 95% CI [-.13, .18], there was no difference 
between label types (Angelic M = 1.49, SD = .59, Devilish M = 1.47, SD = .64), β = -.09 SE = 
.06, t (404.60) = .-1.03, p = .31, d = .14, 95% CI [-.25, .07], and no interaction between the 
two was found, β = .12 SE = .11, t (206) = 1.06 p = .29, d = .15, 95% CI [-.10, .34]. 
 
Healthiness  
A LMM was conducted on the square-rooted health variable, with food and label type as 
predictors. Transformed values are reported. Results showed that participants judged the 
chocolate bar (M = .89, SD = .66) as less healthy than the cereal bar (M = 1.90, SD = .59), β 
= -.98 SE = .07, t (206) = -13.20 p < .001, d = 1.83, 95% CI [-1.12, -.83], but there was no 
effect of label (Angelic M = 1.35, SD = .79, Devilish M = 1.45, SD = .81), β = .13 SE = .09, t 
(385.80) = 1.53 p = .13, d = .21, 95% CI [-.03, .30], or any interaction between food type and 
label on perceived healthiness, β = -.06 SE = .11, t (206) = -.56 p = .58, d = .08, 95% CI [-.26, 
.15]. 
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Calories 
A LMM with food type and label type as predictors of estimated calorie content were 
computed. Two participants had estimated the calorie content to be zero and were therefore 
removed from analysis. Due to a positive skew, the variable was square-rooted, but original 
values are reported here for ease of interpretation. The results showed that participants thought 
a chocolate bar (M = 223.03, SD = 66.62) contained more calories than a cereal bar (M = 
201.07, SD = 57.89), β = .76 SE = .19, t (206) = 4.05 p <.001, d = .56, 95% CI [.39, 1.12],  
there was no statistically significant difference between Angelic (M = 219.80, SD = 57.33) and 
Devilish labels (M = 204.24, SD = 68.05), β = -.52 SE = .32, t (290.40) = -1.64, p = .10, d = .26, 
95% CI [-1.32, .02], and no interaction between label and food type on calorie estimation, β = 
-.03 SE = .02, t (206) = -.12 p = .90, d = .02, 95% CI [-.55, .48]. 
 
Willingness-to-pay  
The results showed that participants did not want to pay more for either food type, nor for any 
label type. There was also no interaction between food type and label type on WTP.  
 
Moderation by individual differences  
To analyse whether the impact of moral labels on the self-reported secondary outcomes for 
food types were moderated by the individual differences restrained eating, moral identity, 
impulsivity and shopping habits, a series of LMMs were run. Due to the number of analyses, 
only significant models are reported here. See Table 6.8 for a full overview of all model results.  
 
Self-reported desire to consume. For desire to consume, food and label type did not interact with 
restrained eating, moral identity, impulsivity, reading nutrition labels, or buying fair trade food, 
all ps > .10. However, there was a significant interaction between tendency to buy organic food, 
food and label type on desire, β = .09 SE = .04, t (202) = 2.23, p = .03, d = .31, 95% CI [.01, 
.16], but no individual slope showed a significant change across groups, >.30. 
 
Taste. No three-way interaction between and label type, and restrained eating, moral identity, 
impulsivity, reading food labels, buying organic food or buying fair trade food were found, all 
ps > .10. 
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Healthiness. No effects were found of the individual differences measures of restrained eating, 
moral identity, impulsivity or reading food labels, buying organic food or buying fair trade food, 
all ps >.10. 
 
Calories. There was no three-way interaction between food and label type and restrained eating, 
moral identity, reading food labels, buying organic food or buying fair trade food, all ps > .10. 
The only significant three-way interaction was between food, label type and impulsivity (see 
Figure 6.8). Simple slopes analysis with Tukey method for comparing a family of four estimates 
showed that for a devilish chocolate bar there was a negative relationship between impulsivity 
and calorie estimation, M = -1.99, SE = .71, df = 265.04, 95% CI [-3.38, -.59]. That is, the 
more impulsive the participants reported to be, the fewer calories they believed the devilish 
chocolate bar contained. Impulsivity did not moderate the effects of any other labelled food 
type.  
 
Figure 6.8. Interaction between food type, label type and impulsivity on estimated calories of the food, with 95% 
CI bands. 
 
Individual differences. Separate LMMs were run with each individual difference measure 
moderating the food and label interaction on willingness-to-pay for the food. No three-way 
interaction was found to be significant, all ps >.10. 
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6.2.3.4 Moral judgements  
See Table 6.10 for a breakdown of means and standard deviation and Table 6.11 for all test 
statistics. 
 
Moral judgement of food  
The model showed that participants thought cereal bars (M = 1.97, SD = 2.62) to be more 
morally good than chocolate bars (M = 1.04, SD = 1.97), β = -.81, SE = .19, t (207) = -4.15 p 
< .001, d = .57, 95% CI [-1.20, -.43], but no effect of label, β = .27, SE = .32, t (297.81) = .84 
p = .40, d = .12, 95% CI [-.36, .90], or an interaction between label and food type, β = -.24, 
SE = .28, t (207) = -.86, p = .39, d = .12, 95% CI [-.78, .31]. In terms of morally bad judgements, 
participants thought the chocolate bar (M = 1.57, SD = 2.1) was more morally bad than the 
cereal bar (M = .77, SD = 1.53), β = .35, SE = .07, t (207) = 4.75 p < .001, d = .67, 95% CI 
[.20 .49], but there was no statistically significant effect of label type, β = .16, SE = .11, t (315.67) 
= 1.41 p = .16, d = .19, 95% CI [-.06, .37] and no interaction, β = -.01 SE = .10, t (207) = -.05, 
p = .96, d = .01, 95% CI [-.21, .20] All reported means and standard deviations are non-
transformed values due to the moral goodness of the food variable not being transformed. 
 
Moral judgement of the self   
For the judgements of moral goodness of the self, there was a significant main effect of food 
type such that participants thought they were more morally good after eating a cereal bar (M 
= .68, SD = .79) than after a chocolate bar (M = .48, SD = .69), β = -.19, SE = .05, t (207) = -
3.84 p < .001, d = .53, 95% CI [-.29, -.09]. However, there was no main effect of label, β = .09, 
SE = .10, t (261.41) = -.91 p = .36, d = .13, 95% CI [-.11 .29], and no interaction between label 
and food type, β = -.02, SE = .07, t (207) = -.34 p = .73, d = .05, 95% CI [-.15, .11]. For the 
judgement of moral badness, the model showed a significant main effect of food such that 
participants thought they were more morally bad after eating a chocolate bar (M = .78, SD = 
.73) than after eating a cereal bar (M = .45, SD = .58), β = .33, SE = .05, t (207) = 6.31 p < 
.001, d = .87, 95% CI [.23, .43], but there was no main effect of label, β = .02, SE = .09, t 
(286.06) = .21 p = .84, d = .03, 95% CI [-.16, .26] and no interaction between the two, β = 
.004, SE = .07, t (207) = .06 p = .96, d = .01, 95% CI [-.14, .15]. Reported means and standard 
deviations are transformed values.  
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Moral judgement of others  
There was a main effect of food type on the judgement of moral goodness of others, such that 
those who ate a cereal bar (M = .74, SD = .79) was judged as higher than those who ate a 
chocolate bar (M = .46, SD = .66), β = -26, SE = .06, t (207) = -4.64, p <. 001, d = .64, 95% CI 
[-.37, -.15], but there was no main effect of label, β = .07, SE = .10, t (280.76) = .66, p = .51, d 
= .09, 95% CI [-.13 .26], and no interaction between the two, β = -.03, SE = .08, t (207) = -
.37, p = .71, d = .05, 95% CI [-.18, .13.] For judgment of moral badness, there was a main 
effect of food type in that participants judged those who ate chocolate bars (M = .55, SD = .64) 
to be more morally bad than those who ate cereal bars (M = .33, SD = .49), β = .24 SE = .05, 
t (207) = 5.12 p < .001, d = .71, 95% CI [.15, .33], but there was no main effect of label, β = 
.07, SE = .08, t (289.77) = .86, p = .39, d = .12, 95% CI [-.09, .22], and no interaction between 
food and label type, β = -.03, SE = .07, t (207) = -.47, p = .64, d = .07, 95% CI [-.16, .10].   
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Table 6.10 
Means and Standard Deviations for moral judgements of goodness and badness for the food, the self and others who eat the food 
across food and label type.  
 Food type 
 Transformed values Original values 
Label 
Total 
M (SD) 
Cereal 
M (SD) 
Chocolate 
M (SD) 
Total 
M (SD) 
Cereal 
M (SD) 
Chocolate 
M (SD) 
Food       
    Goodness       
        Angelic - - - 1.43 (2.31) 1.84 (2.47) 1.02 (2.06) 
        Devilish - - - 1.58 (2.42) 2.11 (2.76) 1.05 (1.88) 
        Total - - - 1.50 (2.36) 1.97 (2.62) 1.04 (1.97) 
    Badness       
        Angelic .64 (.80) .47 (.65) .81 (.90) 1.05 (1.84) .63 (1.36) 1.47 (2.15) 
        Devilish .79 (.82) .62 (.73) .96 (.87) 1.30 (1.91) .91 (1.68) 1.68 (2.06) 
       Total .72 (.81) .55 (.69) .89 (.89) 1.17 (1.88) .77 (1.53) 1.57 (2.1) 
Self       
    Goodness       
        Angelic .54 (.76) .64 (.81) .45 (.70) 1.50 (2.93) 1.83 (3.43) 1.16 (2.31) 
        Devilish .62 (.73) .73 (.77) .52 (.68) 1.55 (2.41) 1.88 (2.60) 1.23 (2.17) 
        Total .58 (.75) .68 (.79) .48 (.69) 1.52 (2.68) 1.85 (3.04) 1.20 (2.24) 
    Badness       
        Angelic .60 (.67) .44 (.60) .77 (.71) 1.38 (2.07) .95 (1.81) 1.81 (2.23) 
        Devilish .62 (.68) .46 (.57) .79 (.75) 1.44 (2.07) .93 (1.54) 1.95 (2.39) 
        Total .61 (.68) .45 (.58) .78 (.73) 1.41 (2.07) .94 (1.68) 1.88 (2.31) 
Others       
    Goodness       
        Angelic .57 (.73) .70 (.76) .44 (.68) 1.44 (2.35) 1.78 (2.5) 1.10 (2.15) 
        Devilish .63 (.74) .77 (.81) .48 (.64) 1.58 (2.44) 2.05 (2.74) 1.10 (2.01) 
        Total .60 (.74) .74 (.79) .46 (.66) 1.51 (2.39) 1.92 (2.62) 1.10 (2.07) 
    Badness       
        Angelic .41 (.57) .29 (.48) .53 (.63) .87 (1.63) .60 (1.44) 1.14 (1.77) 
        Devilish .47 (.59) .36 (.49)  .57 (.66) .97 (1.63) .68 (1.29) 1.26 (1.88) 
       Total .44 (.58) .33 (.49) .55 (.64) .92 (1.63) .64 (1.36) 1.20 (1.82) 
Note. The following variables were transformed: Moral badness of food (log) moral goodness and badness of self 
(log) and moral goodness and badness of others (log). 
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Table 6.11 
Results of LMMs for the judgement of moral goodness and moral badness for the food type (Cereal, Chocolate), the self eating the 
food type and others eating the food type 
Predictor β SE df t p d 95% CIs 
Food        
   Goodness        
      Food -.81 .19 207 -4.15 <.001 .57 -.1.20 -.43 
      Label .27 .32 297.81 .84 .40 .12 -.36, .90 
      Food *Label -.24 .28 207 -.86 .39 .12 -.78, .31 
   Badness        
      Food .35 .07 207 4.75 <.001 .67 .20, .49 
      Label .16 .11 315.67 1.41 .16 .19 -.06, .37 
      Food *Label -.01 .10 207 -.05 .96 .01 -.21, 20 
Self        
   Goodness        
      Food -.19 .05 207 -3.84 <.001 .53 -.29, .09 
      Label .09 .10 261.41 .91 .36 .13 -.11, .29 
      Food *Label -.02 .07 207 -.34 .73 .05 -.16, .11 
  Badness        
      Food .33 .05 207 6.31 <.001 .87 .23, .43 
      Label .02 .09 286.06 .21 .84 .03 -.16, .20 
      Food *Label .004 .07 207 .06 .96 .01 -.14, .15 
Others        
   Goodness        
      Food -.26 .06 207 -4.64 <.001 .64 -.37, -.15 
      Label .07 .10 280.76 .66 .51 .09 -.13, .26 
      Food *Label -.03 .08 207 -.37 .71 .05 -.18 .13 
   Badness        
      Food .24 .05 207 5.12 <.001 .71 .15, .33 
      Label .07 .08 289.77 .86 .39 .12 -.09, .22 
      Food *Label -.03 .07 207 -.47 .64 .07 -.16, .10 
Note. The following variables were transformed before being entered into the model: Moral badness of food 
(square-rooted), moral goodness and badness of self (log) and moral goodness and badness of others (log). 
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6.3 Study 6 
In Study 5 participants ate more cereal bar pieces than chocolate bar pieces, even though they 
reported to desire the chocolate bar pieces more. They also thought the cereal bar pieces to be 
healthier but contain more calories. An interaction between food and label type only emerged 
when the consumption was dichotomised by whether participants ate more cereal than 
chocolate or chocolate than cereal. The significant interaction effect revealed that ‘Angelic’ 
labelled foods were consumed equally, but when the foods had a ‘Devilish’ label there was a 
shift towards participants eating the chocolate rather than the cereal. Two three-way 
interactions were also found: participants high on moral identity were found to eat less 
‘Devilish’ chocolate bar pieces, and the more impulsive participants reported they thought the 
‘Devilish’ chocolate bar pieces contain fewer calories. Overall participants also reported that 
chocolate and those who consume it were morally bad, while cereal bars and its consumers 
were judged as morally good.  
 
Although participants overall ate more of the cereal bars when shown the ‘Angelic’ label there 
was a shift towards participants eating more cereal (n =78) than chocolate (n = 25) and when 
shown the ‘Devilish’ label the shift was towards the chocolate (n = 34) rather than the cereal (n 
= 67) (see Table 6.6 for an overview). 
 
Study 4 differs from Study 5 in an important way. While in Study 4 the participants were 
representative of the general UK population on gender, age (above 18), socioeconomic status 
and geographical location, Study 5 consisted mainly of university students.  Thus, to further 
investigate the effect of moral labelling on eating behaviour an experiment was conducted in 
which participants selected between two bars: a chocolate bar or a cereal bar. Depending on 
the condition, the bars were either labelled as Angelic or Devilish. Based on the results of the 
two previous studies it was predicted that participants would be more likely to choose a 
chocolate bar than a cereal bar, and participants’ selection would be influenced by the label 
displayed. Specifically, it was hypothesised that participants would be more likely to choose a 
chocolate bar labelled as Devilish rather than Angelic, and more likely to choose a cereal bar 
labelled as Angelic rather than Devilish. 
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6.3.1 Method 
6.3.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 276 attendees (124 female) at the Cambridge Science Festival with an average 
age of 24.36 years (SD = 17.25). The sample consisted of both children under the age of 16 (n 
=116) and adults and adolescents above the age of 16 (n = 139). The sample was self-selecting 
in that participants chose to attend the science festival and approached the Behaviour and 
Health Research Unit stand.  
 
6.3.1.2 Study design  
The study was 2 (within-subjects food type: chocolate bar vs cereal bar) x 2 (between-subjects 
label type: moral vs immoral) repeated measures design. Participants saw both food types, but 
only one label type.  
 
6.3.1.3 Intervention   
Participants were shown two baskets side by side, one filled with cereal bars and one filled with 
chocolate bars. Depending on the condition, baskets were either labelled as ‘Angelic Chocolate 
Bar” and “Angelic Cereal Bar”, or “Devilish Chocolate Bar” and “Devilish Cereal Bar”. The 
food was individually wrapped in cellophane to remove the original wrapping but keep the food 
presentable and hygienic (see Figure 6.9). 
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a)  
b)  
Figure 6.9. Presentation of food in the A) Devilish condition, and B) Angelic condition. Order presentation was 
counterbalanced.  
 
6.3.1.4 Procedure  
The study was part of a stall run by the Behaviour and Health Research Unit at the University 
of Cambridge Science Festival. The festival took place at the University Technical College in 
Cambridge on the 26th of March 2017. As participants entered the room in which the stall was 
placed, they were asked for their demographics and were then given a sticker with a participant 
number. They then proceeded to work their way through the different tasks and experiments 
set out by the research group, of which the current study was one. At the current study stall 
participants were given a chance to choose one of two food products, bearing one of two label 
types, as a treat to take home. The labels were rotated approximately every 30 minutes 
throughout the day and order of food presentation was counterbalanced. 
   
6.3.1.5 Measures 
Primary observed behavioural outcome: Selection of food type 
The primary outcome was which food the participant selected: chocolate bar or cereal bar.  
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Demographics 
Participants’ age and gender were recorded, as well as their current hunger and thirst levels.   
 
6.3.2 Results 
6.3.2.1 Demographic characteristics  
Due to the non-random allocation of attendees to group, analyses were carried out to assess 
whether gender, age, hunger and thirst were equally distributed across groups. A Chi-squared 
test gave no evidence that gender distribution was different across groups, χ2 (1) = .02, p > .25, 
and an independent t-test showed that participants were of a similar age in both groups, t 
(228.96) = -1.26, p = .21. Furthermore, participants were equally hungry, t (254.19) = -.40, p > 
.25, and thirsty, t (253.06) = -1.61, p = .11, across both groups. Randomisation to groups was 
therefore deemed successful.  
  
6.3.2.2 Primary outcome: Selection of food type 
Hypothesis 1: Participants will be more likely to choose a chocolate than a cereal 
bar  
A chi-squared test of equal proportions showed that attendees were more likely to choose a 
chocolate bar (184) than a cereal bar (92) overall, χ2 (1) = 322.68, OR = 2, p <.001. 
  
Hypothesis 2: The selection of food will be dependent on the label. Participants 
will be more likely to choose a cereal bar when labelled as Angelic than when 
labelled as Devilish and more likely to choose a chocolate bar when labelled as 
Devilish than when labelled as Angelic.  
A Pearson’s Chi-Square with Yates’ continuity correction revealed that selection of food was 
influenced by label, χ2 (1) = 5.91, OR = 1.95, p = .01, such that the choice of snack bar shifted 
towards cereal bars in the Angelic label condition and towards chocolate bars in the Devilish 
condition (see Table 6.12).  
 
Table 6.12 
Contingency table showing the number of participants in each group choosing either a cereal bar or a chocolate bar.  
                          Selection of Food  
Label Cereal count (%) Chocolate count (%) Total 
Angelic 59 (40.14%) 88 (59.86%) 147 
Devilish 33 (25.58%) 96 (74.42%) 129 
Total 92 184 276 
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6.4 Study 7 
Internal Meta-Analysis 
When conducting multiple studies each individual study might not reach conventional levels of 
significance. It is increasingly recommended for researchers to combine the effect sizes of 
multiple studies in an internal meta-analysis to overcome potential problems with statistical 
power in each individual study (Braver, Thoemmes & Rosenthal, 2014; Cumming, 2014; Goh, 
Hall & Rosenthal, 2016; Schimmack, 2012). As such, the effects of interactions and pairwise 
comparisons of the reported desire to consume and perceptions of taste and health from Study 
4 and Study 5 were combined in an internal meta-analysis to assess the overall effect. The 
consumption and selection results of Study 5 and Study 6 were also synthesised into a ‘observed 
behavioural’ outcome (see section 6.4.1.1). The ‘rma’ function from the R package ‘metafor’ 
was used to conduct all meta-analyses apart from the odds ratio for the observed behavioural 
variable which was analysed using the ‘metabin’ function from the R package ‘meta’. A fixed 
effect model was used due to the interventions across studies being very similar and the small 
number of studies included (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein, 2009).  
 
6.4.1 Results 
6.4.1.1 Observed behaviour (selection and consumption)  
To combine the consumption and selection results from Study 5 (continuous) and 6 (binary), 
the consumption variable from Study 5 was dichotomised. Participants who ate more cereal 
than chocolate were coded as preferring cereal, while participants who ate more chocolate than 
cereal were coded as preferring chocolate. For the meta-analysis of the overall odds ratio for 
each study, the log odds ratio was calculated before being combined in the fixed-effects meta-
analysis. To analyse the odds from each cell, Study 5 and 6 were combined using the odds ratio 
and then analysed using the Mantel-Haenszel method of meta-analysis. The results showed 
that overall observed behaviour towards the food was dependent on the label. Participants ate 
or selected an Angelic labelled cereal bar over a Devilish labelled cereal bar. Conversely, 
participants ate or selected a chocolate bar with a Devilish label in comparison to those labelled 
with an Angelic label.  Furthermore, within each label condition, participants preferred cereal 
over chocolate when the label was Angelic, and chocolate over cereal when the label was 
Devilish. Figure 6.10 for the forest plots.  
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a) Interaction between food and label type for the observed behavioural outcome 
 
b) Difference between Angelic cereal and Devilish cereal bars
 
c) Difference between Angelic chocolate and Devilish chocolate bars 
 
d) Difference between cereal and chocolate bars for the Angelic label 
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e) Difference between cereal and chocolate bar for the Devilish label 
 
Figure 6.10. Forest plot of the interaction between food and label type on the observed behavioural outcome for 
food (a) and for Angelic vs Devilish within cereal bars (b) and chocolate bars (c), and cereal and chocolate bars for 
the Angelic (d) and Devilish (e) labels.  
 
6.4.1.2 Self-reported desire  
There was not an overall interaction between food and label type on the self-reported desire to 
consume the food. There was no significant difference between conditions, and within the label 
conditions participants desired chocolate bars more than cereal bars across both labels. See 
Figure 6.11 for forest plots. 
 
a) Interaction between snack type and label type on desire to consume 
 
 
b) Difference between Angelic cereal bar and Devilish cereal bar desire
 
 
 146 
c) Difference between Angelic chocolate and Devilish chocolate desire 
  
 
d) Difference between cereal and chocolate bar desire for Angelic label 
 
 
e) Difference between cereal and chocolate bar desire for Devilish label 
 
Figure 6.11.  Forest plots showing the fixed effect models of the self-reported desire to consume variable across 
Study 4 and Study 5.  
 
 
6.4.1.3 Taste  
For perception of taste, there was an overall significant interaction between food and label type, 
such that participants judged a cereal bar to taste better when labelled as Angelic than when 
labelled as Devilish. A chocolate bar on the other hand was perceived as tastier when labelled 
as Devilish than when labelled as Angelic. Within each label condition, participants perceived 
the taste of cereal bars to be better than chocolate bars in the Angelic condition, and chocolate 
bars to taste better in the Devilish condition. See Figure 6.12 for forest plots.  
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a) Interaction between snack type and label type on perceived tastiness 
 
b) Difference between Angelic cereal and Devilish cereal bar in perceived tastiness
 
c) Difference between Angelic chocolate and Devilish chocolate bar in perceived tastiness 
 
d) Difference between cereal and chocolate bar in perceived tastiness for the Angelic label 
 
e) Difference between cereal and chocolate bar in perceived tastiness for the Devilish label 
 
Figure 6.12. Forest plots showing the fixed effect models of the taste variable across Study 4 and Study 5.   
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6.4.1.4 Healthiness.  
There was not an overall significant interaction between food and label type for perceptions of 
healthiness. However, participants thought Angelic cereal bars were healthier than Devilish 
cereal bars. Within the Angelic label condition, participants thought the cereal bar was 
healthier than the chocolate bar, while in the Devilish label condition, no significant difference 
was found. See Figure 6.13 for forest plots.  
 
 a) Interaction between snack type and label type for perceived healthiness 
 
 
b) Difference between Angelic cereal and Devilish Cereal in perceived healthiness 
 
 
 c) Difference between Angelic chocolate and Devilish chocolate for perceived healthiness 
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d) Difference between cereal and chocolate bar in perceived healthiness for the Angelic label 
 
 
d) Difference between cereal and chocolate bar in perceived healthiness for the Devilish label 
 
Figure 6.13. Forest plots showing the fixed effect models of the health variable across Study 4 and Study 5.  
 
 
6.5 Discussion 
6.5.1 Summary of findings 
Although Study 3 showed that approximately one third of food advertisements in UK women’s 
magazines contain a moral concept, no previous research has examined the impact of 
associating morality with food products on desire, consumption and selection of food. As the 
first study to carry out this investigation, the aims of the current studies were to assess the impact 
of labels with moral (Angelic) and immoral (Devilish) words on self-reported desire and 
observed behaviour for an unhealthy (chocolate bar) and less unhealthy (cereal bar) food type, 
as well as how these labels might influence perceptions of taste, healthiness and other 
characteristics. An internal meta-analysis of the studies found that observed behaviour towards 
food type was influenced by moral label such that participants ate or selected a morally labelled 
cereal bar over an immorally labelled cereal bar. Conversely, participants ate or selected a 
chocolate bar with an immoral label in comparison to those labelled with a moral label. Within 
each label condition, participants ate or selected a cereal bar over a chocolate bar when the 
label was Angelic and ate or selected a chocolate bar over a cereal bar when the label was 
Devilish. Self-reported desire, on the other hand, was not influenced by such an interaction. 
However, an interaction between food and label type for taste emerged such that participants 
perceived a cereal bar to be tastier if it had a moral label and a chocolate bar to be tastier if it 
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had an immoral label. Within each label condition, participants perceived a cereal bar to be 
tastier than a chocolate bar when the label was Angelic and thought a chocolate bar was tastier 
than a cereal bar when the label was Devilish. Although, no overall interaction between label 
and food type was found for judgements of healthiness of the food bar, the results of the meta-
analysis indicated that participants thought Angelic cereal bars were healthier than Devilish 
cereal bars. Within the Angelic label condition, participants thought the cereal bar was 
healthier than the chocolate bar, while in the Devilish label condition, no significant difference 
was found.  
 
In comparison to the moral balance effect seen in Study 2, there was no support for such an 
effect in Studies 4, 5 and 6. Participants did not behave in line with a moral compensation 
effect, with a decrease in desire, choice and consumption of the immorally labelled foods. There 
was also no support for a moral licensing effect, where participants would preferentially desire, 
choose or consume food with a moral label, or believe it to be tastier, healthier or lower in 
calories than an immorally labelled food. Furthermore, there was no support for a moral credits 
theory, where a food item with a moral label would ‘cost fewer credits’ than one labelled with 
an immoral label, and therefore this ‘cheaper’ product could be chosen more often or eaten 
more of. The alternative theory of moral credentials, in which people want to re-establish their 
moral image in the eye of an audience, was not supporter either. Although participants 
consumed the foods while being alone in the room, the experimenter would have observed how 
much they had eaten while picking up the food bowls after the taste test. For the moral 
credentials theory to be supported, participants should have consumed less in the immorally 
labelled condition.   
 
Instead, the results reflect a pattern of congruently labelled items resulting in increased selection 
and consumption, and increased judgements of taste. Healthier food with a moral label was 
increasingly selected and consumed, and perceived as tastier, while the same was found for 
unhealthy food with an immoral label. It is possible that congruently labelled items are 
appealing to participants because they confirm an already present belief, while incongruently 
labelled items could elicit a state of cognitive dissonance where participants would have to 
change an already established association between morality and health (e.g. Mycroft, 2008; 
Spoel et al., 2012). This interpretation is supported by studies showing that people are more 
likely to like items that are presented with extrinsic information which matches their intrinsic 
properties (Okamoto et al., 2009).  
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A possible explanation for the different effects from Study 2 and Studies 4,5 and 6 could be 
that Study 2 presented the participants with moral behaviours, either remembered or enacted, 
in a serial fashion – participants first recalled a memory of a time they ate a large amount of 
food, then they were given the opportunity to help the experimenter. In Studies 4, 5 and 6 
however, participants were presented with the moral information and the food choice 
simultaneously. It has been theorised that the moral balancing effect to some extent relies on 
feelings of guilt to motivate moral compensation (Ding et al., 2016). However, in the current 
studies, participants are unlikely to feel any specific moral emotions because they have not yet 
behaved in either a morally good or bad manner. Instead, it is possible that in a situation in 
which the moral information is displayed simultaneously as the choice is made, anticipated 
moral emotions play a role.  
 
From previous research on emotional consequences of unhealthy food consumption, it has been 
shown that eating chocolate often results in feelings of guilt (e.g. Steenhuis, 2009). Guilt can 
also influence decisions ahead of time through anticipated guilt. Anticipated guilt is the 
judgement an individual might make about how guilty they will feel depending on a choice 
they make (Erlandsson, Jungstrand & Västfjäll, 2016; Steenhaut & Kenhove, 2006). In these 
studies, when participants were primed with high-responsibility messages they rated their 
anticipated guilt as being significantly higher if they decide on the immoral action. In the 
current study, it could be that when participants are shown a moral label (Angelic) they are 
more likely to anticipate the guilt that might come as a consequence of unhealthy food 
consumption and thus eat less of the unhealthy chocolate bar in comparison to the immoral 
(Devilish) chocolate bar. This could be because being primed with ‘Angelic’ sets a standard of 
behaviour that is more moral than that of ‘Devilish’. In contrast, the ‘Angelic’ label may instil 
a larger sense of anticipated pride in participants for choosing the cereal bar over the chocolate 
bar.  
 
Although there was no support for a moral balance effect, the results could be explained by a 
self-licensing effect. For a self-licensing effect to occur, the individual would use any kind of self-
justification to engage in a certain kind of behaviour (de Witt Huberts et al., 2011). In the 
current study, the finding that participants engaged more with a healthier food with a moral 
label and an unhealthy food with an immoral label could be attributed to participants’ 
justification that they are being ‘good’ by eating the healthier food, and ‘being a bit bad’ – 
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maybe a guilty pleasure – by eating the unhealthy food. However, using this logic it is unclear 
why an unhealthy food with a moral label would not also increase consumption and selection, 
but instead decrease it. If a moral label affects consumers perceptions of how ‘good’ they are 
being, the same should apply to an unhealthy food product. To understand further whether 
participants were using such self-justifications in their selection and consumption of the food, 
further research needs to be conducted.  
 
Interestingly, the results showed no effect of labelling on self-reported desire but did influence 
actual behaviour. These findings are in line with the intention-behaviour gap (Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006) reported throughout the literature. More often than not, people’s intentions do 
not predict their actual behaviour. For example, intentions of eating healthy food rarely result 
in a healthy diet (Kumanyika et al., 2000). Self-report measures are often subject to response 
bias. For example, self-reported desire in Study 5 was the opposite to actual behaviour 
(consumption). Participants reported that they desired chocolate more than cereal bars but ate 
more cereal bars than chocolate. However, even though the results on self-reported desire to 
consume did not reach significance, the patterns were in the same direction as the results on 
observed behaviour: congruently labelled food products were reported as more desirable. A 
reason for this discrepancy could be that the effect of moral labels on food occurs outside 
awareness. By asking participants to judge their desire to consume a labelled food product, this 
requires some insight into their own desires, an evaluation that should occur by definition 
within awareness. Moreover, the failure to find that label affected self-reported desire for 
unhealthy and healthier food could be attributed to Study 4 being powered on a different 
measure, perceived taste.  In the study that was used to calculate sample size (Vasiljevic et al., 
2015), no effect on desire to consume was shown.  
 
The results of moral label on perceived taste of the food products mirror the results on selection 
and consumption. It is possible that the change in taste perception drives the behavioural 
effects. If participants perceive the congruently labelled food as tastier than the incongruently 
labelled food, this could increase consumption of the congruently labelled foods. In comparison 
to desire to consume, which was measured before participants tasted any of the foods, taste 
reflects actual changes in participants taste perception. If the effects of moral label on food 
occurs outside of awareness it is possible that measure which do not reflect a conscious 
judgement of the food are affected. Taste perception requires an evaluation of a product, rather 
than insight into own desires. To test whether changes in taste perception is driving the 
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behavioural effects a sufficiently powered moderated mediational experiment could be 
conducted. 
 
The findings have also expanded the research on health halo effects, showing that in 
comparison to labels such as ‘organic’ and ‘fair trade’ (Schuldt et al., 2012; Schuldt & Schwarz, 
2010), moral labels do not influence how healthy food products are thought to be. However, in 
opposition to results showing that organic labels reduce perceived taste (Schuldt & Hannahan, 
2013), the current studies showed that a moral label such as ‘Angelic’ increased perceived 
tastiness. Thus, even though organic products are sometimes advertised using moral concepts 
(such as Divine Organic Chocolate), they are not interchangeable. An organic, or fair-trade 
label can be argued to signal ethical properties inherent in the production of the food item. 
However, from the results reported here it would seem that labelling a food item as ‘Organic’ 
has different effects than labelling it as ‘Angelic’.  
 
Results from Study 5 extended the results of Study 2 and replicated previous findings on 
consumption stereotypes (Vartanian et al., 2007; Stein & Nemeroff 1995) by showing that not 
only do people judge others as having less moral value when eating unhealthy foods (and vice 
versa with healthy foods), but that this judgement also extends to the food product itself and 
the judges themselves. As such, extending the potential moralisation of eating found indirectly 
in Study 2, in Study 5 the link between food and morality was found to be explicit in the minds 
of participants. There was no difference in moral judgments between those seeing the moral 
label and those seeing the immoral label. However, because participants were given the moral 
judgement questions in the absence of the labelled food and asked about food in general, it is 
possible that the answers did not refer to food with moral labels. Thus, even though participants 
viewed chocolate bars as more morally bad and less morally good, they were more likely to pick 
a chocolate bar and to perceive it as tasty. Furthermore, if it had an immoral label on, it’s 
perceived tastiness and behaviour with it increased further. It is possible that the framing of a 
‘Devilish’ chocolate bar further plays to its characterisation as a ‘naughty but nice’ food product 
due to its pleasurable taste but unhealthy nutritional profile (Stirling & Yeomans, 2003) 
 
In terms of the influence of individual differences, Study 5 showed that participants who 
thought morality to be integral to their sense of self consumed less of the ‘Devilish’ chocolate 
bar than those who did not think morality was important. A ‘Devilish’ chocolate bar, a 
particularly immoral food, could have been off-putting to someone with a highly moral identity. 
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Furthermore, participants who scored high in impulsivity were more likely to also judge the 
‘Devilish’ chocolate bar as containing fewer calories. However, the current studies were not 
specifically powered to test for three-way interactions with these individual difference measures. 
As such, any results showing significant three-way interactions should be interpreted with 
caution and require further testing using appropriately-powered studies.  
 
6.5.2 Strengths and limitations 
A strength of the current studies is the range of measures used, from self-report to selection and 
consumption of food, rather than relying on self-report only. Furthermore, the studies sampled 
participants from different populations. 
 
However, there are several limitations to the present research. The results are based on two 
types of food only, cereal and chocolate bars. Although cereal bars are believed to be healthier 
than chocolate bars, they are both high in sugar content. Further research with different types 
of products is required to establish the effect of moral labels on a wider variety of healthy and 
unhealthy foods. Similarly, the two moral labels used, ‘Angelic’ and ‘Devilish’, only reflect 
moral religious concepts. As seen in Chapter 5, a range of moral concepts are used to marked 
food. Therefore, other moral concepts need to be assessed in future research. In Study 5 
participants were mostly drawn from a student population, limiting the generalisability of the 
results to the wider population. It is possible that this population is more health conscious and 
therefore consumed on average more cereal bars than chocolate bars, in comparison to the 
non-student population in Study 6 that were more likely to choose a chocolate bar than a cereal 
bar. However, the non-student population in Study 6 consisted of both children and adults, 
with previous research finding that children are more likely to say they wanted to choose a 
chocolate based over a cereal based food (Bower & Sandall, 2002).  
 
In Studies 5 and 6, participants saw only one label (Angelic or Devilish) but could choose from 
two types of food (cereal bar or chocolate bar), while in Study 4, participants only saw one 
labelled food type. This might have implications for the interpretation of the results. For Studies 
5 and 6, the moral labels provided a context in which participants made a choice about a food 
type, limiting the interpretation of cross label comparison of the same food type. However, the 
results of the meta-analyses are consistent in terms of participants preferring the food that is 
congruent with the moral label. As such, the overall presentation of results remains unchanged. 
Interestingly, no research has to date been published on the impact of a moral context on a 
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‘nonmoral’ decision. The current results could indicate that a moral context would influence a 
healthier choice and an immoral context an unhealthy choice. If the general proposal presented 
here, that unhealthy food consumption is construed as immoral, is accurate, then it follows that 
a moral context will influence ‘moral’ behaviour, and an immoral context will influence 
‘immoral’ behaviour. These suggestions require further examination outside the realm of food. 
 
6.6 Conclusions and the next chapter 
The four studies presented in this chapter provide some evidence that moral labels influence 
both the selection and consumption of healthier food and make them appear tastier, with a 
similar effect evident for immoral labels in relation to unhealthier food. Given this is the first 
set of studies to assess the impact of moral food labels on perception, selection and consumption 
of food products, further research is warranted to replicate the findings reported here and to 
establish the extent to which they generalise across food and label type. The next chapter 
discusses the results of all seven studies in this thesis, in light of the existing literature, the 
strengths and limitations of the studies and future directions for research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
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Despite the abundance of historical and anecdotal evidence linking food, eating and morality, 
very little research has been carried out on this relationship. The overarching aim of this thesis 
was to address this gap by exploring what the consequences of such an association might be. 
As presented in Chapter 2 and reproduced here, Box 2.3 demonstrates how each research 
question relates to the association between morality and eating.  
 
Box 2.3 Graphical representation of how the association between morality and eating has shaped each research question 
 
                                Morality                Eating 
The first research question concerns the association between and the impact of eating behaviour on morality. 
This is addressed in Study 1 and 2. 
 
Morality      Food/eating 
The second research question concerns the prevalence of the association between morality and food/eating. 
This is addressed in Study 3. 
 
           Morality              Food/eating 
   
The third research question concerns the impact of morality on desire for and consumption of food. This is 
addressed in Study 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
 
Specifically, the consequences examined in the work presented here have focused on whether 
moral judgement and behaviour is associated with and impacted by unhealthy eating, and 
whether eating is impacted by morally labelled food products. In addition, the thesis presented 
an investigation into the prevalence of moral concepts in advertising food products. This 
chapter contains a general discussion of the findings presented in this thesis, alongside their 
implications. It starts by summarising the main findings from each empirical chapter, before 
discussing how the findings address the research questions set out in Chapter 1. Then, it goes 
on to discuss strengths and limitations of the thesis as a whole before exploring future directions. 
The chapter closes by presenting the conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the 
thesis. 
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7.1 Overview of findings 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the consequences of a moralisation of eating. Seven 
studies addressed this aim through three research questions:  
 
1. Do people compensate morally for unhealthy eating behaviours?  
 
2. How prevalent is the tendency to associate morality with eating and food?  
 
3. What is the impact on self-reported desire and behaviour of associating moral terms 
with food?  
 
The first research question concerned how eating behaviour might be associated with or 
impacts on moral judgement and behaviour. Study 1 presented in Chapter 3 tested whether 
there was an association between chocolate consumption and moral judgement. The results 
revealed that the more chocolate participants ate during their study session, the more lenient 
their judgements of other people’s moral transgressions were, and vice versa. Alternatively, the 
more lenient participants were, the more chocolate they ate. Participants’ tendency to restrain 
their food intake was not a moderating factor. This result indicates that eating behaviours and 
moral judgements are either directly related or are both related to a common third variable. 
 
To further explore the association between morality and eating, Study 2, presented in Chapter 
4, used an experimental approach. Participants were given a chance to help the experimenter 
after recalling either an overeating episode or a control memory.  Participants who recalled an 
episode in which they ate a lot of food helped the experimenter for significantly longer than 
those who recalled a control memory. The increased prosociality after recalling an overeating 
memory mirrors a similar pattern of behaviour after moral transgressions, namely moral 
compensation. This could suggest that participants might be perceiving their past eating 
behaviour as a transgression that requires subsequent repenting.  
 
The second research question was explored in Study 3, presented in Chapter 5. Here, food, 
non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplement advertisements (here forth food advertisements 
unless otherwise stated) were extracted from UK women’s magazines for June 2002, 2007, 
2012 and 2017, and examined for presence of a moral concept. Across the fifteen-year period, 
approximately one third of food advertisements contained a moral concept. There was no 
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significant change between the years, between food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional 
supplement advertisements or between magazine types. Both the healthiness of the advertised 
product rated by a group of participants (subjective) and as categorised based on nutritional 
profile (objective) were unrelated to the use of moral concept overall. However, when only 
advertisement containing a moral concept were analysed, it was found that less healthy 
products (as identified both subjectively and objectively) were more likely to contain an immoral 
theme.  
 
The third research question was explored across Studies 4, 5, 6 and 7, presented in Chapter 6. 
Here an unhealthy (chocolate bar) or healthier (cereal bar) food item was labelled with either a 
label denoting moral goodness (‘Angelic’) or moral badness (‘Devilish’). Participants were asked 
to report their desire for the food online (Study 4), both report their desire and consume the 
food in the laboratory (Study 5), or select the food in a field setting (Study 6). An internal meta-
analysis (Study 7) showed that the type of label had no effect on participants’ self-reported desire 
for either food type. However, the combined observed behaviour (selection and consumption) 
towards the food items was impacted by moral label type: when a food had a moral label 
congruent with its healthiness (e.g. ‘Angelic’ cereal bar and ‘Devilish’ chocolate bar), people 
were more likely to select and consume it. 
 
7.2 Discussion of the research questions 
7.2.1 Do people compensate morally for unhealthy eating behaviours? 
The first question asked whether people compensate morally for their unhealthy eating 
behaviour. Moral compensation occurs when people carry out an act perceived as ‘good’ 
following an act perceived as ‘bad’. Research on moral self-regulation has found that when 
participants have engaged in unethical acts, such as harming a person, they tend to behave 
more ethically thereafter to compensate for their transgressions (e.g. Carlsmith & Gross, 1968; 
Ding et al, 2016; Jordan et al., 2016). Feeling morally superior through physical cleansing can 
also influence how wrong other people’s transgressions are perceived to be (Zhong et al., 2010). 
If people construe unhealthy eating practices as immoral, then engaging in them should also 
lead to a similar pattern of moral judgement and behaviour. Consistent with this position, the 
results from Study 1 and 2 show that participants’ unhealthy eating behaviour is indeed related 
to their moral judgement and subsequent moral behaviour. In Study 1, the more chocolate 
participants ate, the less harshly they judged other people’s wrong doings. In Study 2, 
participants remembering a time they overate subsequently spent longer time helping the 
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experimenter. Thus, unhealthy or remembered unhealthy food consumption has consequences 
in line with immoral acts. However, several questions remain unanswered.  
 
First, it is unclear what the driving forces behind this moral compensation are. Results from 
Study 5 show that participants think that chocolate bars are more morally bad and less morally 
good than cereal bars. But whether they make this assessment during the time of consumption 
is unknown. An alternative explanation could be that eating unhealthily can for some people 
trigger feelings of guilt. Unhealthy eating behaviours have been shown to trigger feelings of 
guilt in women in particular (Dewberry & Ussher, 1994; Nowak & Speare, 1996; Rozin, 
Fischler, Imada, Sarubin, & Wrzesniewski, 1999), and guilt is involved in people’s motivation 
to do good after having done bad (Tangney et al., 2007). Previous research using an unhealthy 
eating recall manipulation (Schei et al, submitted; Sheikh et al., 2013) have also shown 
increased feelings of guilt after being asked to consider their last overconsumption episode. As 
such, guilt could be involved in the moral compensation seen in Study 2, but this remains to be 
examined directly. To do so a measurement of guilt could be administered between the recall 
task and the helping measure in a similar design to Schei and colleagues (submitted) and Sheikh 
and colleagues (2013). However, to improve upon the previous designs, an implicit measure of 
guilt could be used in order to circumvent the issues relating to drawing attention to emotional 
states (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
 
For the relationship between chocolate consumption and moral judgement in Study 1, both 
guilt and potentially pride might be involved. Zhong and colleagues (2010) found that 
participants who had been physically or visually cleansed - as a proxy for moral purity - were 
harsher in their judgement of others moral transgressions. They also had an inflated moral self, 
akin to pride. Thus, it is possible that both guilt and pride are in part driving the observed 
relationship, on separate ends of the chocolate consumption spectrum. This could be tested by 
conducting an experiment in which participants either recalled a time they ate a large amount 
of food (similar to Study 2), or the amount consumed was directly manipulated. This could be 
done either through successful implementation of the portion size effect (Hollands et al. 2015) 
or by instructing participants to eat a certain amount. However, it is possible that if participants 
are told how much to eat by the experimenter, rather than choosing how much to eat 
themselves, their personal intention might be diminished and thus less guilt or pride could be 
experienced. 
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Second, previous research has also found that after recalling an overeating event, women 
participants spend more time causing themselves pain, than those recalling a neutral event 
(Schei et al., submitted). Study 2 extended this research by showing that recalling an overeating 
event also led to increased prosociality. Taken together, recalled overeating affects later 
compensation through both self-punishment and prosociality, two strategies found elsewhere 
in the moral compensation literature (e.g. Bastian et al., 2011; Carlsmith & Gross, 1968; Ding 
et al, 2016; Jordan et al., 2016). However, it is unclear under what circumstances someone 
might choose to self-punish or to become prosocial. In comparison to most other moral 
transgressions, unhealthy eating behaviour does not directly harm anyone else. As such, the self 
is both the perpetrator and the victim. It is possible that if given the choice, this might drive the 
individual to seek repentance in a certain manner that involves the self rather than others. 
However, no previous research has explored this distinction and what might drive prosociality 
over self-punishment as a compensation strategy.  
 
Third, it is possible that gender is a significant contributor to moral compensation after 
unhealthy eating practices. Study 2 and the previous study showing increased self-punishment 
after recalled overeating (Schei et al., submitted) both tested women students only. Previous 
research has found that women on average feel guiltier about food than men do (e.g. Dewberry 
& Ussher, 2001; Nowak & Speare, 1996; Rozin et al., 1999), are more likely to be on a diet 
(e.g. Dewberry & Ussher, 2001; Markey & Markey, 2005), and those who are on a diet are even 
more likely to feel guilty about food (Dewberry & Ussher, 2001). Research has also found that 
there are some gender differences in helping (see Espinosa & Kovářík, 2015 for a review). 
Furthermore, Sheikh et al., (2013) found that only women showed an increased accessibility of 
cleaning-related words, such as ‘soap’, ‘wash’ and ‘shower’ after a similar overeating recall. 
Taken together, this could mean that women are more likely to morally compensate for 
unhealthy eating behaviours than men, but this needs to be explored further by extended future 
research to include male participants. In sum, the results of Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence 
for a tendency to morally compensate for unhealthy eating behaviours.  
Fourth, the results of Study 2 can be used to differentiate between the two separate theories of 
moral balance: moral credits theory and moral credentials theory. In Study 2, participants 
completed their memory recall while alone in the room, and their written recall was 
anonymised. As such, it is unlikely that they felt they had lost moral credentials in the eyes of 
the experimenter and needed to regain them by helping for longer. Instead, the results are more 
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in line with the moral credits theory, which represents an internal moral balance in the form of 
moral bank credits that can be depleted by a moral transgression and filled up again by being 
virtuous.  
7.2.2 How prevalent is the tendency to associate morality with eating and food? 
The second research question asked what is the prevalence of associating morality with eating 
and food. A common method to survey cultural trends is through the inspection and analysis 
of advertisements (Dyer, 2015). Griffin and Berry (2003) and Kilbourne (1994) carried out 
qualitative analyses of how morality was used in a select few food advertisements, and found 
that unhealthy food was often presented as immoral with Christian imagery of ‘sin’, while the 
advertised diet version of the unhealthy product was sold as the ‘salvation’. Despite advertising 
agencies using morality to sell products, no other research has been conducted on the use and 
prevalence of this practice.  Study 3 addressed this lack by examining a series of UK women’s 
magazines over a 15-year period. The results showed that moral concepts were present in 
approximately one third of food, non-alcoholic drink and nutritional supplement 
advertisements (here forth referred to as ‘food advertisements’ unless otherwise specified). The 
majority of ads used concepts of moral goodness over moral badness. Furthermore, no 
difference in use of moral concepts was found over years sampled. However, there are several 
outstanding areas of investigation.   
 
First, Study 3 only examined women’s magazine advertisements in the UK. It is therefore 
unclear whether the findings can be extended to advertisements in magazines outside of the 
UK. Considering cultural variations in moral concerns (e.g. Haidt & Jospeh, 2004), it is possible 
that the frequency of use and moral themes might differ from place to place. Women’s 
magazines in the UK might also differ from women’s magazines in other countries. For 
example, results of comparative content analyses (Frith, Cheng & Shaw, 2014; Maynard & 
Taylor, 1999) have shown that in relation to US women’s magazines, Singaporian, Taiwaneese 
and Japanese women’s magazines often portray the local women as demurer and more 
innocent in comparison to western women who are often portrayed as sensual. These 
differences in values could impact the use of moral advertising when relying on portrayals of 
unhealthy food consumption as engaging in an illicit or ‘naughty’ activity.  
 
Furthermore, what makes up the cultural landscape extends far beyond magazine 
advertisements.  As discussed in Chapter 5, qualitative research has found that moral language 
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is used in some weight management support groups (Mycroft, 2008). This could be further 
explored by examining how widespread this tendency is and whether it hinders weight 
management success. Moreover, other avenues could be explored in terms of how they differ 
from advertising in their use of moral concepts related to food. For example, how do outlets 
that do not have a specific commercial aim to sell products present food? Are they taking 
advantage of what they already know is an established link?  Do journalists and blogs discuss 
food in a different way to advertising companies? What about usage in spoken rather than 
written language? There is some indication that moral language is evoked when journalists 
discuss certain aspects of food such as diet and health fads (e.g. Holland, 2018, Wilson 2017, 
Wiseman, 2018) but little is known about the degree to which this occurs.  As such, future 
investigations could examine the presence of moral concepts in the way journalists and bloggers 
discuss and present food.   
 
Second, Study 3 only examined use of moral concepts associated with food in women’s 
magazine advertisements during a 15-year period. During this time, no change was observed. 
However, it is possible that there has been changes over a longer time-period or in different 
mediums. Alternatively, the longstanding association between morality, the body and food as 
seen in early writings such as the Ancient Greeks might mean that the frequency at which food 
is associated with morality is less susceptible to change.  
 
Third, although Study 4, 5, 6 investigated the impact of moral labels on food, it is still unclear 
how an advertisement that includes both pictures and text, rather than a stripped-down label, 
may affect consumers. It is possible that the richness of the advert, which can carry further 
meaning beyond a single label, is more or less persuasive. As such, a future study could be 
carried out using actual food advertisements on a variety of outcomes, such as desire and actual 
consumption. 
 
In sum, the results of Study 3 suggested that the tendency to associate moral concepts with food 
products is common in food advertisements found in women’s magazines in the UK. 
 
7.2.3 What is the impact on self-reported desire and observed behaviour of 
associating moral terms with food? 
The third research question asked how associating moral terms with food can affect people’s 
desire for food and how it affects their selection and consumption of it.  Research on labels such 
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as ‘organic’ and ‘fair-trade’ have shown that these ethical claims make the products appear 
healthier or lower in calories than they are (Schuldt et al., 2013; Schuldt & Schwarz, 2010). As 
an extension of this work, Study 4, 5 and 6 found that using labels indicating both ‘moral’ 
(Angelic) and ‘immoral’ (Devilish) concepts had similar but more complex influences on the 
labelled food. These studies utilised both a label hypothesised to have a health halo effect – 
Angelic – as well as an immoral label – Devilish – the effects of which no previous research 
could predict. In addition, this research also extended the previous work by manipulating 
healthiness of the two types of food: an unhealthy chocolate bar and a healthier cereal bar. By 
the inclusion of two levels of healthiness, the design could test for an interaction between ‘moral’ 
and ‘immoral’, and ‘unhealthy’ and ‘healthier’.  
 
In comparison to the available evidence of health halo labels, the findings show that when a 
moral label is paired with a healthier food, and an immoral label is paired with an unhealthy 
food, people are more likely to consume or choose it. This is in line with the idea that health is 
seen as something moral, while unhealthy is seen as immoral (see Chapter 2 for an overview), 
and that congruent pairings increase liking and selection (Litvin & Kar, 2004; Sirgy, 1982). 
What these findings also indicate is that people might indeed equal health with morality and 
unhealthy with immorality, and that this association can have both positive and negative 
consequences for healthy eating behaviour. It is possible that using concepts of morality such 
as ‘Angelic’ can persuade people to make a healthier food selection, either by increasing 
selection of a healthier food or decreasing selection of an unhealthy food. It is unclear at this 
stage, however, whether other moral terms might have similar effects and with other types of 
foods.  Furthermore, it would also be necessary to test the effect of food labels under more 
naturalistic conditions than the lab or a selection presented as part of a science festival. It is 
possible that pairing moral labels with food only shows an effect if the choice is only between 
two (unhealthy and healthier) options.  
 
From the results of the internal meta-analysis reported in Study 7, there was a distinction 
between effects of moral label on self-reported measures and observed behavioural measures. 
Participants did not indicate that they desired to eat the food any differently depending on 
label, but when they were faced with an opportunity to engage with the food item (by 
consuming or selecting it), moral label significantly affected whether they engaged with the 
healthy or unhealthy food. This would indicate that either participants are not reporting their 
true desires, or the effects of moral label occurs outside of the participants’ awareness in line 
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with predictions from a dual-process theory (e.g. Strack & Deutch, 2004). It is possible that if 
these effects occur outside of awareness they require fewer cognitive resources. This might 
mean that people who have weaker regulatory systems or who are experiencing high 
cognitive load might be especially prone to the influence of moral labelling. In a study 
examining the role of cognitive resources on an environmental ‘nudge’ on eating behaviours 
– the proximity of the food – found no effect of available resources (Hunter, Hollands, 
Couturier & Marteau, 2018). However, it is possible that labelling might be affected 
differently, but there is limited evidence regarding the effect of state cognitive resources on 
the impact of food labelling. Further research could be carried out on whether the influence 
of moral labels on food behaviour occurs in an automatic fashion outside of awareness, and 
thus potentially explained by a dual-process theory. This could be done by manipulating 
cognitive load while participants are exposed to morally labelled food. In sum, the results of 
Studies 4, 5, 6 and 7 showed that people are not more likely to desire, but are more likely to 
engage with – i.e. consume or select -  food types that have congruent moral labels. 
 
7.3 Strengths and limitations of the thesis 
Specific strengths and limitations of each study have been presented and discussed in each 
empirical chapter (Chapters 3 to 6). However, there are some strengths and limitations of the 
thesis as a whole, which will be presented here. A strength of the thesis is the broad set of 
questions investigated. Several aspects of the link between morality and eating has been 
explored, which demonstrated that the link might have far reaching consequences, from 
judgemental, to perceptual and behavioural. However, this strength is also a limitation. Due to 
several aspects being examined, in-depth research was limited. The aim of the thesis was to 
explore consequences of the link, and thereby attention was not given to the specific processes 
that might be involved, such as the role of moral emotions discussed previously. 
 
The studies in this thesis were all carried out with different populations, and often in different 
settings (from online, to lab- and field-based). Study 1 used a student sample, Study 2 a women-
only student sample, Study 4 was a nationally representative sample, Study 5 used a student 
and local community sample while Study 6 used a convenience sample consisting of both local 
community adults and children. Different samples will also likely have different levels of 
experience. The sample in Study 4 was recruited by a research agency, which indicates that 
the participants regularly take part in online studies. As such, it is unclear whether any one of 
the findings were dependent on the sample and whether they would extend to other 
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populations.  For Study 4, 5 and 6, the experiments were sufficiently similar to qualify for a 
meta-analysis, thereby giving an overall effect across the populations. However, this effect could 
be different than if only one population was used. As such, for the first two studies, replications 
need to be conducted to establish the reliability of the effects in the same population and their 
generalisability more broadly.  
 
7.4 Future directions 
As presented in Chapter 2, moral concerns differ from group to group (Shweder et al., 1984; 
1993; 1997). The current set of studies were all conducted in the UK, with participants who 
were either born or live within this country. That means the findings presented here can only 
be used to extrapolate about one culture. Another culture is likely to have its own view on the 
relationship of food to morality, which may affect whether unhealthy food is considered 
immoral, how morality would be used in food marketing and what the effects of moral labelling 
might be. For example, it is possible that other food products have a moral tint rather than the 
unhealthy eating of Western cultures. Furthermore, the moral labels used in Studies 4-7 were 
all related to Christianity (‘Angelic’ and ‘Devilish’) and is likely to not hold the same 
connotations in other predominantly non-Christian societies. As such, further research would 
benefit from examining whether the association between morality and eating is present in other 
cultures, and if so how what the consequences of such an association might be. As a first step, 
this could be done by conducting the studies presented here with participants from a different 
culture, but using appropriate alternatives to Christian terms.  
 
Non-clinical samples were used in this thesis to investigate the relationship between morality 
and eating. However, in several theoretical works on eating disorders (e.g. Bordo, 2003; 
Chernin, 1985; Fallon, Katzman, & Wooley, 1994; Skårderud, 1991) morality has been used 
to interpret and understand the meaning of eating disorders. Echoing descriptions of the ‘holy 
anorexic’ as discussed in Chapter 2, the modern anorexic uses similar metaphors of purity 
(Skårderud, 2007) and discourse replete with moral content (Giles, 2006). Furthermore, as 
discussed previously, moral emotions such as guilt and shame are common within the eating 
disorder population (e.g, Cartwright & Stritzke, 2008; Sassaroli, Bertelli, Decoppi, Crosina, 
Milos & Ruggiero, 2005), and even just thinking about eating the forbidden food is seen as 
morally wrong (Shafron, Teachman, Kerry & Rachman, 1999). Individuals with eating 
disorders also describe putting the need of others in front of their own (e.g. Buchholz, 
Henderson, Hounsell, Wagner, Norris & Spettigue, 2007; Hambrook et al., 2011), an arguably 
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moral quality similar to prosociality. Despite such work, little has been done to investigate the 
role of morality in the development and maintenance of eating disorders. Extending the 
research in Chapter 3 and 4, an avenue for future research could be whether individuals with 
eating disorders are more likely to judge others and themselves more harshly or use moral 
behaviours to compensate for eating in what they perceive to be a ‘wrong’ way. This 
behavioural pattern could be maintained by increasing negative feelings of guilt (Shafran, 
1999).  
 
This thesis only studied a small possible subset of potential consequences of moralisation of 
eating. Beyond the further directions of specific aspects discussed in the previous sections, more 
work is required to understand the process of eating moralisation in the first place. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, Rozin (1999) argues that an entity can become moralised by piggybacking onto 
another already moralised entity or by creating a new moral category. As such, there are two 
aspects of the moralisation process related to food that is yet to be examined. First, its relation 
to other moralised entities can be explored. Study 1 made some preliminary indications that 
chocolate consumption was related to transgressions of moral concerns from Haidt’s Care and 
Fairness foundations above the other foundations. This could suggest that the moralisation of 
eating is piggybacking onto Care and Fairness concerns. However, many aspects of the 
moralisation of health (Brandt & Rozin, 1999), which is likely related to the moralisation of 
eating, seem to be closer to purity concerns, such as contamination fears and ideas relating to 
‘treating your body as a temple’.  Second, although morality has been linked with food for a 
long time, it is unclear how an individual move from viewing food and eating as a neutral entity 
to it having a moral tint. There is some evidence showing that certain emotions, such as disgust, 
can moralise a neutral object or situation (Landy, 2015) Does it happen through an emotional 
association, as is argued in relation to the role of disgust? Alternatively, it is possible that 
repeated exposure to food associated with moral terms might aid individual moralisation.  
 
The majority of hypotheses formation in this thesis was built on the moral balance effect. 
Although there have been two theories that have gone some way to explain this effect, there is 
still a general lack of theory within this field. As a result, this thesis did not specifically aim to 
build or inform an existing theory. Future research could directly test the role of moral credits 
and credentials in how people make eating choices, by for example manipulating the presence 
of an audience.  
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7.4 Conclusions 
The broad conclusion of the research presented in this thesis is that linking morality and eating 
has perceptual, judgemental and behavioural consequences. The findings show that eating and 
food is not perceived as a neutral entity but when unhealthy eating behaviour is engaged with, 
it is associated with changes in moral judgement and how much help is given to another person. 
Furthermore, the evidence also shows that associating morality with food is common, with 
approximately a third of sampled advertisements using morality to present their product. 
Isolating the label and food from the advert, the evidence showed that labelling a food with 
either a moral term denoting good or bad has different effects on how people respond to 
unhealthy and healthier food. Labelling food with these moral terms did not influence self-
reported desire of the food. But when the healthiness of the food and moral goodness or badness 
of the label were congruent, people were more likely to select or consume the food. This 
distinction between self-report (of desire) and behaviour (to select or consume) suggests that the 
effects of moral terms are outside of people’s awareness, requiring elucidation in future studies. 
The research presented here has provided the first steps towards understanding how the long-
standing link between morality and eating might impact how we relate to and behave towards 
food. In addition to replicating the current studies to assess their reliability using wider ranges 
of food and participants, the wider impact of the consequences remains to be understood, both 
for moral judgement and behaviour and eating behaviour. In that way, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between morality and eating can be developed. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 5.1 
Using the categorisation by Pechey et al. (2013) as a guide (see Table 8.1), each individual 
food product was categorised as either healthier, neutral or less healthy.  
 
Figure 8.1  
Healthiness food categories used by Pechey et al. (2013) 
Sweet snacks/puddings 
Unhealthy 
Margarines/cooking oils 
Low-fibre bread products 
Processed meats 
Savoury snacks 
Chocolate/confectionery 
High-fat cheese 
Butter/animal fats 
Regular pasta/rice 
High-energy drinks 
Processed potato 
Low-fibre cereals 
High-fat milk 
Less healthy ready meals 
High-fat dairy (e.g. cheese) 
High-energy soups 
High-energy sauces 
Carcass meats/poultry 
Neutral 
Morning goods 
Other lean protein 
Canned/dried fruit 
Spreads/condiments 
Dairy drinks 
Non-alcoholic beer 
High-fibre cereals 
Healthier 
Fresh fruit 
Vegetables 
Legumes 
Healthier ready meals 
Low-fat milk 
Potatoes 
High-fibre bread products 
Juice 
Low-fat cheese 
Low-energy sauces 
Low-energy drinks 
Brown pasta/rice 
Low-energy soups 
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Appendix 5.2 
The coding scheme developed in Chapter 5 resulted in 39 different themes (see Table 8.2) 
 
Table 8.2 
Overview of each text and image coding category by moral and immoral themes 
Moral goodness themes Moral badness themes 
Text Imagery Text Imagery 
Love/Care Love/Care Illicit activity Illicit activity 
Authority/Tradition Halo Proscription  
Good Wings Devil  
Goodness Heaven Naughty  
In line with nature Wings Giving in to temptation  
Making a difference Ingroup imagery (e.g. flag) Wicked  
On track Angel Sinful  
Angel/God/Saint  Guilty  
Elevated  Bad  
Guilt-Free  Indulgence  
Heaven/Paradise    
Divine    
Ingroup superiority    
Bliss    
Doing good work    
Being a better person    
Clean/pure    
Ethical    
Proper    
Freedom/Liberty    
The right thing    
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Appendix 6.1 
Moral word pairs were constructed by first brainstorming moral terms and then using a 
dictionary and thesaurus expand the sample of word pairs (see Table 8.3) Seven participants 
with knowledge of moral psychology then voted on which word pairs they thought were both 
appealing and credible. Unless the word was already associated with a food product (e.g. 
innocent, honest, divine), the word pairs that received six or more votes were included in the 
final sample of pairs. 
 
Table 8.3 
Word pairs with moral and immoral connotations 
care /harm votes fairness /cheating votes 
kind mean 2 fair unfair 3 
gentle brutal 3 innocent guilty 6 
safe unsafe/dangerous 2 selfless selfish 1 
empathic selfish 1 proper improper 2 
altruistic selfish 2 blameless blameworthy 3 
scrupulous careless 2 lawful lawless 2 
    just unjust 2 
    honest dishonest/insincere/deceitful 6 
    honourable dishonourable 3 
    legitimate illegitimate 4 
      
loyalty /betrayal votes authority /subversion votes 
loyalty betrayal 4 respectable disrespectable 1 
honour dishonour 5 submissive rebellious 4 
faithful unfaithful 4 obey defy 5 
devoted disloyal 3 obedient disobedient/rebellious 4 
trustworthy shifty/untrustworthy 3      
 
sanctity /degradation votes other: moral other: immoral votes 
noble ignoble 3 moral/ immoral 6 
divine mortal/devilish 7 obedient/nice naughty 6 
sacred wicked 7 ethical unethical 5 
sacred profane/wicked 4 conscious blasé 4 
purification pollution 3 praiseworthy blameworthy/disgraceful 3 
pure impure/dirty 5 worthy unworthy 4 
virtuous vicious 5 proud ashamed 3 
virtue vice 6     
righteous wicked/sinful 4     
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saintly sinful 7     
angelic devilish 8     
godly demonic 4     
heavenly hellish 4     
holy sinful/irreligious 5     
blessed cursed 5     
wholesome unwholesome 3     
chaste promiscuous 3     
untainted tainted 2     
modest immodest 3     
decent indecent/obscene 2      
proper improper 3     
shameless shameful 4     
spiritual sensual 6     
good evil 1     
restrained decadent 5     
temperance gluttonous 2     
 
A pilot study was devised in which a convenience sample of 119 participants (age M = 27.98, 
SD = 12.37, 69.74% women) each rated ten labelled cereal bars and ten labelled chocolate 
bars. Participants rated how credible they thought the label was on a VAS scale from 1-100, 
and how appealing they thought the label was on a scale from 1-6. To find the most credible 
and appealing word pair, the four different snack bar/label combinations for each label pair 
(moral label cereal bar, immoral label cereal bar, moral label chocolate bar, immoral label 
chocolate bar) were averaged separately for credibility and appeal. The results showed that 
participants thought the Angelic/Devilish label combination was both most credible and most 
appealing (see Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2). 
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Figure 8.1. Credibility ratings across moral label pairs. Error bars are 95% CIs. 
 
Figure 8.2. Appeal ratings across moral label pairs. Error bars are 95% CIs. 
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Appendix 6.2  
In Study 4, Chapter 6, the model predicting Desire to Consume from an interaction between 
label and food type was found to have a bimodal residual distribution (see Figure 8.3). 
 
 
Desire to consume 
Figure 8.3. Bimodal residual frequency distribution of the model predicting desire to consume 
from label and food type. 
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Appendix 6.3 
For Study 4 in Chapter 6, hunger was significantly different between groups. As such 
sensitivity analyses was carried out. The results did not change the interpretation of the data 
(see Table 8.2).  
 
Table 8.2 
Sensitivity analysis results of ANOVAs for the Study 4 primary outcome (Desire to Consume) and secondary outcomes (Tastiness, 
Healthiness and Calories) by Food, Label, RE and MI controlling for Hunger.  
Predictor F df p η2p 
   Desire to Consume     
      Food 18.08 1, 700 <.001 .02 
      Label .34 2, 700 .71 .001 
      Food*Label 2.63 2, 700 .07 .01 
      Food*Label*RE .16 2, 707 .85 .003 
      Food*Label*MI .48 2, 707 .62 <.001 
  Tastiness     
      Food .28 1, 718 .60 .0001 
      Label 1.25 2, 718 .29 .003 
      Food*Label 5.57 2, 718 .004 .02 
      Food*Label*RE .44 2, 712 .44 .001 
      Food*Label*MI 1.49 2, 712 .23 .004 
  Healthiness     
      Food 65.04 1, 718 <.001 .06 
      Label 1.50 2, 718 .22 .003 
      Food*Label 4.27 2, 718 .01 .01 
      Food*Label*RE .83 2, 712 .44 002 
      Food*Label*MI 1.45 2, 712 .24 .004 
  Calories     
      Food 5.68 1, 718 .02 .007 
      Label .46 2, 718 .63 .001 
      Food*Label .57 2, 718 .57 .002 
      Food*Label*RE .83 2, 712 .44 .002 
      Food*Label*MI 1.45 2, 712 .24 .004 
Note. RE = Restrained Eating, MI = Moral Identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 200 
Appendix 6.4 
Unlucky randomisation process for the pilot of food consumption as a consequence of moral label type.  
 
For the pilot study, 29 participants were exposed to either ‘Angelic’ (n = 15) or ‘Devilish’ (n = 
14) labels and measured their intake of healthier cereal bars and unhealthy chocolate bars 
(within participants factor).  
 
The results showed that participants ate more of ‘Devilish’ bars overall (see Figure 8.4). 
However, examining the characteristics of participants in each group (‘Angelic’ group vs 
‘Devilish’ group) showed that Weight, BMI and SES differed between groups (see Figure 8.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4. Boxplot of intake of healthy cereal bars and unhealthy chocolate bars when exposed to either 
‘Angelic’ or ‘Devilish’ labels.  
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Figure 8.5. Boxplot of participants characteristics across label groups. P-values of equality of location (or 
proportion) tests are shown below the title of each plot.  
 
 
A mixed linear model of the food intake was conducted with different predictors including 
both the label types and the participants characteristics. The results showed that label types 
were not significant predictors, while Gender, Age and BMI were (see Table 8.3). From this it 
was gather that the difference in food intake between the moral labels was a result of an 
unlucky randomisation process.  
 
Table 8.3.  
Mixed linear model with fixed and random effects of the mean intake of food as predicted by moral label type and participants 
characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
Note. The intercept corresponds to the log of the average food intake for the cereal bar group. Sum contrasts 
were used for the variable ‘Gender’ and ‘Morality’. The variable ‘Hunger’, ‘BMI’ and ‘Age’ were standardised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 202 
Appendix 6.5 
For Study 5 in Chapter 6, the secondary outcome measures of taste, health, calories and 
WTP were interspersed between filler items for the taste test section of the study. The filler 
items are presented below.  
 
 
DURING TASTING 
 
 
How tasty is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
 
How pleasant do you think the taste of this chocolate bar is? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
 
How sweet is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
 
How fruity is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
How earthy does this chocolate bar taste? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
How bitter is this chocolate bar? 
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Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
 
 
How salty is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
How strong is the aroma of this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
How flavourful is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
Where in your mouth do you experience the flavour bar? 
 
 
Back of the mouth   Tip of the 
tongue 
 
 
 
How sticky is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
How chewy is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
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How healthy is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
 
 
How nutritious is this chocolate bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
 
How much fibre do you think this chocolate contains bar? 
 
 
Not at all   Very much so 
 
 
 
 
How many calories do you think ONE BAR of this chocolate contains?  
 
 
Please enter your estimate here: _____________________ 
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As a reference point, the following chocolate bar contains 215 calories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the highest amount of money you would be willing to pay for ONE 
BAR of this chocolate? 
 
 
Please indicate the amount in £, p: ___________________________ 
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Appendix 6.6 
For Study 6 in Chapter 6, ethnicity was found to be unequally distributed across groups. A 
sensitivity analysis was carried out in which ethnicity was controlled for in all of the statistical 
analyses. Including ethnicity did not change the interpretation of the data (See Table 8.4). 
 
Table 8.4 
Sensitivity analysis results of LMMs for the primary outcome (Consumption) and secondary outcomes (Desire to Consume, 
Tastiness, Healthiness, Calories and Willingness-to-Pay [WTP]), controlling for Ethnicity. 
Predictor β SE df t p d 95% CIs 
   Consumption        
      Food -.48 .09 197 - 5.06 <.001 .70 -.67, -.29 
      Label -.11 .13 318.40 -.90 .37 .12 -.36, .13 
      Food*Label .21 .13 197 1.60 .11 .22 -.05, .47 
   Desire to Consume        
      Food .35 .08 197.40 4.48 <.001 .62 .20, .51 
      Label .04 .10 347.70 .39 .70 .05 -.15, .22 
      Food*Label -.08 .11 197 -.70 .48 .09 -.30, .14 
  Tastiness        
      Food .02 .08 196.50 .28 .78 .04 -.13, .19 
      Label -.07 .09 369.20 -.84 .40 .12 -.25, .10 
      Food*Label .11 .11 197 .99 .32 .14 -.11, .33 
  Healthiness        
      Food -.97 .08 197 -12.61 <.001 .51 -1.12, -.82 
      Label .12 .09 353.70 1.28 .20 .17 -.06, .29 
      Food*Label -.03 .27 197 -.11 .91 .02 -.26, .16 
  Calories        
      Food .71 .19 197 3.69 <.001 .56 .33, 1.09 
      Label -.42 .34 262.18 -1.25 .21 .26 -1.07, .23 
      Food*Label -.03 .27 197 -.12 .90 .02 -.57, .51 
   WTP        
      Food -.01 .02 197 -.61 .55 .08 -.05, .02 
      Label -.01 .03 254.92 -.25 .80 .03 -.07, .05 
      Food*Label .01 .03 197 .24 .81 .03 -.04, .06 
Note. The following variables were transformed before being entered into the model: Consumption (cube-
rooted), Desire to Consume (square-rooted), Tastiness (square-rooted), Healthiness (square-rooted) and 
Calories (square-rooted). The reference categories are as follows: Snack (Cereal Bar) and Label (Angelic). 
 
 
 
 
